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ABSTRACT
The 2001 United Nations World Conference against Racism (WCAR) was one of the
most controversial United Nations events of the post-Cold War era. Major issues on the
agenda included the Middle East, the question of reparations for the transatlantic slave
trade and colonialism, and the rights of indigenous peoples. Utilizing interviews with
government and non-governmental actors as well as archival material, this dissertation
examines Canada’s preparations for, and participation at, the WCAR as a case study to
explore key theoretical debates about the Canadian foreign policy-making process. At the
international level, Canada was an active participant during the multilateral negotiations
in advance of the conference and at the conference itself. Drawing on the literature
examining Canada as either a middle power, a satellite state or a principal power, this
dissertation suggests that Canadian diplomacy did not fit easily into any one framework.
On some occasions, Canada embraced middle power diplomacy; on other occasions, it
embraced the positions advanced by the United States and other Western countries. At
the domestic level, Canada established a consultation process involving many Canadian
stakeholders intended to help shape the government’s position on key issues. Drawing on
the literature examining the Canadian state as either pluralist, Marxian or statist, this
dissertation suggests that the Canadian state wielded considerable autonomy from
domestic actors and generally sought to define and advance its own interest, as expected
by the statist view.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
On December 12 1997, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution
52/111, which, inter alia, decided to convene a World Conference against Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR). The conference was
intended to advance a wide-ranging agenda and serve as the focal point of global efforts
to combat racism in the new century. It would review progress made in the fight against
racism, consider ways to strengthen existing standards to fight racism, and provide
concrete recommendations to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations (UN)
machinery to combat racism.1 It would be the UN’s third conference on racism, and
stakeholders hoped that it could avoid the controversies and political divisions that had
marred the previous two conferences in 1978 and 1983. These events had been dominated
by discussions about the apartheid regime in South Africa and the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. The United States (US) and Israel boycotted both conferences as a result of the
1975 General Assembly resolution that labeled Zionism as a form of racism, while 14
Western states—including Canada—walked out of the 1978 conference on its closing day
to protest language critical of Israel. Neither conference was particularly successful in
establishing a foundation for subsequent efforts to combat racism at the global level. But
by the 1990s, new global developments gave reason to believe that a third world
conference against racism could be different. In 1991, the General Assembly revoked the
Zionism-is-racism resolution. Three years later, the apartheid regime in South Africa
came to an end. With these contentious issues off the agenda, some saw an opportunity
for the United Nations to take a fresh look at the issues of racism and racial
1

United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/52/111.
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discrimination. The subsequent selection of post-apartheid South Africa as the venue for
the conference was intended to serve as a powerful indicator that global progress against
racism was real and achievable.
The World Conference against Racism, held from August 31 to September 8
2001, in the city of Durban, produced a Declaration and Programme of Action (DPA) that
addressed a variety of issues of concern to many diverse peoples and groups that have
been victims of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia or related intolerance.2 The
formal title of the event was the World Conference against Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, which was selected to ensure a
broad mandate that would facilitate discussion of a wide array of issues. Among the
peoples and groups identified in the DPA are: indigenous peoples, Africans and people of
African descent, Asians and people of Asian descent, Roma/Gypsies/Sinti/Travellers,
Jews, Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims, Mestizo populations, migrant workers, asylum
seekers, internally displaced persons, refugees, and persons belonging to national, ethnic,
linguistic or religious minorities. For various geopolitical reasons, the scope and content
of the DPA’s language with respect to each of these peoples and groups differed
according to the preferences of UN Member States and the nature of the negotiation
process that produced the Declaration and Programme of Action. While not a legally
binding document, the DPA nevertheless established normative standards and
benchmarks that can be used by states and civil society actors alike to measure the
performance of states and hold them accountable for the commitments made in the
document.
2

World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, “Report
of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance.”
A/CONF.189/12.
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Although all UN Conferences experience their own set of difficulties as states
with diverse interests attempt to form a consensus on contentious issues, the World
Conference against Racism was far more divisive than the norm. While there were many
issues on the agenda, the World Conference was dominated by contentious debates about
the Middle East and the issue of reparations for the transatlantic slave trade and
colonialism. The debate about the Middle East polarized states exactly as it had done at
the previous racism conferences, and at various other UN organs, such as the General
Assembly and the Human Rights Commission/Council. In Durban, draft versions of the
declaration and programme of action contained claims that Zionism was “based on racial
superiority” and that Israel was practicing “a new kind of apartheid.”3 While Arab and
Muslim states felt that the Middle East was a legitimate topic of discussion for the
conference and pushed for inclusion of such language, Western states rejected the
substance of these claims and asserted that it was not appropriate for the conference to
discuss the Middle East because the issue concerned a political conflict rather than a
racial one. On the issue of reparations for the transatlantic slave trade and colonialism,
African states pushed for language in the DPA that would label the slave trade a “crime
against humanity” and demanded that Western states offer an apology and some form of
reparations for past injustices. Western states opposed the use of the term “crime against
humanity” and the calls for reparations, arguing that international law did not prohibit the
transatlantic slave trade at the time that it was committed, although some European states
were willing to offer a symbolic public apology that carried no further obligations.

3

World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance,
“Conference Themes: Draft Declaration.” A/CONF.189/4; World Conference against Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, “Conference Themes: Draft Programme of Action.”
A/CONF.189/5.
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After four days of bitter debate in Durban on these issues, the United States and
Israel withdrew their delegations from the conference to protest the language being used
to describe Israel and Zionism. Several participants in Durban felt that the US decision to
leave was also motivated unofficially by a desire to avoid discussion of the reparations
issue. At any rate, those states that remained faced tremendous difficulty negotiating a
final version of the Declaration and Programme of Action, so much so that the conference
reached its final scheduled day without states having reached a consensus on the most
divisive issues on the agenda. As a result, UN organizers had to extend the conference
one more day to give states additional time to do so, which they eventually did at the
eleventh hour. In the end, the Declaration and Programme of Action contained a few
references to the Middle East peace process, “call[ing] for the end of violence” in the
region, expressing concern about “the plight of the Palestinian people under foreign
occupation,” affirming both the “inalienable right of the Palestinian people to selfdetermination” and the “right to security for all States in the region, including Israel.”
The final version of the DPA did not contain any claims that Zionism is a form of racism
or that Israel is an apartheid state. On the issue of slavery and reparations, the Declaration
and Programme of Action stated that “slavery and the slave trade are a crime against
humanity and should always have been so, especially the transatlantic slave trade” and
urged states to take measures at the national level to “ensure the right of victims to seek
just and adequate reparation” for racially-motivated injustices.
Given the acrimonious context in which it was drafted, it was not surprising that
the Declaration and Programme of Action failed to please everyone. States on all sides of
the debates expressed dissatisfaction with the compromise language reached. Quite
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simply, there was no possibility of genuine consensus among states given the significance
of the disagreements they expressed during the conference. As a result, several states
issued statements on the final day of the conference formally disassociating themselves
from portions of the DPA and the legacy of the World Conference against Racism
remains mired in controversy. Indeed, for many, the debates about the Middle East came
to define the entire conference.
Since the 1970s, it has become common for UN conferences to be accompanied
by parallel non-governmental organizations (NGO) conferences which are intended to
provide opportunities for civil society to raise public awareness of issues of concern, to
develop national and transnational networks of NGOs working on common issues, and to
engage in the process of global governance. The main assumption underlying these NGO
conferences is that the global governance process should not be the exclusive domain of
states, but instead requires meaningful participation from a larger set of non-state actors.
In this spirit, the Durban conference was preceded by both a Youth Summit, held from
August 26 to 27, 2001, as well as an NGO Forum held from August 28 to September 1,
2001. Both the Youth Summit and the NGO Forum produced their own respective
Declaration and Programme of Action.4
The Youth and NGO documents addressed many of the same issues addressed by
states in the Declaration and Programme of Action, but also included some issues that
were left out by states, such as the rights of the Dalits. Compared to the DPA produced by
states, both the Youth and NGO documents contained language that was substantially
more critical of governments and the status quo. In this context, the NGO Declaration and

4

International Youth Summit Declaration and Programme of Action. (August 26-27, 2001); WCAR NGO
Forum Declaration and Programme of Action. (September 3 2001).
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Programme of Action became particularly infamous for its inflammatory
characterizations of Israel. Whereas negotiations among states eventually led to the
removal of the most extreme language, NGOs experienced no similar moderating effects.
The NGO Declaration and Programme of Action thus contained numerous references to
Israel as a racist and apartheid state, accused Israel of committing genocide against the
Palestinians, called for the UN General Assembly to reinstitute the Zionism-is-racism
resolution, and further called for the “international community to impose a policy of
complete and total isolation of Israel.” As a result of such language, Mary Robinson, the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Secretary-General of the conference,
took the unprecedented step of declining to recommend to states that they consider the
NGO Declaration and Programme of Action during the government conference.5
Robinson’s decision meant that the NGO Declaration and Programme of Action did not
become an official UN document, and was a powerful indictment of how problematic the
Durban NGO Forum had become.
Several academics, lawyers, politicians, and other commentators have examined
the World Conference against Racism from a variety of perspectives. Theo van Boven, a
former member of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
suggests that a “close and focussed analysis of the work of the Conference, including the
preparatory processes conducted at regional and national levels, would probably warrant
a more favourable appraisal than the opinions of those who declared the Conference dead
on arrival. It would, however, be an overstatement to classify the Conference as an

5

Major international NGOs, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, also abstained from
endorsing the NGO Declaration and Programme of Action.

6

historic event.”6 Ulrika Sundberg, a legal advisor to the Permanent Mission of Sweden to
the United Nations, writes that “despite the different priorities and concerns of the
respective regions and interests groups, the documents adopted in Durban do contain
tools and recommendations that could be effective in the combat against racism.”7
Manfred Nowak, co-founder of the Vienna-based Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human
Rights, argues that the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action contain “little more
than the general statements we have come to know from conventions and declarations
made by the United Nations and regional organizations in the past”8 Christopher
Camponovo, a legal advisor to the United States delegation to the World Conference
against Racism, concludes that “the Durban process was a disaster. The Conference that
ultimately failed cost an exorbitant sum of money and it is questionable whether it made
any progress in the global fight against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and
related intolerance.”9
In 2002, United States Congressman Tom Lantos referred to the World
Conference as an “anti-American, anti-Israeli circus” and a “serious breakdown in United
Nations diplomacy”10 While assigning some blame to the unilateralist foreign policy of
the administration of George W. Bush and to the leadership of United Nations High
6

Theo van Boven, “World Conference Against Racism: An Historic Event?” Netherlands Quarterly of
Human Rights 19, 4 (2001): 379.
7

Ulrika Sundberg, “Durban: The Third World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance,” International Review of Penal Law 73 (2002): 317.
8

Manfred Nowak, Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2003): 153.
9

Christopher Camponovo, “Disaster in Durban: The United Nations World Conference against Racism,
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance,” The George Washington International Law
Review 34, 4 (2003): 708.
10

Tom Lantos, “The Durban Debacle: An Insider’s View of the UN World Conference against Racism,”
The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 26, 1 (2002): 31-32.

7

Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson, Lantos assigned principal blame to a
few states in the Organization of the Islamic Conference. In response to Lantos, Gay
McDougall, a former member of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, accused him of using “only one yardstick to measure the worth and
effectiveness of the conference: whether it was sufficiently supportive of Israel’s policies
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In taking that measurement, he and those who join in
his cause either misunderstand or misconstrue a process that took place over a three-year
period, and they disregard its many positive outcomes”11 In two other responses to
Lantos, Jerry Leaphart, a American lawyer who attended the NGO Forum, suggests that
“it is misleading, to put it mildly, for Mr. Lantos to have referred to WCAR as anything
other than a successful UN conference”12 while Michael Posner and Wade Henderson,
two American lawyers who attended the NGO Forum, state that they “reject
Congressman Lantos’ apocalyptic assessment of Durban. While recognizing the
meeting’s serious failures, we nonetheless believe that the World Conference prevailed in
many ways.”13
Other assessments of the World Conference have focused in more detail on how it
addressed specific issues, such as the Middle East,14 reparations for the transatlantic slave

11

Gay McDougall, “The World Conference against Racism: Through a Wider Lens,” The Fletcher Forum
for World Affairs 26, 2 (2002): 136.
12

Jerry Leaphart, “The World Conference against Racism: What Was Really Achieved,” The Fletcher
Forum for World Affairs 26, 2 (2002): 154.
13

Michael Posner and Wade Henderson, “A Response to Tom Lantos’ ‘The Durban Debacle,’” The
Fletcher Forum for World Affairs 27, 1 (2003): 6.
14

Anne Bayefsky, “The UN World Conference against Racism: A Racist anti-Racism Conference,”
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law 96 (2002): 65-74; Irwin Cotler,
“Durban’s Troubling Legacy One Year Later: Twisting the Cause of International Human Rights against
the Jewish People,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Jerusalem Issue Brief 2, 5 (2002, August 20):
http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief2-5.htm; Harris O. Schoenberg, “Demonization in Durban: The World
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trade and colonialism,15 the rights of indigenous peoples,16 the intersectionality of race,
ethnicity and gender,17 and the impact of the World Conference on domestic politics in
South Africa.18 Thus, there is a considerable amount of analysis about the World
Conference against Racism generally or about how specific issues were addressed.

1.1 - Canada and the World Conference against Racism
The role of Canada at the World Conference has received far less attention,
although Canada was an active participant throughout the entire World Conference
process and undertook considerable work in preparation at both the domestic and
international level. The majority of this preparatory work was performed by the
Multicultural Program within the Department of Canadian Heritage, which organized
Canada’s domestic approach, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, which led Canada’s negotiations abroad. At the domestic level, Canada’s

Conference against Racism,” American Jewish Year Book (2002): 85-111; Raphael Walden, “The Drafting
of the Articles on the Middle East and Anti-Semitism at the Durban Conference against Racism,” in Racism
and Human Rights, ed. Raphael Walden, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), 165-176.
15

Michelle E. Lyons, “World Conference against Racism: New Avenues for Slavery Reparations?”
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 35 (2002): 1235-1268; Suhas Chakma, “The Issue of
Compensation for Colonialism and Slavery at the World Conference against Racism: A Fine Balance
Between Rhetoric and Legality,” in Human Rights in Development Yearbook 2001, eds. George Ulrich and
Louise Krabbe-Boserup, (Frederick, MD: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 57-71.
16

Darren Dick, “The United Nations World Conference against Racism,” Indigenous Law Bulletin 5, 13
(2001): 5-7; Martin Nakata, ed., Indigenous Peoples, Racism and the United Nations (Australia: Common
Ground Publishing, 2001); Alberto Saldamando, “The World Conference against Racism: Continuing
Racism against Indigenous Peoples,” International Indian Treaty Council (undated):
http://www.treatycouncil.org/section_211442.htm#_edn1
17

Celina Romany and Katherine Culliton, “The UN World Conference against Racism: A Race-Ethnic and
Gender Perspective,” Human Rights Brief 9, 2 (2002): 14-17.
18

Peggy Maisel, “Lessons from the World Conference against Racism: South Africa as a Case Study,”
Oregon Law Review 81 (2002): 739-770.
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preparations were led by Hedy Fry, the Secretary of State for Multiculturalism and the
Status of Women, who launched several key initiatives leading up to Durban. In the
spring of 2000, Canadian Heritage established a national secretariat to help coordinate
Canada’s policies toward the conference. Between September 2000 and April 2001, the
secretariat organized six regional consultations across Canada and one national
consultation to provide civil society organizations an opportunity to offer their input to
the government.19 The secretariat also organized a national Aboriginal consultation, a
Northern consultation and a Youth Forum.20 More than 1,000 individuals representing
Aboriginal organizations, NGOs, academia and other groups attended at least one of
these meetings. Additionally, Hedy Fry established an Advisory Committee that
comprised more than 20 individuals representing a diverse cross-section of Canadian civil
society that functioned as a liaison between government and civil society, and prepared
research reports for the government’s consideration. A separate Aboriginal Advisory
Committee was later formed to serve the same functions with respect to Aboriginal
communities. Further, Canada provided financial support to 63 Canadian NGOs to send
delegates to attend the NGO Forum in Durban, and even selected a few NGO officials to
serve on the official government delegation in Durban.
In addition to these domestic initiatives, Canada’s preparations for Durban
involved a significant amount of diplomatic work at the international level. Like all UN
conferences, the road to the World Conference against Racism involved substantial
organizational work by the UN Secretariat and various organs and branches within the
19

Regional consultations took place in Vancouver, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Toronto, Montreal and Halifax.
The national consultation took place in Ottawa.
20

The Aboriginal consultation took place in Winnipeg, the Northern consultation took place in Iqaluit, and
the Youth Forum took place in Ottawa.

10

world body, such as the Commission on Human Rights, which served as the preparatory
committee for the Durban conference. It was, however, at the inter-governmental
preparatory conferences that the more substantive preparations for Durban began. There,
states engaged in the difficult tasks of establishing the agenda of the World Conference
against Racism, organizing the logistical arrangements, and, most importantly, beginning
the work of negotiating the draft versions of the conference declaration and programme
of action. Three inter-governmental preparatory conferences were held in Geneva; the
first from May 1-5, 2000, the second from May 21-June 1, 2001, and the third from July
30-August 10, 2001. Canada sent a delegation to all three and was actively involved in
the negotiations that took place at each. These meetings were supplemented by two intersessional working groups that were held in Geneva from March 6-9 and May 7-11, 2001,
and an informal meeting in Geneva held from January 15 to 16, 2001, all of which
Canada attended. Furthermore, UN Member States held four regional preparatory
meetings between October 2000 and February 2001. A meeting of states in the Americas,
which included the United States and Canada as participants, occurred in Santiago, Chile
from December 5-7, 2000, while regional meetings also occurred in Europe (Strasbourg),
Africa (Dakar), and Asia (Tehran). Thus, Canada’s preparations for, and participation at,
the World Conference against Racism was a multifaceted endeavour that combined
elements of international diplomatic negotiation with domestic governmental politics that
included wide-ranging consultations with various key stakeholders in Canada.
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1.2 - The two research questions
Despite the considerable amount of analysis that has been done on the World
Conference generally, little academic analysis has been done on the role that Canada
played at the World Conference.21 Indeed, the only academic analysis available is a
chapter on the Durban Conference that appears in Andrew F. Cooper’s 2004 book, Tests
of Global Governance: Canadian Diplomacy and United Nations World Conferences.22
Cooper’s central goal is to examine UN conferences as examples—or “tests”—of how
global governance processes have evolved during the post-Cold War era and to assess the
implications of this evolution on international politics. Canada is examined as a case
study through which to examine the contours and development of these broader
international and multilateral processes and institutions.
This dissertation approaches the topic from a different perspective. It uses the
World Conference against Racism as a case study to examine the domestic and
international determinants of the Canadian foreign policy-making process. It examines
two central theoretical questions. First, to what extent was the Canadian state autonomous
from civil society and non-state actors during the creation and implementation of its
policy toward the World Conference against Racism? Second, what role did Canada play
internationally during the negotiations that led to the Durban Declaration and Programme

21

There is a growing body of research that examines the role of Canada at other UN Conferences,
particularly those held during the 1990s. The Canadian experience with the World Conference against
Racism was shaped, in part, by its experience at these conferences. See Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, Canada
and the Beijing Conference on Women: Governmental Politics and NGO Participation (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 2001); Andrew F. Cooper, Tests of Global Governance: Canadian
Diplomacy and United Nations World Conferences (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2004).
22

Cooper, Tests of Global Governance.
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of Action and how can this role be assessed against competing theories of Canada’s role
on the world stage?
The first question concerns the domestic determinants and processes of Canadian
foreign policy and explores the extent to which the Canadian state is able to operate
autonomously from civil society and non-state actors during the creation and
implementation of foreign policy. This question itself can be explored from a variety of
angles. First, there is the debate between proponents of statist theory and proponents of
the dominant class approach. According to the statist view, the Canadian state enjoys
considerable autonomy from civil society and is largely insulated from domestic
pressures in its definition and pursuit of the national interest.23 By contrast, the dominant
class approach argues that non-state actors serving the interests of business enjoy
considerable access to, and influence over, the Canadian state, which is constrained
significantly by the structural pressures of the capitalist economy.24 Second, there are
debates about the extent to which the state is able and willing to “democratize” the
Canadian foreign policy making process by making it more transparent, inclusive and
accountable to civil society organizations and to the public at large.25 Third, research

23

David Dewitt and John Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1983); Kim
Richard Nossal, “Analyzing the Domestic Sources of Canadian Foreign Policy,” International Journal 39,
1 (1983/84): 1-22; Kim Richard Nossal, “Mixed Motives Revisited: Canada’s Interest in Development
Assistance,” Canadian Journal of Political Science. 21, 2 (1988): 35-56; Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, “State
Autonomy and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of Deep Seabed Mining,” Canadian Journal of Political
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focusing directly on the activities and influence of Canadian NGOs and interest groups
has also considered their capacity to contribute to the shaping of Canadian foreign
policy.26 Especially pertinent here are studies that focus on racial, ethnic or religiousbased organizations.27 In general, most scholars of Canadian foreign policy agree with the
statist assumption and suggest that the foreign policy making process is largely driven by
government elites who have wide latitude to shape policy free from the constraints of
public opinion and NGO and interest group pressure. The examination of Canada’s
approach to the World Conference against Racism is intended to provide fresh evidence
and insight into these questions. The nature of Canada’s domestic consultations with civil
society and its relationship with various NGOs throughout the Durban process makes it a
useful case study to address questions about state autonomy and state-society relations in
the context of the Canadian foreign policy making process.
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The second question concerns the role that Canada plays in the world and the
nature of the external opportunities and constraints for action that confront Canada given
the hierarchical structure of the international state system and Canada’s relative position
within it. Research on these issues has produced a three-pronged debate between those
who view Canada as a middle power, those who view it as a satellite state dependent on
the hegemonic order of the United States, and those who view it as a foremost or
principal power.
Discussions about Canada as a middle power have focused on both the relative
military and economic capabilities of the Canadian state vis-a-vis other states, as well as
on the kinds of activities in which Canada engages on the world state.28 The view of
Canada as a satellite state has focused on the hegemonic role that the United States has
played in world politics since 1945 and situated Canada within this American sphere of
influence. In this view, Canada’s relatively limited military capabilities rendered the state
only a junior partner of the United States in the context of US-led institutions such as the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD), while Canada’s relatively smaller economic output left the state
vulnerable to pressures to integrate its national economy within a regional and global
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economic order centred around the United States.29 In the 1970s, a third perspective
emerged that viewed Canada with considerably more power and influence on the world
stage than either the middle power or satellite state views allowed. Arguing that
American power was on the decline following its retreat from Vietnam, some felt that this
decline created opportunities for Canada to emerge as a foremost or principal power. This
new approach rejected the view of Canada’s military and economic capabilities as being
of only modest proportions and argued instead that Canada’s foreign policy has been, and
could continue to be, much more independent and focused on advancing a distinct
Canadian national interest.30
In the early post-War era, scholarship on Canadian foreign policy generally
worked within either the middle power or the satellite dependency framework. The view
of Canada as a foremost or principal power emerged only in the 1970s and has found
comparably fewer adherents. Nonetheless, each framework remains part of current
debates about Canadian foreign policy.31 As such, the study of Canada’s participation at
the World Conference against Racism can serve as an interesting case study through
29
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which to examine the utility of each perspective by focusing on Canada’s diplomatic
contributions within the United Nations system and evaluating Canada’s ability to
influence the negotiating process that produced the Durban Declaration and Programme
of Action.
Through an exploration of these two research questions, the dissertation advances
two arguments. First, while Canada’s domestic consultation process with civil society
actors provided an important opportunity for two-way dialogue between government and
civil society actors, it provided civil society actors with only a marginal amount of
influence to shape Canada’s positions at the UN conference. The statist view of Canadian
foreign policy thus provides a compelling explanation of the domestic determinants of the
positions that Canada took to the World Conference against Racism. Canada’s hesitation
to accede to the demands of civil society was particularly evident on issues concerning
indigenous peoples as Canadian Aboriginal organizations expressed strong objections to
both the domestic consultation process and Canada’s tepid approach during the
international negotiations to the issue of recognizing indigenous peoples as “peoples”
without adding qualifying language that limited the applicability of the term under
international law. Canada also firmly rejected the demands of many NGOs to consider
offering a formal apology and reparations for various past government actions and
policies, such as the allowance of slavery in pre-Confederation Upper Canada, the
administration of the Head Tax for Chinese Canadians, the system of Aboriginal
residential schools, and the mass eviction of the residents of Africville, Nova Scotia in
the 1960s. On all such matters, Canada was not willing to support the creation of any new
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international framework that might result in a reduction of state sovereignty or introduce
any new financial or legal obligations for the state.
Second, the results of Canada’s diplomatic effort to influence the outcome of the
Durban Declaration and Programme of Action provide a more ambiguous answer to the
question of whether the middle power, satellite dependency or foremost/principal power
framework best explains Canada’s participation at the World Conference against Racism.
On the one hand, Canada’s positions toward many of the major issues on the agenda,
including the Middle East, the question of apologies and reparations, and the status of
indigenous peoples as “peoples” closely resembled the positions adopted by the United
States and most other Western states. This suggests that Western states approached
certain key issues as a fairly united bloc and that Canada had little room to manoeuvre on
these critical areas. On the other hand, the World Conference did provide Canada with
some opportunities to make its own mark on the proceedings. Canada played a leading
role in organizing the Youth Summit that preceded the World Conference against
Racism. Moreover, the withdrawal of the United States from the conference at the halfway point created an opportunity for states like Canada to fill the void left behind by the
absence of the world’s most powerful state, particularly at a time when the atmosphere at
the conference was rapidly deteriorating. While Canada did not exert the degree of
influence over the outcome of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action that
might be expected from a foremost or principal power, it did exert some meaningful
influence over key aspects of the document, particularly regarding the removal of the
most contentious language addressing the Middle East. At least in this regard, therefore,
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Canada was more than a mere subordinate of the United States and was able to play the
role of the middle power constructive helper in the world.

1.3 - Methodology
This dissertation uses a qualitative analysis of a mixture of primary and secondary
source material, with a particular emphasis on the former. Primary sources used include
interviews with key Canadian individuals involved in the World Conference process,
information obtained via access to information requests from the government of Canada,
online archival material from both the Canadian government and the United Nations, and
press releases issued by the government of Canada, the United Nations and relevant
Aboriginal organizations and Canadian NGOs.
Between August 2011 and December 2012, 22 interviews were conducted with
various individuals involved in Canada’s preparations for, and participation in, the World
Conference against Racism (Appendix A). Eight of these interviews were conducted with
Canadian government officials and 14 were conducted with non-state actors, including
representatives from Aboriginal organizations and NGOs. The government officials
interviewed included Hedy Fry, the Secretary of State (Multiculturalism)(Status of
Women) and head of the Canadian delegation in Durban; and Paul Heinbecker, Canada’s
Permanent Representative to the United Nations and an alternate head of the Canadian
delegation. It also included four officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade (DFAIT) who served in senior roles during the World Conference
process and one official from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).
In addition, one government official requested to remain anonymous. The 14 non-state
19

actors interviewed included a range of individuals representing diverse organizations in
Canada that were sponsored by the government to attend the World Conference in
Durban and some of the international preparatory meetings. In some cases, individuals
interviewed also provided access to personal notes and other documents relevant to their
experiences. In addition to the 22 interviews conducted, efforts were made to contact
numerous other relevant individuals for an interview—both in government and nongovernment—but these efforts proved unsuccessful for various reasons.
The dissertation also relies upon information obtained via access to information
requests filed between 2010 and 2012 with relevant government departments, including
the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department of
Canadian Heritage. The most fruitful information obtained in this manner included
dozens of email exchanges between relevant government officials that occurred during
the various international preparatory meetings and at the Durban Conference itself (i.e.
emails from the diplomats on the ground sent to others in Ottawa). Although some of the
information was redacted by the government, a considerable amount remained accessible
via this method.
Information was also obtained from the online archives of both the government of
Canada and the United Nations. Canadian documents included those made public via the
website of the Canadian Secretariat for the World Conference against Racism, which
provided the general public with government press releases and other information about
the World Conference process and Canada’s role therein. United Nations documents
included those available from the organization’s Official Document System (ODS), the
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official website of the World Conference against Racism, and press releases issued by the
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
The last source of primary material included information and press releases made
publicly available by the numerous Aboriginal organizations in Canada and NGOs in
Canada that participated in some way in the World Conference process.
Additional secondary source material was obtained from newspapers and other
media sources in Canada that reported on the World Conference against Racism.

1.4 - Organization of the dissertation
This dissertation is divided into eight chapters. Following this introductory
chapter, the second chapter provides the literature review and discusses in more detail the
literature on both the domestic determinants and process of Canadian foreign policy, and
the external opportunities and constraints that shape Canada’s role in the world. Chapter
three introduces the political and historical context of the World Conference against
Racism by providing a general overview of the nature of UN conferences and a brief
history of the two previous UN conferences on racism that occurred, respectively, in 1978
and 1983.
Chapters four through seven provide the empirical data of the case study through
a chronological narrative of key events and developments. Chapter four discusses the
early stages of the international preparations and examines Canada’s role at the first
Preparatory Committee meeting in May 2000 and the Regional Conference of the
Americas in December 2000. Chapter five examines Canada’s domestic preparations for
the World Conference and focuses on the domestic consultation process that began in
21

September 2000 and culminated in the national consultation in Ottawa in February 2001.
Chapter six returns to the international level to examine Canada’s role at three
international meetings in Geneva held during the winter and spring of 2001 as well as at
the second and third Preparatory Committee meetings (May and August 2001,
respectively) during which time the World Conference agenda became increasingly
contentious. Chapter seven examines Canada’s role at the World Conference itself as well
as at the Youth Summit and the NGO Forum.
Chapter eight offers concluding remarks and synthesizes the main empirical
findings of the study with the theories discussed in the literature review and the two
central research questions informed by the literature review.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
This dissertation addresses two central theoretical questions. First, to what extent
was the Canadian state autonomous from civil society and non-state actors during the
creation and implementation of its policy toward the World Conference against Racism?
Second, what role did Canada play internationally during the negotiations that led to the
Durban Declaration and Programme of Action and how can this role be assessed against
competing theories of Canada’s role on the world stage? The first question speaks
primarily to domestic political processes in Canada and encompasses three interrelated
scholarly debates in the literature on Canadian foreign policy: debates between the
adherents of the statist model and adherents of the dominant class approach, debates
about the extent to which Canadian foreign policy is or can be democratized, and debates
about the ability of domestic interest groups and other non-state actors to influence
government policy. The second question speaks primarily to international political
processes and explores the role that Canada plays on the world stage and the external
opportunities and constraints for action that confront Canada given the hierarchical
structure of the international state system and Canada’s relative position within it. The
major scholarly debates concern three competing views of Canada either as a middle
power, a satellite/dependent state, or a principal power. This chapter discusses the
relevant literature on both of these two questions and situates the study of Canada and the
World Conference against Racism within these overlapping theoretical debates.

2.1 - State autonomy and the domestic determinants of Canadian foreign policy
In the two decades following the Second World War, Canadian foreign policy was
23

widely recognized to be an elite-driven process that was shaped by the Prime Minister’s
Office and a small set of actors in the Department of External Affairs who operated
largely free from the preferences and constraints of Parliament, public opinion and nonstate actors. The central goals of Canadian foreign policy during this time were to help
promote multilateral governance within the United Nations system and preserve the unity
of Western states within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 1970,
however, the Trudeau government publicly rejected much of this approach and released
Foreign Policy for Canadians, a policy review paper that sought to redefine Canada’s
foreign policy-making processes and goals. Trudeau sought to distance his government
from the multilateral and internationalist policies of his predecessors and create a foreign
policy more directly focused on domestic considerations and the advancement of the
Canadian national interest. The white paper proclaimed that foreign policy was an
extension of national policy abroad and, as Kim Richard Nossal notes, “was insistent that
the government’s foreign policy decisions would find their wellsprings in the aspirations,
needs, and desires of civil society.”32 Although scholars have since expressed skepticism
about the extent to which Trudeau’s foreign policy produced a genuine departure from
the past, the Trudeau years coincided with a growing scholarly interest in examining the
domestic factors that help shape Canadian foreign policy.33
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2.1.1 - Theories of the state
One aspect of this research involved drawing upon competing theories of the
state—liberal pluralist, Marxian and statist—and applying them specifically to the
analysis of Canadian foreign policy. According to liberal-pluralist theory, the state is not
viewed as an autonomous agent in its own right, but rather as a neutral agent that reflects
the aggregate preferences of the multitude of actors within society. Liberal-pluralists
assume that political power is dispersed across a wide range of actors throughout society,
all of whom possess the capacity to articulate their preferences to the general public and
to the state. In many cases, societal preferences are organized and expressed in the form
of interest groups, and a central feature of the democratic political process is thus the
formation of a variety of interest groups representing diverse, and often competing,
preferences on key policy issues. In the context of this domestic marketplace of ideas and
interests, the role of the state is to receive the various preferences articulated by interest
groups and public opinion and create policies that the state determines to best reflect the
general will of the public.34 Of course, on any given policy outcome, some factions of
society will be more satisfied than others, but given a large range of policy issues over an
extended period of time, it is expected that no one single group will prevail a
disproportionate amount of time.
Liberal-pluralist theory was the dominant view of the state among academics in
the United States during the 1950s and 1960s, but it later came to be challenged for its
rose-coloured view of political equality in the democratic process. Some of these
challengers were more radical than others. Neo-pluralist theory agrees with the
34
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assumption that interest group competition is a key feature of the democratic political
process, but suggests that some societal actors are more powerful, organized and wellfunded than others, and correspondingly hold more influence with the government.35
Marxian theories of the state depart from liberal-pluralism much more significantly. For
Marxians, society can be understood only by reference to the underlying material
economic conditions and is divided between those who control the means of production
(the bourgeoisie) and those who sell their labour to them (the proletariat). This unequal
economic relationship between classes allows the bourgeoisie to exercise a dominant
political influence over the state, which is in turn viewed as subservient to the interests of
the capitalist class. The state, in Karl Marx’s famous phrase, is merely “a committee for
managing the affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.”
Within the Marxian tradition, there are two schools of thought about how the state
performs this function. According to the instrumentalist view, the state is not viewed as
being autonomous from the bourgeoisie. Rather, both the state and the bourgeoisie are
composed of individuals who come from the same elite background and social circles. By
effectively penetrating the state and the policy-making process, the bourgeoisie solidify
its privileged position and “use the state as its instrument for the domination of society.”36
By contrast, according to the structuralist view, the state is relatively autonomous from
the bourgeoisie and serves the function of maintaining the broader political and social
order within the capitalist economy.37 For structuralists, the bourgeoisie cannot be
35
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regarded as a unified bloc and is therefore not necessarily able to distinguish between its
short-term interests and long-term interests. The relative autonomy of the state allows it
to establish policies that are likely to contradict the short-term interests of the capitalist
class, but are necessary to resolve the internal contradictions of capitalism and maintain
the economic order in the long-term. For example, modern capitalist states have adopted
varying degrees of redistributionist welfare policies designed to partially mitigate
economic inequality and subdue large-scale demand for political protest and revolution.
One commonality between liberal-pluralist theories and Marxian theories is their
assumption that the state can be explained solely by examining the preferences of society.
Statist theory departs from this assumption and argues that the state possesses both an
autonomous interest of its own and a considerable degree of autonomy from societal
actors to pursue this interest.38 The state’s primary interest is the preservation of political
order and the further entrenchment of state power. In much of the International Relations
(IR) literature, states are viewed to value power, survival and state-sovereignty above all
else in an anarchic international system in which these goals cannot be taken for
granted.39 Statist theory further assumes that states wish to protect their power against
domestic challenges to the state, including those ranging from revolutionary challenges to
the state to less confrontational normative challenges to the moral legitimacy of the
state’s role as the arbiter and enforcer of law and order.
The ability of the state to successfully define and pursue its own interest depends
on the specific context in which it operates. In some cases, the state is able to advance its
38
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own interest because societal preferences are largely absent or not well organized and
articulated in the public sphere. In other cases, societal preferences are divided across a
range of policy outcomes and no one preference emerges as the dominant one, allowing
the state considerable room to manoeuvre between the competing demands placed upon
it. Yet even in cases where the state faces strong pressure from society to move policy in
a specific direction, the state retains considerable agency to resist these pressures. Several
tactics are available to this end; the state can rely upon its vast resources and attempt to
alter societal preferences, create or magnify political divisions among key stakeholders in
society, or co-opt key societal stakeholders.40 To be sure, statist theory does not assume
that the state will succeed in every such instance. Indeed, adherents of statism concede
that the state should not be viewed as enjoying an absolute degree of autonomy from
society. Rather, the point is to emphasize that—in contrast to liberal-pluralist and
Marxian theories—the state should be regarded as an active agent in its own right that
cannot be properly understood only by reductionist appeals to the preferences of society.
As Nordlinger suggests “the preferences of the state are at least as important as those of
civil society in accounting for what the democratic state does and does not do.”41
It is important to note that the empirically measurable distinctions between these
competing theories of the state are not always as clear as their divergent assumptions
might suggest. Neo-pluralism and Marxian accounts overlap to the extent that both
assume the existence of hierarchical divisions within society and assign important
influence to privileged societal groups at the top of this hierarchy with regard to their
ability to shape state policy. Similarly, both structural Marxians and statists view the state
40
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as possessing a considerable degree of relative autonomy from society and suggest that
the key goal of the state is the preservation of the status quo order. Stephen Krasner, a
leading proponent of statist theory, has acknowledged that distinguishing between statist
theory and structural Marxian theory is a “difficult task.”42 For Krasner, the ultimate
difference is that statist theory explains state behaviour as the result of ideological goals
rather than economic goals.

2.1.2 - Theories of the state and Canadian foreign policy
Competing theories of the state and its relationship to society have played an
important role in shaping scholarly debates about Canadian foreign policy. Although
liberal-pluralist theory has few, if any, adherents in Canada, both statist and Marxian
theories have received significant support, and a reasonable case can be made that statism
is the dominant approach to the study of Canadian foreign policy. Several interrelated
factors contribute to the popularity of statist theory among scholars of Canadian foreign
policy. From an institutional perspective, Canada’s parliamentary system of governance
tends to centralize political power to a considerable extent and insulate top government
officials from outside pressure. Hence, the foreign policy-making process is often seen as
being dominated by a small group of elite actors within the Prime Minister’s Office and
the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT).43 Accordingly,
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parliament is assumed to play only a minor role in shaping foreign policy.44 Further, from
a political behaviour perspective, foreign policy issues are rarely the decisive factor
influencing voting decisions during Canadian federal elections, thus allowing elected
officials the ability to formulate and implement their agenda without much fear of
electoral reprisal. Hence, whereas the domestic policy-making process encourages policymakers to work more cooperatively with parliament, and to keep a closer eye on the
perceived impact on public opinion, such constraints are largely missing from the foreign
policy-making process. As a result, statists argue, the Canadian state enjoys a
considerable degree of autonomy from society on foreign policy matters.
Several scholars have applied statist theory to a variety of empirical case studies
examining a diverse range of Canadian foreign policy issues. For example, David Dewitt
and John Kirton offer a statist interpretation of immigration and refugee policy, energy
policy, space policy and Middle East policy.45 Other case studies employing statist theory
have examined foreign aid to the developing world,46 deep seabed mining and Canada’s
policy on the United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea,47 Canada’s
relations with Latin America,48 and Canada’s approach to the 1995 United Nations
Conference on Women.49
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On the other hand, several scholars have used Marxian alternatives to statist
theory to provide contending interpretations of various aspects of Canadian foreign
policy, including foreign economic policy toward the developing world50 and especially
Canada’s foreign aid policies and the politics of the Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA).51 In other instances, scholars have expanded on the core assumptions of
Marxism to provide analysis from a critical theory or Gramscian perspective. One
example of the latter is Mark Neufeld, who critiques the image of Canada as a middle
power as a hegemonic effort by the state intended to create broad-based public support
for policies ultimately designed to advance the interests of the Canadian dominant class.52
While such analysis departs in important ways from the more traditional Marxist
understanding of the state, it provides an example of how the Marxian framework
remains relevant within debates about Canadian foreign policy. Even where Marxism has
been modified, the core assumptions remain part of the discussion.
As was the case with debates about competing theories of the state generally,
scholars who applied these theories to the specific domain of Canadian foreign policy
recognized the need for theoretical flexibility in order to avoid presenting an overly
simplistic view of state-society relations in Canada. Hence, Nossal advances a “modified”
statist theory that emphasizes the state’s autonomous interest as a central determinant of
foreign policy, but also recognizes that societal actors maintain some ability to influence
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state behaviour.53 Similarly, Pratt’s emphasis on the centrality of the dominant class also
recognizes that state interest, such as the geo-political interest to contain the spread of
communism in the developing world, needed to be taken into consideration when
explaining Canadian foreign aid policies during the Cold War.54 Nonetheless, the
differing emphasis on the extent to which the state was autonomous from society allowed
for a productive debate about the domestic determinants of Canadian foreign policy that
remains relevant today.

2.1.3 - Interest groups and foreign policy
In the liberal-pluralist framework, interest groups are seen as key societal actors
that have the potential to impact both government policies and the broader policy
environment in which democratic government operates. Interest groups can impact policy
and the policy-making process in several ways. They can generate information for both
the general public and government, frame the discussion of key issues in the minds of
citizens and government officials, and provide oversight and commentary on the creation
and implementation of policy.55 The ability of interest groups to perform these tasks
depends on several factors, such as the goals of the interest group, their financial
resources and the strength of their relationship with the media and government officials.
The ability of interest groups to shape policy and the policy-making environment also
depends on external factors that are largely beyond their control, such as public opinion
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on policy issues of concern, and the extent to which the institutional structure of
government facilitates or restricts outside influence.56
During the second half of the twentieth century, interest groups became
increasingly more active in attempting to shape foreign policy-making processes in the
United States, Canada and in other advanced democracies. To some extent, increased
interest group activity on foreign policy issues reflected the growth in interest group
activity in general, but it also reflected the changing perception of what constituted
foreign policy as issues such as global environmentalism, global economic inequality and
the protection of human rights in developing world countries became more salient to the
general public. In addition, the rapid pace of globalization has tended to blur the
traditional distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy, resulting in greater
interest group activity on policy matters that straddle the line between foreign and
domestic policy.57
Measuring the influence of interest groups on policy outcomes and the policymaking environment remains a difficult task for scholars. Andreas Dür identifies three
methodological approaches for addressing this challenge: process-tracing, attributed
influence and preference attainment. Process-tracing involves efforts to examine the
intervening steps that link the causal variable(s) with the dependent variable. As Dür
notes, “with respect to measuring interest group influence, scholars scrutinize groups’
preferences, their influence attempts, their access to decision-makers, decision-makers’
responses to the influence attempts, the degree to which groups’ preferences are reflected
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in outcomes and groups’ statements of (dis-)satisfication with the outcome.”58 Attributed
influence attempts to measure influence by examining the extent to which key actors
involved in policy debates and policy-making—including officials from government and
the interest group themselves—identify a causal link between the activities of a particular
interest group and policy outcomes. Preference attainment examines the extent to which
interest groups feel that their demands were heard by government and reflected in policy
outcomes. To be sure, each of these methods contain drawbacks as they rely on the
subjective viewpoints of individuals and cannot necessarily control for all relevant
variables that are involved in the policy-making process. Accordingly, Dür recommends a
strategy of “methodological triangulation” that attempts to examine interest group
activity using two or more of these frameworks.

2.1.4 - Interest groups and Canadian foreign policy
Although liberal-pluralist theories of the state have not found significant scholarly
support as a framework for explaining Canadian foreign policy, scholars examining the
role of interest groups in shaping Canadian foreign policy have often implicitly drawn on
some of the key assumptions advanced by the liberal-pluralist framework to suggest that
interest groups can indeed exert significant influence on policy. For the most part,
scholarly analysis examining the role of interest groups in shaping Canadian foreign
policy has focused on specific policy issues rather than focusing on Canadian foreign
policy-making generally. For example, both scholars and NGOs themselves suggest that
Canada’s strong support for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines can be
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attributed, in part, to the lobbying efforts of concerned Canadian (and international)
NGOs and the close relationship that these NGOs were able to form with senior
government officials, such as Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy.59 There is
similarly a large body of work examining the role of interest groups in shaping Canada’s
policy toward the Middle East generally, and Israel in particular.60 While some have
concluded that pro-Israel interest groups in Canada wield substantial, though not
necessarily decisive, influence over government officials,61 others concluded that proIsrael interest groups possess only minimal and sporadic influence.62 Additionally, there
is some research examining the foreign policy interests and lobbying efforts of MuslimCanadian interest groups, although these studies tend to conclude that such groups have
limited impact in shaping Canadian policy.63
As mentioned, one challenge for scholars studying the ability of interest groups to
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influence Canadian foreign policy, or any government policy in general, is the difficulty
in defining and measuring what exactly constitutes influence. Indeed, this challenge
permeates efforts to examine the influence of not just interest groups, but any set of
societal actors, such as business groups, trade unions, activist groups, or public opinion
generally. Denis Stairs’ analysis of the relationship between public opinion and foreign
policy provides a useful guide for addressing this issue. Stairs notes that public opinion
can influence foreign policy in four ways. It can work to set the agenda of policy-makers
by bringing to their attention issues that might otherwise have gone overlooked (agendasetting); it can establish basic parameters of what policy-makers consider to be feasible
courses of action (parameter-setting); it can determine the choices of policy-makers
(policy-setting); and it can influence the implementation of policy once chosen
(administration setting).64 Building upon this analysis, Nossal, Roussel and Paquin
propose that societal influence can be categorized in two ways: societal actors can
influence the policy-making environment—what Stairs calls agenda-setting and
parameter-setting—and societal actors can influence the decision-making processes—
what Stairs calls policy-setting and administration setting.65 This framework is helpful
because it allows scholars to discuss the multitude of ways in which societal actors can
influence government policy, and allows for analysis of influence measured in both the
short-term and the long-term. While a given societal actor or interest group may not
succeed in the short-term efforts to persuade government to adopt their preferred policy,
they may be more successful in the long-run by shifting the nature of policy-debates
toward a direction more favourable to their viewpoint.
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2.1.5 – The democratization of Canadian foreign policy
The examination of government using statist theory and the examination of the
ability of interest groups to influence government policy can be viewed as two sides of
the same coin. Both are efforts to identify the key actors that shape government policy
and to explore the relationship between the state and key non-state actors. The key
difference is that statist theory regards the state as its central unit of analysis whereas the
study of interest groups gives primacy to these non-state actors. But the findings of one
approach will inevitably complement the findings of the other. If statist theory is correct
that the state is largely autonomous from society in its decision-making powers then
interest groups will be seen as only marginal actors in the policy-making process. On the
other hand, if interest groups can be shown to exert meaningful influence over policy then
the assumptions of statist theory will be significantly undermined.
The examination of government efforts to democratize Canadian foreign policy
can be viewed as yet another way to approach the interrelated questions about state
autonomy and the role of non-state actors and interest-groups in the policy-making
process. During the early 1990s, there emerged a growing public concern that the
Canadian foreign policy-making process was too elitist and secretive, and thus provided
few opportunities for ordinary Canadian citizens to engage meaningfully in the process
and have input over policy outcomes. In 1993, the Liberal Party of Canada campaign
material stated that “Canadians are asking for a commitment from government to listen to
their views, and to respect their needs by ensuring that no false distinction is made
between domestic and foreign policy.” To this end, the Liberal party pledged to establish
a “National Forum on Canada’s International Relations as part of our commitment to the
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democratization of foreign policy-making in Canada.”66 Established in 1994 following
the Liberal Party’s electoral victory, the National Forum provided an institutional
framework for dialogue and consultation between government officials and a variety of
non-state actors including interest groups, NGOs, journalists, academics, business groups
and former members of the Canadian foreign service. In addition, the government
established a Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy. Composed of
Members of Parliament and the Senate, the committee “spent seven months considering
561 briefs, holding over 80 meetings in ten cities in Canada and three abroad, hearing
from over 550 witnesses, and in the process generating over 10,000 pages in
parliamentary testimony.”67
These efforts generated considerable debate among scholars about the extent to
which they genuinely resulted in a more “democratic” policy-making process.68 Most of
this analysis was skeptical about the results. First, concerns were raised about the extent
to which non-state actors involved in these processes could be seen as representative of
the Canadian public as a whole. Second, concerns were raised about the government’s
motives and the extent to which government officials were genuinely interested in
listening to the views of non-state actors and producing policy that reflected these views.
Nonetheless, the trend toward holding more public consultations prior to the creation of
public policy can be seen as a step in the direction of greater democratization of foreign
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policy even if such efforts fall short of the normative ideal.

2.1.6 - The domestic determinants of Canadian policy toward the World Conference
against Racism
The examination of Canada’s approach to the 2001 United Nations World
Conference against Racism provides a rich case study to assess theoretical debates about
state autonomy, the role of interest groups and NGOs, and the government’s efforts to
democratize the foreign policy making process. In preparing for the conference, the
government established an extensive consultation process with a wide variety of civil
society actors representing diverse groups from across Canada. Between September 2000
and July 2001, the government organized six regional consultations as well as a national
consultation that included more than 1,000 participants and provided opportunity for
policy dialogue between government and civil society as Canada prepared its positions
for the conference. The government also organized separate consultation meetings for
both Aboriginal organizations and youth groups. Additionally, dozens of Canadian NGOs
were funded by the government to travel abroad to Geneva to attend UN preparatory
meetings in advance of the conference, and later to attend the World Conference itself.
Many other NGOs attended these events at their own expense. Further, some NGO
officials were included as members of the official government delegation at both the
Geneva preparatory meetings and in Durban. The Department of Canadian Heritage also
established a Civil Society Advisory Committee and a separate Aboriginal Advisory
Committee to provide policy suggestions to Hedy Fry. The sustained interaction between
government and NGO officials that occurred in the lead-up to the world conference as
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well as in Durban itself offers a fruitful opportunity to examine the relationship between
these actors and to assess the extent to which government policy was shaped by these
interactions. Additionally, as it was the Liberal government under Prime Minister Jean
Chrétien that managed Canada’s approach to the world conference, the case study also
offers an opportunity to examine the policy-making process in the context of its professed
efforts to democratize Canadian foreign policy.

2.2 – Canada on the world stage
In addition to the various domestic factors that contribute to the creation and
implementation of government policy, government must also contend with the many
external factors that constitute the global political landscape. Canadian policy, like that of
any other country, is shaped by a mixture of both domestic and international forces. To
that end, the remainder of the chapter is concerned with discussing the international
determinants of Canadian foreign policy.
According to structural realist theory, one of the major theories of International
Relations (IR), the international system is defined by its anarchic structure, meaning the
absence of effective international institutions that can govern the interaction between
states. In this environment, states compete against one another for survival in a world in
which the state’s national interest cannot be taken for granted.69 Realists emphasize that
the distribution of power is the key variable in international politics and define power
primarily in terms of a state’s military capabilities. As a result, realists see international
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institutions and laws as merely epiphenomenal to the distribution of power rather than as
causal variables that shape and constrain the behaviour of states. Realists thus agree with
the famous pronouncement of Thucydides that international politics is an arena in which
the strong do what they can while the weak suffer what they must.
Competing theories of IR hold different assumptions about the role of power in
the international system. Institutionalists challenge the assumption that international
institutions are epiphenomenal to the distribution of power and emphasize the ability of
institutions to promote meaningful cooperation between states. Over time, institutions can
establish rules of conduct that regulate interaction between states and prevent powerful
states from imposing their will on others.70 Constructivists challenge the assumption that
anarchy is an objective concept that exists exogenously of how states behave and
emphasize how anarchy is a social construction created by a particular set of state
attitudes and behaviours. In this view, power itself is a social construct and power politics
between states occurs only if states believe and behave in a way that promotes such
conflict.71 Liberal theorists challenge the assumption that international politics can be
easily separated from domestic politics and emphasize how a given state’s foreign policy
is determined primarily by domestic factors rather than the international distribution of
power.72 Nonetheless, while IR scholars differ among themselves about the role of power
in international politics, none go so far as to deny that power plays an important role.
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Debates about the nature and impact of state power in world politics are thus at the heart
of much of the IR literature.
Questions about power have likewise occupied a central place in the literature on
Canadian foreign policy. Both policy makers and scholars alike have grappled with the
issues of how much power Canada has and the purposes to which that power is used at
the international level. Over time, three dominant theoretical frameworks emerged to
address the question of Canada’s power: Canada as a middle power, a satellite state, and a
principal power. Each of these three frameworks relies on a distinct set of assumptions
about the international determinants of Canadian foreign policy and Canada’s capacity to
promote its interests and values on the world stage.

2.2.1 - Canada as a middle power
As Nossal, Roussel and Paquin note, the term middle power holds two meanings
when used to describe Canada’s place in the world. Canada can be viewed as a middle
power based on its position within the hierarchy of states in the international system, but
it can also be viewed as a middle power based on the kinds of policies that it performs on
the world stage.73 According to the positional view, Canada is a middle power simply
because it is less powerful than the few great powers, but more powerful than most other
states in the world. As one Canadian diplomat said in 1944, Canada is a middle power
because “with her smaller population and lack of colonial possessions, she is not a major
or world power like Britain, the United States or Russia. But with her natural wealth and
human capacity she is not a minor power like Mexico or Sweden. She stands in between
73
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as a Britannic Power of medium rank.”74 By contrast, the second view of Canada as a
middle power focuses on what Canadian foreign policy does rather than simply how
much power Canada has relative to other states. According to this view, a middle power
is a state whose foreign policy goals generally serve to promote global stability, effective
international institutions and the rule of law, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts
between states. Assessments of Canada as a middle power oftentimes rely on both
meanings of the term and suggest that Canada is able to engage in middle power
diplomacy because of its positional rank among states. That is, Canada is able to make
niche contributions to specific global issues because it both possesses enough material
and diplomatic resources to engage with the tasks at hand, but also holds none of the
political baggage of the great powers, such as their history of wars of aggression and
colonialism in the developing world. Hence, as indicated in footnote 28, many scholars of
Canadian foreign policy have concluded that Canada is a middle power.
Labeling Canada as a middle power is not without controversy, however, and the
term has produced several detractors alongside its proponents. Some critics suggest that
the Canadian government has embraced the term in an attempt to exaggerate Canada’s
influence on the world stage. Adam Chapnick, for example, argues that Canada’s middle
power status is a “myth” and no more than “rhetoric crafted to justify the attainment of
disproportionate influence in international affairs.”75 Such criticisms were, in fact, rather
common during the 1990s as government budget cutbacks to DFAIT, the military, and
CIDA limited Canada’s ability to impact events abroad. Other critics go further and
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suggest that the language of Canada as a middle power is designed to do more than
merely overstate the importance of Canada on the world stage, but to legitimize state
power76 and whitewash the darker side of Canadian foreign policy.77
The image of Canada as a middle power originated in the 1940s and was the
dominant view of Canada during the 1950s, a period of time often referred to as the
“Golden Age” of Canadian foreign policy.78 During this time, Canada participated
actively in the establishment of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Canada also made a major contribution to
the Colombo Plan to promote economic development in South East Asia, the Korean
War, and the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Egypt
following the 1956 invasion of that country by the United Kingdom, France and Israel. In
1957, Lester B. Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in resolving the
Suez Canal Crisis, an achievement that has come to be regarded as the apex of Canadian
middle power diplomacy.
However, the golden age of Canadian foreign policy lasted only a little more than
a decade. By the 1960s, Canada’s influence on the world stage began to wane as
European economies recovered from the war while developing world states throughout
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Africa, Asia and the Middle East attained independence. Domestically, the country
debated whether it should engage in a liberal internationalist foreign policy or one more
closely tied to strengthening Canada’s bilateral relationship with the United Kingdom. In
1960, Secretary of State for External Affairs Howard Green argued that the country
should “drop the idea that Canada’s role in world affairs was to be an honest broker.”79 In
1967, UN Secretary-General U Thant accepted a request by Egypt to withdraw
peacekeepers from the Sinai, a decision made without Security Council consultation and
one that stunned Prime Minister Pearson. It was an unceremonious end to Canada’s
peacekeeping mission in Egypt and appeared to some as an indicator of the limits of
Canadian middle power diplomacy and a sign of how much the world had changed since
1945.
Despite these developments, those who regarded Canada as a middle power could
continue to find support for this belief in a variety of foreign policy decisions. Canada
remained committed to UN peacekeeping and sent a large contingent to Cyprus in 1964,
where the Canadian mission would remain for almost three decades. Canada stayed out of
America’s war in Vietnam. In his post-Prime Minister years, Pearson played a leading
role in encouraging Western states to increase their foreign aid budgets. Even the election
of Pierre Elliott Trudeau and his explicit promise to alter dramatically the landscape of
Canadian foreign policy proved in the end to be more rhetoric than reality. In 1970, the
government published the results of its major foreign policy review, Foreign Policy for
Canadians, a series of books that recommended a more realist-oriented foreign policy
concerned with promoting economic growth at home and protecting Canadian
sovereignty and national interests abroad. Like others before him, Trudeau believed that
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Canada should be more than a mere helpful fixer. In practice, however, much of
Canadian foreign policy under Trudeau remained consistent with the middle power
framework. Throughout the 1970s, Canada continued to participate actively in UN
peacekeeping missions and in the early 1980s, Trudeau’s government created the
Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS) and launched a global
“peace initiative” effort to promote nuclear disarmament. Indeed, Trudeau even defended
his peace initiative by telling Parliament that, “preventing the spread of nuclear weapons
is in the interest of superpower, middle power and micro-states alike.”80
The Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney, despite eschewing
the use of term middle power, made several policy decisions that could be viewed in this
tradition as well, such as continuing support for UN peacekeeping, adopting an
increasingly critical stance toward the apartheid government in South Africa, and offering
strong support for the Montreal Protocol and global efforts to protect the environment.
And as Nossal, Roussel and Paquin note, Mulroney was also known to invoke the middle
power narrative to defend some of his policies, including referencing the legacy of
Pearson while defending Canada’s participation in the Gulf War.81 Finally, the
government of Jean Chrétien also adopted several policies that could be viewed within
the middle power framework. The Axworthy Doctrine, named after Foreign Affairs
Minister Lloyd Axworthy, emphasized a foreign policy concerned with promoting human
security rather than state security. Key policies in this regard include the promotion of the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the establishment of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which developed the “Responsibility
80

As quoted in Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy, 19.

81

Nossal, Roussel and Paquin. International Policy, 58.

46

to Protect” doctrine.
In sum, the history of Canadian foreign policy during the second half of the
twentieth century provide proponents of the view of Canada as a middle power with
many examples to cite in defence of this framework. However, the narrative of Canada as
a middle power is only one of several competing frameworks used to describe the
determinants and purposes of Canadian foreign policy, and, as will be discussed below,
proponents of other frameworks offer starkly different interpretations of Canadian foreign
policy.

2.2.2 – Canada as a satellite/dependent power
Whereas the view of Canada as a middle power characterizes Canada as an active
participant in world politics, the view of Canada as a satellite or dependent power
describes Canada as a much more passive actor. In this view, Canada is perceived as a
smaller power on the world stage and adopts a foreign policy concerned primarily with
managing relations with its most powerful ally. Prior to the Second World War, Canada’s
most powerful ally was the United Kingdom and, until the 1931 Statute of Westminster,
Canadian foreign policy was heavily shaped by Britain. Canada was a loyal member of
the British Commonwealth and therefore had few foreign policy interests beyond serving
the interests of the United Kingdom. Following the end of the Second World War,
however, this orientation changed dramatically as the United Kingdom’s status on the
world stage fell while the United States rose to become a superpower. The post-War
order would be defined by the world’s two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet
Union, and in this context, Canada was naturally aligned with the United States. Thus,
47

Canada adopted a foreign policy designed to supplement the key goals of American
foreign policy, which was to halt the spread of communism in Europe and the developing
world and promote a global economic order controlled by the capitalist democracies of
the West. Hence, Canada is often viewed as little more than a junior partner of the United
States. As indicated in footnote 29, this view of Canada as a satellite state orbiting around
the hegemonic order of the US has been embraced by many scholars of Canadian foreign
policy.
Since 1945, the view of Canada as a satellite state has been the second most
commonly used framework for examining Canadian foreign policy, and many of the
debates about Canadian foreign policy during the 1950s and 1960s focused on whether
this view or the middle power framework best explained Canada’s place in the world.82
Broadly, the satellite state framework suggests that Canada was a Western capitalist
democracy that was in no sense neutral or “in the middle” during the Cold War struggle
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Rather, Canada was a committed
member of the US-led military alliance organized around NATO and NORAD, and
Canadian foreign policy rarely departed from the goals pursued by the United States.
While Canada’s multitude of peacekeeping missions helped to bring some degree of
stability to geo-politically unstable hot spots in the world, they did so under the umbrella
of US power. For example, the United States was opposed to the UK-French-Israeli
attack against Egypt in 1956 and expressed concern that the attack would escalate
tensions with the Soviet Union and drive Arab states into the Soviet sphere of influence.
UN peacekeeping could thus be seen to fit perfectly with US interests to resolve the crisis

82

J. L. Granatstein, ed. Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite? (Toronto: The
Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1969).

48

as quickly as possible. Subsequent UN peacekeeping missions in the Congo and Cyprus
can also be seen in the context of the Cold War, as each mission sought to prevent the
expansion of Soviet influence in the developing world. From this perspective, Canada’s
participation in UN peacekeeping missions has been viewed as merely a form of Cold
War foreign policy by other means.83 As David Cox notes, “there is perhaps an element
of wishful thinking in seeking to be at once a loyal member of the Western Alliance and a
neutral middle power with considerable freedom of action.”84
In addition to their focus on Canadian defence policy, proponents of the satellite
framework also highlight Canadian economic policy and point to the rapidly growing
economic ties between the United States and Canada as evidence that Canadian policy
makers have limited flexibility in an increasingly globalized economy. During the
Diefenbaker years, for example, the Prime Minister was ultimately unable to fulfill his
pledge to divert 15 percent of Canada’s trade with the United States to the United
Kingdom. A decade later, the Trudeau government established the Foreign Investment
Review Agency (FIRA) in an effort to monitor foreign investment in Canada and ensure
that it was consistent with the Canadian national interest, but this policy did little to halt
the growth in trade and investment between the two countries. The 1988 Canadian federal
election was fought almost entirely over the issue of free trade with the United States, and
in the end resulted in the establishment of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA). When the
Liberal Party of Canada won government in 1993, it quickly reversed its previous
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opposition to the FTA and even expanded it to include Mexico under the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As a result of these and similar developments,
proponents of the view of Canada as a satellite state argue that Canada has only limited
control over its domestic economic policy and must cater to the business demands of
external actors.
Critics of the view of Canada as a satellite state, however, have suggested that the
framework puts too much emphasis on the structural constraints of the global political
and economic order and, accordingly, understates the degree of agency that the Canadian
state possesses in shaping its defence and economic policy. Far from being inevitable,
Canada’s increasing economic integration with the United States can be seen as the result
of a series of policy choices made by elected officials in Ottawa who have greater room
to manoeuvre than proponents of the satellite view would suggest. At a normative level,
assessments of Canada as a satellite state of the United States might be criticized for their
almost uniform belief that such a relationship is politically or ethically undesirable.
Hence, the satellite state argument is often advanced from an economic nationalist
political persuasion and presented in polemical terms.85
In sum, the satellite state framework has been an enduring part of scholarly
discussions about Canadian foreign policy for most of the country’s history and will
likely remain part of the debate so long as Canada continues its membership in US-led
organizations like NATO and NORAD and actively seeks to integrate into the North
American and global economy.
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2.2.3 – Canada as a foremost/principal power
The third major scholarly framework for examining Canada’s place on the world
stage holds that Canada is a foremost or principal power that is roughly on par with the
world’s great powers, or at least fairly close to them. Emphasizing Canada’s vast
economic, natural, technological and diplomatic resources, this view suggests that
Canada occupies a top position among states within the hierarchy of the international
system and that Canada accordingly holds significant influence on the world stage. As
indicated in footnote 30, this framework has several adherents among scholars of
Canadian foreign policy.
Relative to the middle power and satellite frameworks, the foremost or principal
power framework was a late-comer to scholarly debates on Canadian foreign policy. The
view emerged only in the mid-1970s after the election of Trudeau and during a time of
world politics in which America’s global position seemed to be in decline following the
Vietnam War, the 1973 oil-embargo and the Watergate scandal. Hence, just as the
Canadian Prime Minister was rhetorically embracing the idea of Canada more boldly
pursuing its national interest, the relative decline of American power appeared to create
an international context in which other states could fill the emerging power vacuum. In a
1975 article, James Eayrs sought to define “a new place for Canada in the hierarchy of
world power” above that of middle power as Canada “has almost sinfully bestowed upon
it the sources of power, both traditional and new.” Canada was thus a “foremost power”
in the sense of it being “most notable or prominent.”86 A few years later, Peyton V. Lyon
and Brian Tomlin offered a quantitative ranking of state military and economic power
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and concluded that Canada ranked as the world’s sixth most powerful country.87 David
Dewitt and John Kirton subsequently argued that Canada was a “principal power” and
that “Canada’s objective capability—grounded in the relative size, breadth, and diversity
of its natural resources, advanced technology, and skilled population and in other
standard calculations of national power—places it predominantly within the top tier of
the system.”88
However, the view of Canada as a foremost or principal power has attracted few
adherents among scholars of Canadian foreign policy. The end of the Cold War and the
emergence of America as an unchallenged superpower during the 1990s put to rest for the
time any notion that the United States was declining and creating a power vacuum for
other states to fill. Moreover, the principal power framework was viewed by most
scholars of Canadian foreign policy to simply overstate the amount of power and
influence that Canada holds.89 This seemed particularly evident during the 1990s when
Canada’s focus on deficit reduction resulted in significant cuts in military and foreign aid
spending. Thus, the foremost or principal power framework has had a rather short shelflife among scholars of Canadian foreign policy.

2.2.4 – Canada on the world stage at the World Conference against Racism
The three frameworks addressing Canada’s power position on the world stage
provide vastly different assumptions and expectations about the determinants and
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outcomes of Canadian foreign policy, and have allowed for productive debate among
scholars of Canadian foreign policy.90 In that vein, the three frameworks can also provide
a useful foundation for the study of Canada and the 2001 UN World Conference against
Racism. Canada was an active participant at both the preparatory meetings in Geneva and
elsewhere as well as at Durban itself. Canada brought to this process its own set of ideas,
values and interests about how the UN could proceed with its efforts to address racism at
the international and domestic level. At the same time, UN politics is frequently prone to
produce bloc politics in which like-minded states work together to advance a common
agenda while working against opposing blocs that seek to advance a competing agenda.
Hence, Canada’s relationships with the United States and European states cannot be
overlooked as important factors that helped to shape Canada’s approach to the World
Conference. As such, the study of Canada and the World Conference against Racism can
be seen as a useful case study to contribute to ongoing scholarly debates about the
relative usefulness of the middle power, satellite/dependency, and principal power
frameworks within the larger study of Canadian foreign policy.
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CHAPTER 3: UN CONFERENCES AND PREVIOUS CONFERENCES ON
RACISM
In order to best examine Canada’s contribution to the 2001 World Conference
against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, it is helpful
to situate this experience within a broader historical and political context. The goal of this
brief chapter is to discuss the international context in which the World Conference
against Racism occurred and the Canadian response to these developments. The chapter
begins by introducing the concept of UN conferences, in general, and discusses the rapid
rise and evolving nature of these global UN-organized events. The chapter then focuses
specifically on the two previous UN racism conferences, which occurred in 1978 and
1983, respectively, and provides some analysis of Canada’s participation at these two
conferences.

3.1 - United Nations Conferences
United Nations Conferences are a unique form of international diplomacy that is
designed to focus attention on specific global issues and problems and to contribute
toward the creation and implementation of international and national policy solutions to
these issues. According to the United Nations Joint Inspection Unit (JIU), a global
conference can be defined as:
a conference that is not part of the regular recurrent conference programme of a
biennium, but that is convened in response to a specific resolution by the General
Assembly or the Economic and Social Council, for whose substantive preparation and
specific additional budgetary provisions are made and which all States are normally
invited to attend. Such a conference usually extends over a period of a minimum of two
to a maximum of four to six weeks and requires an intensive level of planning and
servicing.91
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Generally, each UN conference focuses on a specific theme, such as the environment,
trade and economic development, human rights, women’s rights, racism, food, or
population growth (to name only a few). Each conference occurs in a designated hostcountry, thus bringing together in one location delegates from UN member states from
around the world. Since the 1970s, non-state actors, such as NGOs, indigenous
organizations, journalists, academics, and publicly renowned individuals, have been
given a larger role to play as well. As a result, UN conferences are a forum for both
traditional multilateral negotiations between states as well as a forum for various nonstate actors to participate in the process of global governance.
UN conferences vary according to their purposes, procedures and outcomes.
Volker Rittberger has differentiated between “action-oriented” conferences and “rulemaking” conferences. Action-oriented conferences “enunciate and/or affirm basic
principles governing the interaction of states (and, to some extent, of non-state actors,
too) in a certain issue area, and promulgate broad mandates or guidelines for collective
action at the national, regional and global level.” Generally, this is done by producing two
separate, but complementary, written documents—a declaration and a programme of
action. By contrast, rule-making conferences “focus on the drafting of a convention,
treaty or other international legal instrument with the intent of codifying, altering, or
adding to, the existing body of international public law.”92 UN conferences also differ
according to the frequency and regularity with which they meet. Some conferences meet
on a regularly scheduled basis, such as the Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), which meets every four years. Other conferences are ad hoc, and occur only
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when specifically convened by an organ of the UN, usually the Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) or the General Assembly.
The UN began convening conferences almost immediately after its creation.
Jacques Fomerand identifies the first such gathering as the 1947-1948 Havana conference
on Trade and Employment.93 However, it would not be until the early 1970s that UN
conferences emerged as major events on the global scene, following the 1972 Conference
on the Human Environment in Stockholm, Sweden. Throughout the 1970s, several UN
conferences were held addressing a wide variety of economic and social issues, but by the
1980s, UN conferences became less frequent. The rapid rise and relative decline of UN
conferences can be explained as a reflection of broader trends occurring in world politics
and at the United Nations during this time. The United Nations was founded in 1945
primarily by states from North America, Europe and Latin America. Throughout the
1940s and 1950s, the major goals of the UN reflected the geo-political interests of the
United States and its allies, principally the containment of Soviet communism and the
selective promotion of civil and political rights in that context. However, as Western
colonialism came to an end, new sovereign states emerged throughout Africa and Asia
and became members of the United Nations. Whereas the UN had only 51 member states
in 1945, by 1960, it had 99 members and by 1980, it had 154. The UN’s newer members
brought their own agenda to the world body, focusing on issues such as economic
development, global economic inequality and nuclear disarmament. Hence, UN
conferences were often initiated at the behest of developing world states, which viewed
these conferences as opportunities to discuss issues that were not being addressed by the
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United Nations, and particularly by the Security Council, which remained firmly in the
control of the five veto-wielding states.
However, the 1980s witnessed a decline in the frequency of UN conferences,
which can be attributed, in part, to the dual rise of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in
the United Kingdom and President Ronald Reagan in the United States. Both leaders
viewed the United Nations with deep scepticism and sought to resist the growing
influence of developing world states within the halls of the UN. In addition, there was a
widespread sense—and not only among Western states—that UN conferences had often
failed to live up to expectations. UN conferences cost time, money and resources and
often did little to produce tangible results. Nonetheless, during the 1990s, UN
Conferences witnessed a moderate revival, largely as a result of renewed confidence in
the United Nations following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold
War.
UN conferences are inherently political events. Key stakeholders often do not
agree about what issues should be on the agenda, how they should be addressed, or even
whether it is desirable to hold a conference in the first place. Even successful conferences
are not able to resolve every issue addressed, and the more contentious conferences often
serve only to exacerbate tensions between participants at the state and non-state level.
Understandably, opinions about the utility of UN conferences are mixed. Michael
Schechter provides a summary of the common contributions and critiques of global
conferences. To their supporters, the major contributions of UN conferences are their
ability to mobilize governments, NGOs and other engaged political actors, establish new
behavioural and normative standards at the global level, introduce new ideas and
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proposals, and help monitor progress made toward addressing existing global problems.
To their critics, UN conferences are wildly expensive, duplicative of existing
international mechanisms, and dominated by considerations of political self-interest.94
What is beyond debate, however, is that UN conferences have developed during the past
few decades to become permanent fixtures on the international political landscape.

3.2 – United Nations Conferences on Racism
Although the Durban Conference is probably the mostly widely known of the
UN’s conferences on racism, it was not the first time the world body organized a global
conference to address this topic. The World Conference against Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance was preceded by two UN racism
conferences held in 1978 and 1983. Both of these conferences were dominated by debates
about apartheid South Africa and the politics of the Middle East, particularly the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Developing world states used their numerical advantage to control
the agenda and push for language in the conference texts that was strongly critical of
South Africa and Israel. Western states sought to minimize criticism of these two states
and were especially forceful in rejecting efforts to label Zionism as a form of racism. The
United States and Israel did not attend either of the two conferences and most Western
states—including Canada—walked out of the 1978 conference before its conclusion to
protest the language used to describe Israel. In the end, both conferences exacerbated
tensions between Western states and developing world states and failed to produce
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significant consensus among participants.95

3.2.1 - The World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination
The first UN conference on racism was held from August 14 to 25, 1978, and
occurred in the context of a much larger and sustained effort by the United Nations to
address the issue of racism. While some of this work succeeded in promoting
international agreement in the fight against racism, some of it served only to exacerbate
differences among states. In 1965, the General Assembly adopted the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, which entered into legal force in 1969.
In 1972, the General Assembly initiated the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and
Racial Discrimination, which officially began in December 1973.96 To help organize the
UN’s activities for the Decade, the General Assembly adopted the “Programme for the
Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination,” which declared, inter
alia, that a major feature of the Decade would be the convening of a world conference to
address racism and racial discrimination. The Programme noted that the main theme of
the conference would be:
the adoption of effective ways and means and concrete measures for securing the full and
universal implementation of United Nations decisions and resolutions on racism, racial
discrimination, apartheid, decolonization and self-determination, as well as the accession
to and ratification and enforcement of the international instruments relating to human
rights and the elimination of racism and racial discrimination. 97
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Social Council established a 23 Member State Preparatory Sub-Committee to assist with
the preparation of the conference, but already by that time, the value of the United
Nations as an appropriate institution for addressing the issue of racism had become
severely contested. In 1975, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 3379, which
declared Zionism to be a form of racism.98 While states from the developing world
supported the resolution, Western states did not, and a major impact of the resolution was
to further reinforce and magnify existing geo-political divisions at the UN. As a result of
the resolution, the United States declared that it would not participate in any event
associated with the UN decade to combat racism, including the 1978 racism conference.99
Similarly, Israel stated that it would not attend the conference. The World Conference to
Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination was, thus, controversial even before it began.
The conference produced both a declaration and a programme of action, which
together amounted to an 18-page document containing 69 paragraphs.100 The conference
focused primarily on apartheid South Africa and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but also
briefly addressed the treatment of indigenous peoples, migrant workers and immigrants.
The majority of the conference declaration and programme of action, however, addressed
the issue of apartheid, which is mentioned directly in seven of the 27 paragraphs in the
conference declaration, and in 19 of the 42 paragraphs in the conference programme of
action. By contrast, Israel was directly referenced only in two paragraphs in the
declaration and was not referenced once in the programme of action. Beyond South
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Africa and Israel (and the unrecognized state of Rhodesia which was briefly referenced),
no other state was mentioned by name or singled out for criticism in either the declaration
or programme of action. This limited agenda reflected the political preferences of most
states in the developing world, particularly those in Africa and the Middle East. Hence,
the focus was exclusively on racism committed by a few Western states and was not
balanced by any corresponding mention of racism perpetrated by states elsewhere in the
world, such as anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, the expulsion of South Asians from
Uganda or the Cambodian genocide.
Regarding South Africa, the conference declaration stated that apartheid is a
“crime against humanity and an affront to the dignity of mankind.” The declaration
further stated that South Africa posed a “threat to peace and security in the world,”
language designed to invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The conference programme
of action sought to isolate South Africa politically and economically, calling upon states
to “prevent transnational corporations and other vested interests from collaborating with
the racist regimes in southern Africa” and requesting the UN Security Council to
“consider urgently the imposition of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, against the apartheid regime of South
Africa and the racist regimes of southern Africa.”
Regarding Israel, the conference declaration “condemns the existing and
increasing relations between the zionist State of Israel and the racist regime of South
Africa, in particular those in the economic and military fields, and deplores and warns
against co-operation between them in the nuclear field ... the Conference views this cooperation as an act of deliberate choice, and a hostile act against the oppressed people of
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South Africa.” The declaration also:
recalls with deep regret the cruel tragedy which befell the Palestinian people 30 years ago
and which they continue to endure today—manifested in their being prevented from
exercising their right to self-determination on the soil of their homeland, in the dispersal
of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, the prevention of their return to their homes,
and the establishment therein of settlers from abroad, and in the practice of diverse forms
of racial discrimination against Palestinians affecting all aspects of their daily lives in a
manner which prevents their enjoyment of their elementary human rights on a basis of
equality.

On the topic of indigenous peoples, the declaration “endorses the right of
indigenous peoples to maintain their traditional structure of economy and culture,
including their own language, and also recognizes the special relationship of indigenous
peoples to their land and stresses that their land, land rights and natural resources should
not be taken away from them.” The programme of action “urges States to allow
indigenous peoples within their territories to develop cultural and social links with their
own kith and kin everywhere, with strict respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity
and political independence and non-interference in the internal affairs of those countries
in which the indigenous peoples live.”
The references to South Africa put Western states in an awkward situation
because while they were, at least in principle, opposed to the policy of apartheid, they
were unwilling to support the strong language used in the document to characterize the
government of South Africa and the particular policy suggestions intended to bring about
an immediate end to the apartheid regime. Hence, while Western states did not make
significant efforts during the negotiations to remove the references to South Africa from
the declaration and programme of action, most of these states issued statements of
reservation at the end of the conference announcing that they could not accept many of
the paragraphs that addressed South Africa. For example, the Federal Republic of
Germany, on behalf of the nine-member European Economic Community (EEC), stated
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that “although we understand the feeling behind the phrase “crime against humanity”, we
cannot for well-known legal reasons accept this reference” and that “as regards the
references to a threat to international peace and security in this paragraph, we do not
consider this wording, taken from Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to be
appropriate in these circumstances.”101
Western opposition to the references to Israel, by contrast, was far more steadfast
and proved to be a deal breaker. Not only did Western states try to remove these
references during the negotiations, but when it became clear that they would not succeed
in their efforts, they withdrew from the conference altogether. On the conference’s final
day, Syria requested roll call votes on the inclusion of each of the two paragraphs that
mentioned Israel in the declaration. The vote passed easily, as Western states constituted
only a numerical minority at the conference, but the process provided them an
opportunity to voice their concerns on the official record. Immediately following the
second of the two votes, the nine members of the EEC, joined by Australia, Canada and
New Zealand, announced that they would no longer participate in the conference.
Norway and Iceland subsequently withdrew as well. An article from the Globe and Mail
at the time noted that “West German ambassador Per Fischer, speaking for the EEC
delegates, told reporters he believes it is the first time the European nine, acting as a bloc,
have withdrawn from a UN forum in mid-session. ‘Regrettable, but in the end inevitable,’
he said.”102 Following the withdrawal of most Western states from the conference, the
remaining states adopted the declaration and programme of action by a vote of 88 in
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support, four against and two abstentions. Having withdrawn from the conference,
Canada did not cast a vote.
Canada did, however, issue a brief statement of reservation expressing its position
on the conference and the reason for its withdrawal. The statement said that the two
paragraphs mentioning Israel “went beyond the legitimate parameters” of the conference
and that Canada “could not, therefore, continue to associate itself with the proceedings of
the Conference after the acceptance of these paragraphs.” Canada continued that because
“these extraneous elements have been incorporated in the Declaration and Programme of
Action as a whole ... the Canadian delegation has therefore found it necessary to
dissociate itself completely from these texts.”103
In addition, a subsequent written report by the Department of External Affairs
summarized Canada’s experience at the conference in less diplomatic terms.104 The report
began bluntly by declaring that “the conference did not go well.” The report noted that
the declaration and programme of action “contained many elements that caused us
difficulty, but we were particularly concerned about two paragraphs that singled out
Israel for its links with South Africa, used the term “Zionism” in a derogatory sense, and
accused Israel of racial discrimination against the Palestinians.” The report also noted that
“attempts by the Canadian Delegation to remove the unacceptable paragraphs on the
Middle East and to promote compromise language for the Declaration gained the support
of the Western group and were well received by some of the moderate non-aligned. But
the atmosphere at the Conference had become so polarized that it turned out to be

103

Report of the World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. A/CONF.92/40.

104

Government of Canada, “World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, Geneva, 1425 August, 1978.” (August 29, 1978).

64

impossible to bring about a consensus.”

3.2.2 - The Second World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination
Held from August 1 to 12, 1983, the second UN racism conference was timed to
mark the close of the UN Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial
Discrimination. Coming only five years after the first conference on racism, Western
states were concerned that another conference would exacerbate the divisions that had
marred the first. For their part, UN officials were cautiously optimistic about the
opportunity to effectively hold a “do over” of the first conference. In his opening address
to the second conference, James Jonah, the Conference Secretary-General, pleaded with
states to “exercise maximum restraint in ensuring that we do not repeat the events of 1978
which in the long run proved to be detrimental to a successful outcome of the Decade
which comes to an end this year.”105 To that end, Jonah’s address focused almost entirely
on the need for states to work toward the eradication of apartheid and was careful to
avoid any mention of the Middle East.
Nonetheless, the second conference was, for the most part, a repeat of the first.
One notable difference was that Western states did not withdraw from the conference
despite their disagreement with several portions of the declaration and programme of
action. But once again, the United States and Israel refused to attend. As expected, the
conference focused again on South Africa and Israel while ignoring events in any other
part of the world. On South Africa, the declaration stated that apartheid was a “crime
against humanity and a threat to international peace and security.” The programme of
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action “further reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South
Africa and Namibia and their national liberation movements for the elimination of
apartheid by all available means, including armed struggle, and the special responsibility
of the United Nations and the international community to provide them with moral,
political and material assistance in the realization of their quest to exercise their right to
self-determination.” For their part, Western states reiterated their position that while they
were opposed to the policy of apartheid, they did not consider it legally accurate to label
it a crime against humanity, and they were not willing to support language designed to
invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In addition, they objected to the programme of
action’s support of “armed struggle” against the apartheid regime and voted against the
inclusion of this paragraph in the final text.
The declaration included two paragraphs referencing Israel—one addressing
diplomatic cooperation between Israel and South Africa and another on Israeli policies
toward the “Palestinians and the other inhabitants of the Arab territories occupied by
Israel.” While the paragraph on Israeli-South African relations was repeated almost
verbatim from the 1978 text, the second paragraph was comparatively less inflammatory
than the language used at the first racism conference. The second paragraph read:
The Conference recalls with deep regret the practices of racial discrimination against the
Palestinians as well as other inhabitants of the Arab occupied territories which have such
an impact on all aspects of their daily existence that they prevent the enjoyment of their
fundamental rights; the Conference expresses its deep concern about this situation and
calls for the cessation of all the practices of racial discrimination to which the Palestinians
and the other inhabitants of the Arab territories occupied by Israel are subjected. 106

The decision to use more moderate language reflected the desire of developing world
states to criticize Israel in a manner that would not provoke the sort of strong backlash
from Western states that occurred at the first racism conference. In this regard, they were
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successful. Western states voiced their displeasure by voting against the inclusion of each
of these two paragraphs, but they did not withdraw from the conference.
On the topic of indigenous rights, the conference took the notable step of
refraining from using, as it had in 1978, the term “indigenous peoples” and used in its
place the term “indigenous populations.” The choice of terminology is significant
because the UN Charter, as well as a variety of other international legal documents, grant
self-determination rights to peoples, but not to populations.107 For example, the UN
Charter twice refers to “the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,”
while making no mention whatsoever of the term “populations.” The decision to use the
term populations rather than peoples was therefore viewed by indigenous peoples as an
effort to limit their rights under international law.
In the end, the declaration was adopted by a vote of 101 in support, 12 against and
three abstentions while the programme of action was adopted by a vote of 104 in support,
zero against and 10 abstentions. As they explained in their respective statement of
reservations, Western states opposed the declaration because of the two paragraphs
referring to Israel, and while they were critical of some of the language used in the
programme of action to describe South Africa, they were content to abstain rather than
vote against the text as a whole.
Canada voted against the declaration and abstained on the programme of action.
In its statement of reservation, Canada said that it “would have liked to be able to
associate itself more closely than its vote indicates with the Declaration and Programme
of Action” and that the texts “contain a large number of measures and recommendations
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which will guide Canada” in its efforts to combat racism, racial discrimination and
apartheid. Canada stated that it “unequivocally condemns the institutionalized racism
which apartheid represents.” But Canada also said that it was “unable to associate itself
with the Declaration because political matters extraneous to the fundamental concerns of
the Conference have been introduced into it.” Canada referred to the two paragraphs on
Israel as “unacceptable to Canada” and “outside the terms of reference of the
Conference” and further stated that “certain references to South Africa are likewise
drafted in terms that are unacceptable to Canada.” Regarding the Programme of Action,
Canada stated that it supported “most” of the text, but had “serious reservations” about
some of the measures recommended against South Africa.
A subsequent report by the Department of External Affairs described the
declaration as a “package worthy of support from all delegates if it had not contained a
couple of litigious paragraphs ... dealing with relations between Israel and South Africa
and the treatment of inhabitants of the Arab occupied territories by Israel.”108 Canada
opined that “without these two paragraphs, the Declaration would most probably have
been adopted unanimously.” Canada further suggested that the Programme of Action was
met with “general support and would have been endorsed by all delegations, with few
reservations, if it had not been for some aspects of the section on apartheid,” in particular
the paragraph supporting “armed struggle” against the government of South Africa. In a
section discussing Canada’s contribution to the conference, the report stated that Canada
focused on the issue of “systemic discrimination and affirmative action” and could claim
significant credit for the inclusion of several paragraphs in the Declaration and
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Programme of Action, such as those endorsing affirmative action programmes, antiracism education curricula, and “non-discrimination, with particular regard to refugees
fleeing from apartheid, racism and racial discrimination.” The report concluded on an
optimistic note about the future impact of the racism conference, stating an expectation
that UN racism conferences were likely to become regular events occurring on a five-year
basis and that the Conference Declaration and Programme of Action are “likely to inspire
and support the efforts of governments, non-governmental organizations and individuals
combating racism and racial discrimination.”

3.3 - Conclusion
In the end, the first and second World Conferences to Combat Racism and Racial
Discrimination failed to achieve their principal goals of promoting greater international
cooperation among states and strengthening the UN as an effective institution in the fight
against racism. From the outset, the conferences were hindered by geo-political divisions
between states. Because the conferences placed so much focus on only a few Western
states, they created a political environment in which it was impossible for states to reach
a consensus, especially on the topic of the Middle East. Disagreement about the
usefulness of the two conferences ultimately prevented the UN from establishing
conferences on racism as regular events occurring every five years. As Schechter noted,
the experience of the two conferences made clear that it “would not make much sense to
convene another global conference on this topic until the “Zionism as racism” resolution
had been dumped in the dustbin of world history.”109
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CHAPTER 4: THE INTERNATIONAL PREPARATIONS (PART I)
Like any United Nations conference, the World Conference against Racism,
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance was preceded by months of
extensive preparatory work as states and UN officials worked to establish the
conference’s themes, agenda and substantive content. At the international level, Canada
participated actively throughout this process and attended key regional and multilateral
meetings beginning in the spring of 2000 and continuing until the World Conference in
September 2001. Chapter 4 begins the analysis of these meetings. It examines the first of
three Preparatory Committee meetings at which states negotiated and established the
scope and domain of the World Conference, and focuses on Canada’s participation
therein. It also discusses Canada’s participation at the Regional Conference of the
Americas, which was held in Chile, in December, 2000.

4.1 - The First Preparatory Committee Meeting
Held at the UN Office in Geneva from May 1 to 5, 2000, the first Preparatory
Committee meeting was the first major event of the international preparations for the
World Conference against Racism.110 Organized by the UN Commission on Human
Rights, which had been tasked with managing the UN’s preparations for the World
Conference, the meeting was attended by 125 UN Member States as well as two nonmember states represented by observers (Holy See and Switzerland) and one non-state
observer (Palestine). Also in attendance were numerous UN bodies and human rights
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mechanisms, specialized UN agencies, several intergovernmental organizations and
dozens of NGOs, including some Canadian NGOs.
In her opening address, Mary Robinson, the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights and Secretary-General of the WCAR, stated that the World Conference had the
potential to be “a landmark in the struggle to eradicate all forms of racism.”111 Robinson
noted that while the two previous UN racism conferences had focused primarily on
apartheid South Africa, the upcoming conference—fully entitled the World Conference
against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance—“extends
its scope to the many forms of racism and bigotry in our modern world, to xenophobia in
all its manifestations; to anti-Semitism; negrophobia; discrimination against indigenous
peoples, migrants, refugees, displaced persons and the minority communities such as the
Roma and Sinti.” In an effort to put pressure on Western states, in particular, Robinson
emphasized the “economic dimension” of racism and stated that the “gulf between the
rich and the very large numbers who live in dire poverty is widening all the time ... While
some are aware of this gulf and attempt to bridge it, many prefer to adopt a fortress
mentality, based on a determination to defend their prosperity against perceived external
threats.” She also noted that governments carry a particular responsibility to combat
racism, but that “unfortunately, not all political leaders act in a responsible way. The rise
of far right parties in Europe is a clear example of unscrupulous politicians playing on
fears.” Notably absent from Robinson’s address, however, was any reference to the
politics of the Middle East, an issue that had occupied a central place on the agenda of the
two previous racism conferences, and which, as Robinson surely knew at the time, had
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the potential to dominate the upcoming conference as well.
The agenda of the first Preparatory Committee meeting was devoted in large part
to technical and procedural matters, including establishing rules of procedure, addressing
the issue of NGO participation, and selecting the dates, duration and venue of the
conference. Early on in the session, states unanimously accepted an offer by South Africa
to serve as the host country. The first session also set the timeline for subsequent
international preparations, deciding that a second session of the Preparatory Committee
would be held in May 2001 and that an inter-sessional working group would be held in
January 2001. States also decided on a slogan for the World Conference: “United to
Combat Racism: Equality, Justice, Dignity.” Additionally, states received written reports
pertinent to the international effort to combat racism produced by various UN specialized
agencies and treaty bodies. These reports helped to inform the negotiation process.
The Canadian delegation at the first Preparatory Committee meeting consisted of
three officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, two from
the Department of Canadian Heritage, and one from the Canadian Human Rights
Commission. As mentioned in Chapter 1, DFAIT’s main responsibilities for the World
Conference were to lead the Canadian delegation during the preparatory processes and at
the World Conference itself, coordinate Canada’s position on international issues, consult
and negotiate with other states, and consult with the various administrative arms of the
UN. As explained in a DFAIT pre-assessment of the meeting, Canada approached the
first Preparatory Committee meeting with five key objectives.112 Canada wanted the
World Conference to establish a broad and forward-looking agenda, involve significant
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NGO participation, involve significant youth participation, and ensure the involvement of
various UN specialized agencies. In addition, Canada planned to use the meeting as an
opportunity to prepare for the upcoming regional preparatory meeting of the Americas,
scheduled to be held in December. The remainder of this chapter thus evaluates Canada’s
participation at the first Preparatory Committee meeting in the context of Canada’s
priorities for the meeting.
To begin, Canada wanted the first Preparatory Committee meeting to address
“broad themes of the conference agenda and the potential range of outcomes.”
Significantly, Canada wanted the themes to be “consistent with a forward-looking,
results-oriented Conference and should discourage discussions that go into too much
detail on the agenda or attempt to narrow its potential scope.”113 Reading between the
lines of this seemingly innocuous statement reveals two important points about Canada’s
approach to the World Conference. First, members of the Canadian delegation had been
briefed on the previous UN racism conferences and were well aware of the divisive
debates that occurred over South Africa and Israel. Hence, Canada was keen to avoid
discussion of specific states and geopolitical conflicts, particularly the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Second, the phrase “forward-looking” was effectively a diplomatic euphemism
meaning that the conference should not explore the question of reparations for past
racially-motivated injustices. While Canada was willing to talk about its past, it did not
view the World Conference against Racism as an appropriate forum to help launch new
policies designed to provide resources to historically marginalized groups in Canada.
While the first Preparatory Committee meeting did not address the Middle East,
the question of reparations could not be avoided. After several days of negotiation, states
113
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adopted the five themes of the World Conference:
1) “Sources, causes, forms and contemporary manifestations of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance.
2) “Victims of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.
3) “Measures of prevention, education and protection aimed at the eradication of racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance at the national, regional and international
levels
4) “Provision of effective remedies, recourse, redress, [compensatory] and other measures at the
national, regional and international levels.
5) “Strategies to achieve full and effective equality, including international cooperation and
enhancement of the United Nations and other international mechanism in combating racism,
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, and follow-up.”114

The debate on the fourth theme was fraught with controversy and lasted late into the
evening on the final day of the Preparatory Committee meeting. African states pushed
strongly for the inclusion of the term “compensatory” and argued that the question of
reparations for the transatlantic slave trade should be discussed at the World Conference.
The reference to measures at the regional and international levels indicated that a key
component of this argument was the implementation of some form of state-to-state
reparations. The United States took the lead in opposing this position, and was joined by
other Western states, including Canada. The issue was resolved temporarily when states
agreed to put the term in square brackets, a common practice at the UN indicating that the
identified language had not been agreed upon by consensus and thus remained open for
subsequent negotiation.
There is no denying that the transatlantic slave trade was a racist and inhumane
practice, and that its political, economic and social consequences continue to be felt
today. During a period of roughly four hundred years, European and North America slave
traders transported more than 11 million African slaves across the Atlantic Ocean to the
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Americas.115 In addition, more than a million Africans died in captivity either in the
process of being transported from the African interior to coastal slave trading ports or
aboard ships sailing across the Atlantic Ocean. The transatlantic slave trade had severe
consequences not only for those individuals sold into slavery, but also for the African
societies from which they were taken and the societies to which they were transported.
Today, African countries remain among the poorest and least developed in the world,
while people of African descent throughout Europe and the region of the Americas
continue to face significant barriers to the full enjoyment of their human rights. While the
causes of these contemporary problems are multifaceted, the impact and legacy of the
transatlantic slave trade is certainly among one of the major causal factors.
Nonetheless, as Camponovo notes, Western states offered several “factual and
legal” arguments against reparations for the transatlantic slave trade.116 First, Western
states argued that it was problematic for the discussion about slavery at the World
Conference to focus narrowly on the history and legacy of the transatlantic slave trade
while ignoring the historical practice of slavery and the slave trade in other regions of the
world. Moreover, Western states noted that while they have since abolished the slave
trade and the practice of slavery, slavery continues to exist elsewhere in the world in the
present-day. Second, Western states argued that the discussion of the transatlantic slave
trade ignored the active role that some Africans played throughout the slave trade and the
fact that slavery in Africa existed prior to the arrival of Europeans in the fifteenth
century. Third, Western states argued that there are many reasons for Africa’s current
political and economic underdevelopment, and that it is inaccurate to assign a direct,
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causal link between these problems and the transatlantic slave trade. Fourth, Western
states felt that if the primary purpose of reparations was to compensate the victims of
slavery and the slave trade, then it would be misguided to implement state-to-state
reparations when the majority of the descendents of those victimized by the slave trade
live today in Europe and North America, not in Africa.117
Western states also advanced a legal argument against reparations. This argument
held that there is no basis in law for a claim of reparations for the transatlantic slave trade
because the practice was legal under international law at the time that it occurred.
International legal measures to eliminate slavery and the slave trade began only in the
late-eighteenth century, and among the more significant international laws and treaties in
this regard are the 1842 Webster-Ashburton Treaty; the 1862 Treaty for the Suppression
of the African Slave Trade; the 1885 General Act of Berlin; the 1890 General Act of
Brussels on the Slave Trade and Importation into Africa of Firearms, Ammunition, and
Spirituous Liquors; the 1919 Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye; and the 1926 Convention to
Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery.118 As Camponovo concludes, “since international
law did not consider slavery unlawful until at the earliest, the entry into force of the
Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye, claims for redress for acts of slavery could not
legitimately be based on acts that predated the turn of the twentieth century.”119
This conclusion effectively characterized Canada’s view of international law
during the reparations debate at the first Preparatory Committee meeting and throughout
the World Conference process. As a DFAIT report on the meeting explained, Canada
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expressed concern that “the reference to compensation, as drafted, could be interpreted as
going beyond the existing duty contained in international human rights treaties incumbent
on States to provide redress to victims of human rights violations, and entail some form
of international compensation.”120
In sum, the emergence of the reparations debate on the agenda of the World
Conference can be seen as a blow to Western states, which would have preferred to avoid
discussion of the issue altogether. Accordingly, it was also a blow to Canada’s efforts to
maintain what it called a “forward-looking” agenda. From the point of view of African
states, of course, the reparations debate was a vital part of the World Conference against
Racism agenda and one that Western states could not ignore. The debate that occurred on
this issue at the first Preparatory Committee meeting served as an early indicator of the
geopolitical divisions that would surround the World Conference and set the tone for
subsequent debate on the reparations issue throughout the World Conference process.
Canada’s second objective at the first Preparatory Committee meeting was to
advocate for widespread inclusion of NGOs throughout the Durban preparatory process
and at the World Conference itself. Here, Canada achieved some important success. Since
1996, NGO participation at the United Nations had operated within the framework of
Economic and Social Commission (ECOSOC) Resolution 1996/31, which established a
set of principles governing NGO “consultative status” with the United Nations. NGOs
that received consultative status had increased access and greater ability to present input
to various UN meetings. Any NGO that held consultative status with ECOSOC would
automatically receive accreditation to attend the World Conference against Racism and
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the parallel NGO Forum, but NGOs that did not hold this status would have to apply for
accreditation from the Preparatory Committee. Because the Preparatory Committee was
not scheduled to meet again until May 2001, Canada expressed concern that the
application process for NGO accreditation would be slow and burdensome, and that many
Canadian NGOs that lacked consultative status would face difficulty participating in the
World Conference. Canada thus successfully pushed for the UN to create a mechanism to
process NGO applications for accreditation while the Preparatory Committee was not in
session. Similarly, Canada “secured a fast-track accreditation process for indigenous
groups already accredited to the Working Group on the Draft Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples.”121
In addition, Canada wanted to “liaise early and frequently” with Canadian NGOs
at the first Preparatory Committee, noting that at “this planning stage of the domestic
consultation process, it will be important to set a precedent of a good working
relationship at this UN forum.”122 Once again, Canada achieved some success toward this
goal. Among the Canadian NGOs and other civil society groups that attended the first
Preparatory Committee Meeting were the African Canadian Coalition Against Racism
(ACCAR), the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), the Canadian Race Relations
Foundation (CRRF), Article 19, Human Rights Internet, the International Feminist
Alliance, Minority Rights Group, the International Centre for Human Rights and
Democratic Development (Rights and Democracy) and the Franciscans. According to a
report by the African Canadian Legal Clinic (a member of the ACCAR), the Canadian
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delegation held two formal meetings and several more informal meetings with Canadian
NGOs. During these meetings, the Canadian delegation briefed NGOs on key
developments at the multilateral negotiations while NGOs were offered an opportunity to
discuss their ideas and concerns with the government. The African Canadian Legal Clinic
(ACLC) raised questions about various issues, including the “flow of information from
government,” the level of NGO consultation, Canada’s plans to provide financial support
for NGOs to participate in the World Conference, and Canada’s definition of the term
“related intolerance.”123
At the same time, relations between the government and Canadian NGOs were
not without challenges. The ACLC also expressed frustration that while members of the
Canadian delegation were highly skilled as diplomats, they generally lacked experience
working on policy matters related to issues of race and racism in Canada (ACLC
Newsletter). There were also some disagreements among Canadian NGOs. The first
Preparatory Committee meeting allocated some time for NGOs to address states directly
but the only Canadian NGO to deliver such an address—the ACCAR—issued a statement
that strongly condemned Canada’s “history of sweeping racism under the rug” and
argued that “while it is true that racism is pervasive and embedded in all structures of
society, it is people of African descent who are the primary target domestically and
globally ... domestically, anti-Black racism which is rooted in slavery, colonialism and
white supremacy, is a fundamental aspect of Canadian history and culture.”124 According
to the DFAIT report on the first Preparatory Committee meeting, the strong language
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used by the ACCAR did not sit well with some of the other Canadian NGOs in
attendance, which felt that the tone was combative and might create difficulties in
promoting cooperation among NGOs and with the Canadian government. From the
perspective of DFAIT, “there was little cooperation among the Canadian NGOs present
with clear divisions between the [international non-governmental organizations], the
CRRF and the Feminist Alliance on the one hand and the ACCAR and the CLC on the
other.”125 These divisions reflected the competing strategies among NGOs regarding how
they should balance the task of working cooperatively with the government while also not
shying away from directly addressing the issue of racism in Canada and, in some cases,
expressing the viewpoint that the government’s response was inadequate to meet the
needs of historically marginalized communities. Hence, while there was much
cooperation among Canadian NGOs, there was also some divergence of interests as well.
One last point to mention about the role of Canadian NGOs at the first
Preparatory Committee Meeting—albeit one that does not involve the Canadian
government per se—is their participation in meetings with NGOs the world over to
discuss the establishment of an international NGO Coordinating Committee for the World
Conference. For the next 16 months, the Committee would serve as one of the key groups
responsible for organizing the NGO Forum, facilitating NGO participation in the World
Conference, and disseminating information about the World Conference to NGOs
throughout the world. The NGO Coordinating Committee was composed of 61 members,
selected to ensure that each region of the world received representation on the body.
NGOs from Canada were allocated one spot on the committee and those Canadian NGO
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officials present at the first Preparatory Committee meeting selected Margaret Parsons,
executive director of the African Canadian Legal Clinic, to represent Canadian NGOs. In
the subsequent months, Parsons attended key international preparatory meetings for the
World Conference and provided ongoing updates to many Canadian NGOs about the
preparations for Durban. The active involvement of Canadian NGOs with the work of the
NGO Coordinating Committee was thus another important development that was
consistent with Canada’s overall goal of promoting NGO participation at the World
Conference.
Canada’s third objective at the first Preparatory Committee Meeting was to ensure
that the Durban Conference and preparatory process would provide meaningful
opportunities for youth involvement. At the domestic level, Canadian Heritage had
initiated several programs designed to engage youth in the struggle against racism,
including the “Racism. Stop It! Action 2000” campaign. Throughout the preparations for
the World Conference, Canada felt that “the participation of youth in the development of
action-oriented strategies to combat racism is key to the building of positive relations
between communities and peoples.”126 As a result, at the first Preparatory Committee
meeting (and throughout the preparatory process), Canada pushed to give youth a greater
role at the World Conference. Ultimately, this effort culminated in Canada taking a
leading role in organizing the International Youth Forum against Racism (held in
Germany in August 2000) and the International Youth Summit, which was held in
Durban a few days prior to the World Conference.
Canada’s fourth objective was to promote the extensive participation of various

126

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “First PrepCom Meeting for the World
Conference against Racism – Instructions for Candel,” (April 28, 2000).

81

UN specialized agencies and human rights mechanisms throughout the World
Conference. Canada specifically highlighted organizations such as the UN treaty bodies
and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) as organizations that “do concrete,
field-level work” and as examples of UN agencies and mechanisms that should be given
a key role to play at the World Conference.127
Canada’s fifth key objective was to prepare for the upcoming regional preparatory
meeting of the Americas. Ordinarily, Canada is a member of the Western European and
Others Group (WEOG) and participates in that group’s regional meetings. However, as
European states began their preparations for the World Conference, it became clear that
they intended to develop a common set of European Union (EU) positions, and that it
would therefore be difficult for non-EU members to have meaningful input at the
upcoming WEOG regional meeting, held in Strasbourg, France. Hence, Canada (and the
United States, which faced the same situation) attended the first Preparatory Committee
meeting already having made prior arrangements to participate in the regional meeting of
the Americas instead.
At the time, the Americas meeting was scheduled to be held in Brazil in
December 2000. However, at the first Preparatory Committee meeting, Brazil announced
unexpectedly that it was withdrawing its offer to host the event. This decision created a
logistical dilemma for all states and NGOs in the region as states had to scramble to
arrange an alternate venue while NGOs had to ensure that they were kept up to speed
with new developments. Canada thus spoke to a number of other states in the region to
reiterate the importance that Canada attached to the regional meeting of the Americas and
the opportunity for Canada to attend. In the subsequent discussions, both Costa Rica and
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Uruguay were considered as potential sites for the meeting, but eventually it was decided
that Chile would serve as host. There was never any serious discussion about the
possibility that Canada (or the United States) would serve as host. As the DFAIT report
explained, “it would be a logistical near-to-impossibility” for Canada to host the meeting
given its other commitments at the time, and, perhaps more importantly, Canada “would
also be concerned about perceived (or real) domination of this event by a North American
host.”128
One last significant development at the first Preparatory Committee meeting was
that states requested that Mary Robinson prepare a draft version of a declaration and
programme of action to serve as a guide for subsequent negotiation. The draft text would
be based on the outcomes of each of the upcoming regional preparatory meetings as well
as input from states, UN specialized agencies, other administrative arms of the UN, and
NGOs. The Robinson draft was completed in February 2001 and presented to states in
advance of the inter-sessional working group meeting in March. The content of the draft
and the response it elicited from states is a central focus of Chapter 6. Suffice it to say, it
proved to be highly divisive.129
In sum, the first Preparatory Committee meeting made important progress in
establishing the groundwork for the World Conference, but also produced some early
tensions between states, particularly over the issue of reparations. The issue polarized
states along the North-South divide, with Western states on one side of the debate and
states from Africa, Asia, the Middle East and South America on the other. In this context,
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Canada sided firmly with other Western states in opposing the creation of new
international agreements to provide reparations for past racially-motivated injustices,
most notably the trans-Atlantic slave trade. With regard to its other key objectives,
Canada achieved meaningful success, particularly on the issue of promoting NGO and
youth involvement at the World Conference. The government and Canadian NGOs
established a productive working relationship and maintained an open dialogue about key
developments at the negotiations. This relationship was not without challenges, and there
were clear limits to the level of influence that NGOs held over the government’s
positions. Nonetheless, the first Preparatory Committee meeting set a positive tone for
future interaction between the Canadian government and Canadian NGOs regarding the
World Conference against Racism.

4.2 - The Regional Conference of the Americas
Following the first Preparatory Committee meeting, the next major international
preparatory events were a series of regional preparatory meetings. Four regional meetings
were held, in Europe (October 2000), the Americas (December 2000), Africa (January
2001) and Asia (February 2001). The purpose of the regional meetings was to provide
states an opportunity to discuss their positions on the five themes of the World
Conference and to produce regional declarations and programmes of action that would be
used as a basis for negotiation for a global declaration and programme of action. Hence,
whereas the first Preparatory Committee meeting focused mostly on procedural and
technical matters, the regional meetings allowed states to debate the substantive content
of the World Conference in greater depth. As a result, many of the most contentious
84

issues that would come to dominate the World Conference against Racism were first
raised at this stage in the preparatory process. This section examines Canada’s
participation at the Regional Conference of the Americas, during which Western
hemispheric states held important debates about many issues, including the rights of
indigenous peoples as well as the legacy of the transatlantic slave trade, colonialism and
the issue of reparations.
The Regional Conference of the Americas was held in Santiago Chile, from
December 5 to 7, 2000.130 Twenty-four states attended the conference as participants
from the Western hemisphere. Also in attendance were four observer states from outside
the region (Iran, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden), various UN bodies and
human rights mechanisms, international organizations, national institutions, and more
than 100 NGOs from around the region, including more than a dozen from Canada. The
opening ceremony of the conference featured statements by the Vice President of Chile,
José Miguel Insulza, and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson,
among others. On the first day of the conference, delegates confirmed Chile as the
president of the conference, and named six vice-presidents, one of whom was Canada.
In the end, the Regional Conference of the Americas produced a 76 paragraph
declaration and a 149 paragraph plan of action. The two documents addressed a broad set
of issues involving racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance in
the Americas. Among the issues addressed were the rights of indigenous peoples, people
of African descent, migrants, Mestizo populations, persons of Asian descent, women,
Jews, Arabs, refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons. Although states

130

World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Report
of the Regional Conference of the Americas, Santiago, Chile, 5-7 December 2000. A/CONF.189/PC.2/7.

85

were able to reach a consensus on most of these issues, consensus was not always
possible. Throughout the Regional Conference of the Americas, there was a notable
divide along regional lines, as the United States and Canada adopted positions on key
issues that were at odds with the positions adopted by the Latin American and Caribbean
states (GRULAC). As a DFAIT report on the event noted, the “Conference was a difficult
exercise during which the differences between the Northern and the Southern parts of the
hemisphere were put in evidence on more than one occasion.”131 These differences were
most clearly seen on issues involving the rights of indigenous peoples and people of
African descent, the reparations debate, and on language discussing international law and
the duties of states. The United States and Canada each issued several statements of
reservation indicating that they did not accept some of the language contained in the
Regional Conference of the Americas declaration and plan of action. They were the only
two states to do so.
Organizationally, the Regional Conference of the Americas was a difficult
experience for Canada. The DFAIT report provided the following summary of the overall
structure and process of the three-day conference:
Negotiations started late Tuesday afternoon (after a delay in producing the annex
document) and finished a review of the preamble by the end of the day. Although the
original plan was for negotiations to continue in one drafting committee, it was evident that
time would not be sufficient, and as of the Wednesday afternoon, negotiations took place in
two drafting committees, one on the Preamble and Declaration and the other one on the
Plan of Action. We started the negotiations started [sic] late Tuesday afternoon and finished
a review of the preamble by the end of the day. However, it took until Thursday morning
(the final day of the conference) to complete the first reading of the draft Declaration and
Plan of Action. During the course of the 3 days, delegations submitted an important number
of new proposals, particularly for the Plan of Action, often in Spanish only. While some of
the paragraphs were discussed for hours, others were considered for less than a minute
given the time pressures towards the end (and some were dropped completely). Canada
successfully presented a series of new paragraphs on youth participation, civil society,
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media and advertising, indigenous women, Asians, workers and national institutions. 132

The Canadian delegation was led by Hedy Fry and consisted of 15 government
officials—seven from Canadian Heritage, six from Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, one from Indian and Northern Affairs, and the Canadian Ambassador to Chile. In
addition, the Canadian delegation included an observer from the Canadian Human Rights
Commission and four “non-governmental observers” representing Aboriginal
organizations and NGOs. Canada also sponsored eight non-governmental organizations
to attend, though not as members of the delegation.
Canada’s efforts to include Aboriginal organizations and NGOs at the Regional
Conference of the Americas (and, more generally, throughout the entire World
Conference process) proved to be somewhat of a double-edged sword for the
government. On the one hand, the government was able to use their inclusion to help
bolster its claim that Canada existed as a positive example of a multicultural and
inclusive country. On the other hand, it contributed to divisions between the government
and civil society members as the latter were not always satisfied with Canada’s stated
policy positions and worked to highlight the discrepancies between the government’s
positions and the sometimes conflicting reality of Canada’s domestic situation.
Conversely, the arrangement proved to be somewhat of a mixed blessing for Canadian
NGOs and Aboriginal organizations. On the one hand, their participation on the
government delegation allowed them greater access to government officials and helped to
enhance their profile and reputation while they worked to establish advocacy networks
with international NGOs and indigenous groups. On the other hand, they were well aware
that the government sought to use their presence at the regional conference to help bolster
132
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its public image. In this sense, the government, Canadian NGOs and Aboriginal
organizations all worked together in a symbiotic fashion throughout the World
Conference preparatory process.
As was the case at the First Preparatory Committee meeting, the government held
regular meetings with Canadian NGOs and Aboriginal organizations to update them
about the status of the negotiations and to maintain an open line of communication. Once
again, Canadian NGOs and Aboriginal organizations expressed their concerns about
some of the positions adopted by Canada as well as the mechanisms established by the
government to dialogue and consult with civil society. Many Canadian NGOs and
Aboriginal organizations were frustrated that the government was not able to complete
the domestic consultation process before attending the Regional Conference of the
Americas. There was also a sense that the government was not taking the domestic
consultations process as seriously as it could and appeared to treat the process in some
ways like an afterthought when deciding its positions on important and contentious
issues. Aboriginal organizations, in particular, strongly encouraged the government to
endorse the right of self-determination for indigenous peoples and to critically re-examine
its domestic record on racism and Aboriginal peoples. In addition, there was a concern
that the process by which government selected NGOs to participate on the official
government delegation was not as transparent as it could have been. It was suggested that
NGOs could benefit by receiving additional financial resources in order to better prepare
for the World Conference against Racism and to cover the costs of travelling abroad to
attend the various international preparatory meetings. Lastly, it was recommended that
the government provide financial resources particularly to the many Canadian NGOs and
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Aboriginal organizations that wished to participate more fully in the World Conference
process.
Broadly, Canada’s central goals for the Regional Conference of the Americas
were “to share the Canadian experience of diversity (‘valuing difference’) in order to
influence world progress on fighting racism and related intolerance” and “to advance
Canada’s domestic agenda and its strategy to combat racism by raising awareness,
building capacity amongst civil society.”133 Over the course of the three-day conference,
Canada delivered two statements to the plenary session and one statement to the chair of
the negotiating committee. The statement to the negotiating committee outlined Canada’s
key priorities for the Regional Conference of the Americas while the two statements to
the plenary session discussed the domestic history and politics of race, visible minorities
and Aboriginal peoples in Canada. Taken at face value, the two statements to the plenary
session are notable for the candour with which Canada was willing to discuss the
existence of racism in Canada both as a historical issue and as a contemporary reality. At
the same time, many Canadian NGOs and Aboriginal organizations found it problematic
that Canada’s public acknowledgements abroad of its shortcomings were not
accompanied by more concrete efforts to eliminate racism in Canada. They appreciated
the government’s rhetoric, but wanted greater action.
Nonetheless, it is worth reviewing Canada’s public pronouncements in order to
highlight how Canada presented its domestic record to an international audience. At the
outset of the Regional Conference of the Americas, Canada delivered a statement to the
chair of the negotiating committee in which Canada outlined its 10 priorities for the
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conference.134 The priorities were:
1) Telling the Truth
2) Recognizing Victims and Vulnerable Groups
3) Intersectionality
4) Valuing Our Diversity
5) Role of Civil Society
6) Youth
7) Hate and Bias
8) International Issues
9) Education and Other Concrete Preventative Strategies
10) Contribution to the World Conference
In the statement, delivered by a senior DFAIT official, Canada indicated that “we must
acknowledge that the history of the Americas has not always been one of inclusion and
respect, but rather has been and remains one often characterized by racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance” and that “telling the truth about the
history and ongoing manifestations of racism in the Americas is essential to
reconciliation.” Canada specifically highlighted indigenous peoples as one set of victims
and vulnerable groups and noted that the impact of racism can “further contribute to the
marginalization of people who face discrimination based on age, gender, sexual
orientation, disability, social or economic status.” Canada again reiterated its support for
the widespread inclusion of civil society, NGOs, and youth throughout the preparatory
process and at the World Conference itself. It also reiterated its support for combating
“hate propaganda, hate on the Internet, and crimes that are motivated by hatred” while
noting that “one challenge that faces this conference is the identification of measures that
lead to the eradication of these manifestations of racism, while simultaneously respecting
free speech and freedom of association.” Canada expressed support for educational
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measures and public awareness campaigns and that “these types of forward-looking
initiatives and strategies should be included in the plan of action as examples of concrete
measurable outcomes. Last, Canada stated that the World Conference should work to
strengthen existing international frameworks for combating racism, such as the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD).
In addition, Hedy Fry spoke at the Regional Conference of the Americas on its
opening day to discuss Canada’s domestic record.135 Fry acknowledged that “systemic
racism, xenophobia and discrimination still exist in Canada, sometimes subtly but often
overtly and with hate.” Canada’s “history is not always one of which we are proud. It has
been marred by the colonialisation [sic] of indigenous peoples who still bear the scars of
assimilation today—currently manifested by poverty, disadvantage, substance abuse and
poor health status—Indigenous women being the most disadvantaged.” Fry further
acknowledged that “over the years, subsequent groups of migrants of Asian, African and
European origin faced discrimination and denial of equal rights.” She made similar
remarks speaking on the second day of the conference, noting that Canada is:
not proud of the way that Italians, Ukrainians and Germans were treated in Canada during
the war. Similarly, the stories of religious intolerance against the Jews when they came to
Canadian shores prior to the Second World War, and were turned away and died in camps
in Germany, is a part of our history of which we are ashamed. Historically, as well, Asians
in Canada have met with discrimination, notably the Japanese, the Chinese and the Sikhs.136

Given the usual atmosphere of multilateral gatherings that address human rights, in which
most countries use the opportunity to cynically assert their unimpeachable domestic
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record while criticizing the domestic record of their geopolitical foes, Canada deserves
some credit for the clarity with which it discussed the problem of racism in Canada. Even
among the various Canadian NGOs and Aboriginal organizations that worked to eradicate
racism in Canada and oftentimes found themselves at odds with the government’s policy
agenda, there was an overall sense among many that Hedy Fry, as an individual
representative of government, appeared to approach the World Conference preparatory
process with a genuine willingness to confront the issues head on. Of course, many of
these same NGOs and Aboriginal organizations also noted that Fry’s personal
commitment to the cause was not always reflected in the government’s official stance on
the issues. In particular, Canada’s positions on key aspects of the debate regarding the
rights of indigenous peoples and people of African descent tended to reflect a careful
consideration of the national interest and a desire to protect state sovereignty rather than a
more empathetic concern for the plight of marginalized groups in Canada.

4.2.1 - Indigenous peoples
Before discussing how the topic of indigenous peoples was addressed at the
Regional Conference of the Americas, it is useful to briefly review the historical and
political situation of indigenous peoples in the Americas as well as international and
multilateral efforts at the United Nations to address the rights of indigenous peoples. In
general, the key debates on indigenous peoples that occurred throughout the World
Conference process should be understood in the context of the larger debate on these
issues.
According to a 2006 study, estimates for the number of indigenous people living
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in Central and South America range from between 28 to 43 million people. Indigenous
peoples constitute 17 percent of the population in Peru, 20 percent of the population in
Belize, 42 percent of the population in Guatemala and 62 percent of the population in
Bolivia.137 In the United States, census data from the year 2000 showed that 4.1 million
people identified as American Indian and Alaska Native while 874,000 identified as
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander.138 Data from the 2001 Canadian census
showed that about 1.3 million people reported having “at least some Aboriginal ancestry”
while 976,305 persons identified as belonging to one or more of the First Nations, Métis
or Inuit peoples.139 Overall, indigenous peoples constitute between 3.5 to 5 percent of the
total population of the countries in the Americas.
Although the current living conditions of indigenous peoples vary greatly both
between and within these countries, indigenous peoples in the Americas face significant
barriers to the full enjoyment of their basic human rights. For centuries, countries in the
Americas adopted an assimilationist approach to indigenous peoples, forcibly and
sometimes violently dispossessing them of their land and resources, dislocating families
and communities, and generally attempting to demolish indigenous identities, languages
and cultural ways of life. As a result, indigenous peoples throughout countries in the
Americas are more likely than the general population to live in poverty, receive

137

Heather Marie Layton and Harry Anthony Patrinos, “Estimating the Number of Indigenous Peoples in
Latin America,” in Indigenous Peoples, Poverty and Human Development in Latin America 1994-2004,
eds. Gillette Hall and Harry Anthony Patrinos, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 25-39.
138

Stella U. Ogunwole, “The American Indian and Alaska Native Population: 2000,” United States Census
2000. (Washington DC: United States Census Bureau, February 2002); Elizabeth M. Grieco, “The Native
Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander Population: 2000,” United States Census 2000. (Washington DC:
United States Census Bureau, December 2001).
139

Statistics Canada, “2001 Census: Analysis Series. Aboriginal peoples of Canada: A Demographic
Profile,” (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2003).

93

inadequate access to vital health care services, have shorter life expectancies and higher
infant mortality rates, receive less formal education, and experience wage discrimination
in the workplace.140 A UN press kit released in advance of the World Conference against
Racism situated these problems in a larger historical context:141
The world’s indigenous peoples—or “first peoples”—do not share the same story of
colonization. In the New World, white European colonizers arrived and settled suddenly,
with drastic results. The indigenous peoples were pushed aside and marginalized by the
dominant descendents of Europeans. Some peoples have disappeared, or nearly so. Modern
estimates place the 15th century, or pre-Columbus, population of North America at 10 to 12
million. By the 1890s, it had been reduced to approximately 300,000. In parts of Latin
America, the results were similar; in others, there are still majority indigenous populations.
But even in those areas, indigenous people are often at a disadvantage. Indigenous peoples
in Latin America still face the same obstacles as indigenous peoples elsewhere—primarily,
separation from their lands. And that separation is usually based on distinctions originally
deriving from race.

As a matter of foreign policy, states have been reluctant to recognize the rights of
indigenous peoples.142 The issue was not a priority for states at the time of the UN’s
founding and only seriously emerged on the UN agenda during the 1970s. In the past half
century, discussions about indigenous peoples at the international level have occurred in
several arenas, including the International Labour Organization (ILO), the General
Assembly and the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples (WGIP). At the time of the
World Conference against Racism, ongoing negotiations were occurring at the UN over
the draft text of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. These negotiations,
and the general work of the UN on the issue of indigenous peoples, have consistently
exposed the tensions between the demands of indigenous peoples for greater rights to
shape their own political, economic and cultural affairs and the desire of states to retain
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sovereign control over these processes.
In 1957, the International Labour Organization initiated one of the first efforts to
address the issue of indigenous rights at the international level when states adopted the
Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention. As the “first international legal treaty on
this subject,”143 the convention addressed the rights of indigenous peoples on issues
involving land rights and ownership, employment, social security, health, education and
means of communication, among others. However, the convention addressed these issues
in the context of promoting an assimilationist attitude toward indigenous peoples. As a
recent ILO document explains, when the 1957 convention was adopted, “indigenous and
tribal peoples were seen as ‘backwards’ and temporary societies. The belief at the time
was that, for them to survive, they had to be brought into the national mainstream, and
that this should be done through integration and assimilation.”144
A more empathetic attempt to address indigenous rights at the international level
occurred in the early 1970s, when the UN initiated a “Study of the Problem of
Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations.” Thirteen years in the making, the fivevolume study was completed in 1986 and greatly helped to elevate the issue of
indigenous peoples on the UN agenda and create a framework that allowed indigenous
peoples themselves to participate in international negotiations involving their rights. As
Stamapoulou notes, the “drafting process of this study was a key to the development of
relations between the United Nations and indigenous peoples. It contributed significantly
to the assertion by indigenous peoples of their own identities at the international level
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under the flag of universal human rights. A major consideration was that the study also
had to reflect the views and aspirations of indigenous peoples about their own fate.”145
As a result of the growing prominence of indigenous issues on the United Nations
agenda, the UN Economic and Social Council created a Working Group on Indigenous
Populations (WGIP) in 1982. A subsidiary body of the Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, the WGIP was composed of five individual
experts who were members of the Sub-Commission.146 The mandate of the WGIP was to
“review developments pertaining to the promotion and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples” and “to give attention to the evolution of
international standards concerning indigenous rights.” Between 1985 and 1993, the
WGIP produced a draft of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In
1994, a completed draft declaration was submitted to the sub-Commission and over the
next dozen years, states negotiated the content of the declaration before adopting it at the
UN Human Rights Council in 2006 and at the General Assembly in 2007.
Meanwhile, during the 1980s, there was a growing recognition that the 1957 ILO
convention reflected an outdated and problematic approach to indigenous issues. Thus, in
1989, the ILO revised the convention and, among other things, changed the name of the
document to the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention. The recognition at the
international level of indigenous peoples as “peoples” rather than “populations” was a
significant distinction that helped to enhance the rights of indigenous peoples.
Throughout all of the discussions at the international level about indigenous peoples, one
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of the central issues concerned the applicability of the right to self-determination, as
international law grants the right to self-determination specifically to “peoples” but not to
“populations.” For example, the UN Charter refers to “the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples” while both the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) affirm that “all peoples have the right to self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.” However, there is no clear legal definition of
what constitutes a “peoples” under international law, and many states have been reluctant
to recognize indigenous peoples as such due to concerns that it could encourage
secessionist movements. Indeed, these concerns led states to add a significant qualifier to
the use of the term indigenous peoples in the revised 1989 ILO convention, which reads
that “the use of the term peoples in this Convention shall not be construed as having any
implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law.”
Thus, while the change in terminology was a sign of progress in the efforts of indigenous
peoples to have states recognize their rights under international law, the decision to limit
the meaning of the peoples underscored the general hesitancy of states to move forward
in this regard.
Given the history of racism against indigenous peoples at both the domestic and
international level, it was appropriate that the issue occupied a major place on the agenda
of the Regional Conference of the Americas. The Regional Conference of the Americas
declaration and plan of action adopted several paragraphs addressing racism and racial
discrimination against indigenous peoples. Most of these paragraphs were adopted by
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consensus. For example, paragraph 19 of the declaration:
recognize[d] the value and diversity of the cultures and the heritage of indigenous peoples,
whose singular contribution to the development and cultural pluralism of the societies of
the region and full participation in all aspects of society, in particular on issues that are of
concern to them, are fundamental for political and social stability, and for the development
of the States in which they live.147

Paragraph 20 of the declaration “recognize[d] the special relationship that indigenous
peoples have with the land as the basis for their physical and cultural existence.”
Paragraph 22 “recognize[d] that the indigenous peoples of the Americas have been
victims of discrimination for centuries and affirm that they are free and equal in dignity
and rights and should not suffer any discrimination whatsoever; and particularly not on
the basis of their indigenous origin and identity.” Paragraph 23 discussed some of the
efforts being taken to rectify these problems, noting that:
in order for indigenous peoples freely to express their own identity and exercise their
rights, they should be free from all forms of discrimination, which necessarily entails
respect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms. Efforts are now being made to
secure universal recognition for those rights in the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, including the following: to call themselves by their own names; to participate
freely and on an equal footing in a country’s political, economic, social and cultural
development; to maintain their own forms of organization, lifestyles, cultures and
traditions; to maintain and use their own languages; to maintain their own economic
structures in the areas where they live; to take part in the development of their education
systems and programmes to manage their lands and natural resources, including hunting
and fishing rights; and to have access to justice on a basis of equality. 148

Probably the major reason why states were able to reach a consensus on such language
addressing indigenous peoples is that they continued the practice of situating indigenous
rights within the context of state sovereignty. Thus, paragraph 24 of the declaration
recognized “all of the rights of the indigenous peoples in conformity with the principles
of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States.” In addition, at the request of the
United States, the declaration included a qualification regarding the use of the term
147
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indigenous peoples, borrowing language almost verbatim from the 1989 ILO convention.
Thus, paragraph 3 of the declaration stated that “the use of the term ‘peoples’ in this
document cannot be construed as having any implications as to the rights which attach to
the term under international law. The rights associated with the term ‘indigenous peoples’
have a context-specific meaning that is appropriately determined in the multilateral
negotiations in the texts of declarations that specifically deal with such rights.”
As was the case during previous international negotiations on this issue,
indigenous peoples in Canada and abroad objected strongly to this limitation of their
rights. For some, the denial of their status as peoples under international law was nothing
short of “an act of racism at [the] international level, a violation of the principles of
equality and non-discrimination.”149 For others, the text provided an opportunity for
further negotiation. Tony Belcourt, President of Métis Nation of Ontario, stated that “the
compromise text in the Draft remains unsatisfactory to Indigenous Peoples, however it is
an opening that we welcome. We note that Canada has reserved its position on the text
and we intend to pursue amendments which would remove the qualifications on the use
of the term Indigenous Peoples.”150
In order to understand Canada’s position on indigenous peoples at the Regional
Conference of the Americas, and subsequently throughout the World Conference process,
it is useful to briefly review the history concerning Canadian foreign policy and
indigenous peoples. In the two decades prior to the World Conference against Racism,
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Canada had adopted a contradictory position on the question of whether indigenous
peoples constitute a “peoples.” At the domestic level, Canada was willing to recognize
Aboriginal peoples as peoples and did so most notably in section 25 of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, which refers explicitly to “Aboriginal peoples.” But at the
international level, Canada frequently opposed efforts to identify indigenous peoples as
peoples under international law.151 During the 1980s, Canada explicitly stated to the
Working Group on Indigenous Populations that the Canadian Charter’s reference to
Aboriginal peoples “should not be interpreted as supportive of the notion that Canada’s
aboriginal groups are ‘peoples’ in the sense of having the right to self-determination
under international law.”152 Canada maintained this position during the negotiations to
revise the ILO convention, expressing “strong reservations” about the use of the term
peoples in the convention. As Barsh noted, “the representative of the Canadian
government reiterated that any use of the term ‘peoples’ would imply the right to selfdetermination, and therefore prove unacceptable.”153 In 1993, Canada again opposed
efforts to use the term indigenous peoples in the negotiations at the UN World
Conference on Human Rights. While Canada has not offered a clear rationale for its
contradictory position, scholars and Aboriginal organizations alike have suggested that a
major motivating factor for Canada is a concern of how the issue might impact the
question of Quebec secession. As Barsh concludes, “federalists may well have feared UN
endorsement of Aboriginal peoples’ right to self-determination as a precedent for
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Quebec.”154
Despite Canada’s consistent opposition to this issue during the 1980s and mid1990s, Canada’s position began to evolve during the late-1990s in the course of
negotiations over the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Following the
WGIP’s completion of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the UN
created a Working Group on the Draft Declaration to provide states a forum to negotiate
the text and consider it for adoption. Records from the Indigenous Peoples’ Center for
Documentation, Research and Information (doCip) indicate that during the negotiations at
the Working Group, Canada began to discuss an expanded understanding of the right to
self-determination under international law. According to the summary records produced
by the doCip, at the third session of the Working Group, held in 1997:
Canada underlined the fundamental role of SD [self-determination] in the protection of
human rights of all peoples. As a State party to the UN Charter and to the Covenants on
Human Rights, Canada considers itself legally and morally committed to the observance of
this right. It applies equally to all collectivities, indigenous and non-indigenous, which
qualify as “peoples” under international law. The main issue raised by the Draft is whether
the right applies to indigenous “peoples” living within existing democratic States. The
understanding of the right of SD is expanding to include the concept of an internal right to
groups living within existing States. The right to SD intends to promote harmonious
arrangements for self-government within sovereign and independent States. Any
prescriptive solutions must be avoided in order to allow the right of SD to be implemented
flexibly through negotiations between States and IPs [indigenous peoples]. 155

Similary, doCip summary records of the sixth session, held in 2001, note that:
Canada pointed out that the right of SD has evolved and is now seen by many as a right
which can continue to be enjoyed in a democracy in which citizens participate in the
political system and have a say in the political processes that affect them. It accepts the
right to SD, involving negotiations between States and IPs to determine IP’s political status
and means of pursuing their economic, social and cultural development, as arrangements
for self-government.156
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Thus, Canada began to consider that the right to self-determination can be granted to
peoples living within existing states and does not necessarily require that all peoples be
granted their own sovereign state. In adopting this refined position, Canada appeared to
relent on one of its principal concerns with the Draft Declaration and demonstrate a
willingness to move toward a greater recognition of the rights of Aboriginal peoples in
Canada. Once Canada began to consider the rights of self-determination within this new
light, it was more willing to accept that indigenous peoples constituted peoples under
international law. Nonetheless, Canada continued to argue at the Working Group on the
Draft Declaration that the fulfillment of the right of Aboriginal peoples in Canada to selfdetermination could only come about as a result of negotiations between Aboriginal
peoples and the government of Canada, and hence, that the government would retain
considerable control over the process.
These developments during the late-1990s set the context for Canada’s position at
the Regional Conference of the Americas. The key DFAIT officials involved in the
preparatory process for the World Conference against Racism maintain that Canada’s
position on the status of indigenous peoples under international law did evolve during the
negotiations in the Working Group on the Draft Declaration, and that by the time of the
Regional Conference of the Americas, Canada was prepared to recognize that indigenous
peoples constitute peoples under international law. As one DFAIT official who attended
the Regional Conference of the Americas explained:
at that time, we had a position to support the use of the term peoples with an “s”, and that
was something that we had developed in the course of the negotiations on the draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. But the US, at that time ... couldn’t accept
the [term] peoples, they couldn’t accept the “s.” That’s why they put the qualifier. And
there may have been one or two other countries that also had similar issues with that term,
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but we didn’t have any issues with it.157

According to Hedy Fry, Canada not only accepted the unqualified use of the term
indigenous peoples, but was one of the states that took the lead on the issue. As Fry
stated, Canada “brought forward a resolution in Santiago ... which basically said that
indigenous peoples are peoples in their own right and not a population demographic, and
that therefore they have rights to self-determination, self-government and to lands that
had been taken away from them.”158 Aboriginal organizations in Canada welcomed
Canada’s new position. A statement issued by the Grand Council of the Crees,
“acknowledg[ed] Canada’s official position in support of the applicability without
discrimination of international human rights law to indigenous peoples, including the
right of self-determination.”159
At the same time, if Canada recognized the unqualified definition of indigenous
peoples at the Regional Conference of the Americas, it did not appear to make this policy
clear on the official UN record. None of Canada’s prepared remarks at the Chile meeting
endorsed the view that indigenous peoples constitute peoples under international law. Nor
did Canada’s statement of reservation issued on the final day of the Regional Conference
of the Americas refer to the controversial qualifying paragraph and clarify Canada’s
opposition to it. Whatever efforts Canada may have exerted behind the scenes to lobby
the United States and other countries, the public records from the Regional Conference of
the America suggest that Canada was ultimately willing to go along with the text as
157
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adopted in Chile with regard to the rights of indigenous peoples and their status under
international law.

4.2.2 - People of African descent, the transatlantic slave trade, colonialism and
reparations
As was the case at the First Preparatory Committee meeting, a major item on the
agenda of the Regional Conference of the Americas was the interrelated set of issues
concerning the transatlantic slave trade, colonialism and reparations. During the
negotiations of the Regional Conference of the Americas declaration and programme of
action, states were able to reach consensus on several paragraphs acknowledging the
history in the Americas of racism and racial discrimination against people of African
descent. However, on the more contentious issue of reparations, debate was drawn along
regional lines as the United States and Canada opposed efforts to use the World
Conference against Racism as a venue to create new mechanisms for regional and
international reparations while countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC)
pushed for language designed to lead to the establishment of a reparations process. In the
end, Canada and the United States each issued a few statements and comments indicating
that they would not support certain language used to describe international law, the legal
duties of states, and the establishment of new regional and international institutions to
address reparations.
In general, all countries were able to accept language that discussed historical and
present-day racism in broad terms, and most paragraphs in the declaration and plan of
action addressing people of African descent were agreed upon by consensus. For
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example, paragraph 28 of the declaration recognized:
that the legacy of slavery has contributed to perpetuating racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance against people of African descent throughout the region.
Also note the disastrous consequences of slavery, which are at the root of the situations of
profound social and economic inequality which generally victimize people of African
descent in the Americas.160

Paragraph 31 of the declaration similarly recognized:
that the racism and racial discrimination that people of African descent have historically
suffered throughout the Americas is at the root of the situation of marginalization, poverty
and exclusion that affects the majority of them in many countries of the continent and that,
despite the many efforts made, this situation persists, in varying degrees.161

Paragraph 103 of the plan of action “urge[s] States to take measures to alleviate
inequalities that still persist because of the shameful legacy of slavery” while paragraph
104 “urge[s] States to facilitate the participation of people of African descent in all
political, economic, social and cultural aspects of society and in the advancement and
economic development of their countries, and to promote a greater knowledge of and
respect for their heritage and culture.” These paragraphs can be seen as representative
examples of the type of language that was agreeable to all states.
By contrast, paragraphs in the declaration that appeared to challenge state
sovereignty more concretely, or call upon states to introduce new measures to eliminate
racism and provide reparations for people of African descent, were met with opposition
from Canada and the United States. As expected, the objections raised by Canada and the
United States were similar to the objections they raised at the First Preparatory
Committee meeting regarding the issue of reparations for slavery and the transatlantic
slave trade.
Canada had objections to three paragraphs in the declaration and plan of action
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that addressed people of African descent.162 The first such paragraph was paragraph 4 in
the declaration, which “repudiate[d] the brutal crimes and injustices that were committed
against indigenous peoples and Africans and their descendants who were subjected to
slavery, the transatlantic slave trade and other forms of servitude that today could
constitute crimes against humanity.” Canada opposed this language on the basis that “it is
inappropriate to apply a modern concept of international law to acts which took place
centuries ago.” The second paragraph to which Canada had objections was paragraph 27
of the declaration, which:
recognize[d] that people of African descent have for centuries been victims of racism, racial
discrimination and enslavement and of the denial by history of many of their rights. Assert
that they should be treated with fairness and respect for their dignity and should not suffer
discrimination of any kind based on origin, culture, skin colour or social condition.
Recognition should therefore be given to their rights to culture and their own identity; to
participate freely and on equal conditions in political, social, economic and cultural life; to
development in the context of their own aspirations and customs; to keep, maintain and
foster their own forms of organization, their mode of life, culture, traditions and religious
expressions; to maintain and use their own language; to the protection of their traditional
knowledge and their cultural and artistic heritage; to their ancestrally inhabited land; to the
use, enjoyment and conservation of the natural renewable resources of their habitat and to
active participation in the design, implantation and development of educational systems and
programmes, including those of a specific and characteristic nature. 163

While Canada stated that it found most of the paragraph acceptable, it “could not support
some of the language ... particularly with respect to the question of ancestral lands and
natural resources.” The third paragraph was paragraph 70 of the declaration, which:
acknowledge[d] that the enslavement and other forms of servitude of Africans and their
descendants and of the indigenous peoples of the Americas, as well as the slave trade, were
morally reprehensible, in some cases constituted crimes under domestic law and, if they
occurred today, would constitute crimes under international law. Acknowledge that these
practices have resulted in substantial and lasting economic, political and cultural damage to
these peoples and that justice now requires that substantial national and international efforts
be made to repair such damage. Such reparation should be in the form of policies,
programmes and measures to be adopted by the States which benefited materially from
these practices, and designed to rectify the economic, cultural and political damage which
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has been inflicted on the affected communities and peoples.164

Canada asserted that “the paragraph does not properly reflect international law” and that
“it is not clear from the current language what obligations and responsibilities arise out of
the paragraph.”
As expected, some Canadian NGOs, particularly those representing AfricanCanadians, expressed strong disappointment with Canada’s opposition to the
establishment of a reparations mechanism for the transatlantic slave trade. As was the
case when the issue was raised six months earlier at the First Preparatory Committee
meeting, Canada’s position against reparations was rooted firmly in the state’s
understanding of the national interest to protect its sovereignty and its view that the
language being used created expansive and undetermined legal and financial obligations.
At any rate, the continued insistence of other states to raise the matter ensured that the
issue of reparations would continue to remain a major issue on the agenda of the World
Conference against Racism.

4.2.3 – Other Issues
In addition to the debates on indigenous peoples and people of African descent,
the Regional Conference of the Americas also addressed several other important topics.
Language addressing issues such as poverty, globalization, Mestizo populations,
migrants, persons of Asian descent, women, Jews and Arabs was adopted by consensus
and without any of the political tension that surrounded the debates on the rights of
indigenous peoples under international law and the issue of reparations for the
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transatlantic slave trade. While it is important for an analysis of the World Conference
against Racism to address the difficulties and contentious lines of debate that occurred
throughout the process, it is also important to highlight the many areas on which there
was strong consensus. For example, a paragraph on the intersection of poverty and racism
read:
Note with great concern that the descendants of racial and ethnic groups which were the
victims of past acts of racial discrimination often find themselves amongst the poorest
segments of the population in the States of the region; and recognize the close correlation
between racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and extreme
poverty.165

A paragraph on the impact of globalization acknowledged both the negative and positive
side of this transformative phenomenon:
Express our determination to prevent and mitigate the negative effects of globalization.
These effects may contribute to, inter alia, cultural homogenization, economic inequality
within and between States which may occur along racial lines, or may be based on the
social and economic exclusion of peoples, communities and groups, especially those who
continue to endure the legacy of slavery and colonialism. Also express our determination to
maximize the benefits of globalization through strengthening cooperation to create
increased opportunities for trade, economic growth and sustainable development, global
communications through the use of new technologies and increased inter-cultural exchange
through the preservation and promotion of cultural diversity, which may contribute to the
eradication of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. 166

Paragraphs discussing Mestizo populations “recognize[d] the valuable contribution of the
mestizo population” and “condemn[ed] the discrimination of which mestizos are in many
cases the victims because of their different ethnic and racial origins or their different
varieties of skin colour.”
Regarding migrants, states agreed on language that “recognize[d] the positive
economic and cultural contributions made by migration to both countries of origin and of
destination” and “reaffirm[ed] the responsibility of Government to safeguard and protect
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the human rights of migrants living in their territory and under their jurisdiction against
illegal acts by their agents or by individuals or groups motivated by racism, xenophobia
or related intolerance.” The text also “express[ed] our concern and indignation that,
despite the measure taken by the international community, racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance against migrants are on the increase, as are
stereotypes usually applied to them.” In addition, the plan of action “invite[d] States to
consider signing, ratifying or acceding to the International Convention on the Protection
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990).” A
paragraph on persons of Asian descent noted:
Recognize the history of persons of Asian descent in the Americas as one often
characterized by systemic and overt discrimination that violated their human rights, a
history that manifests itself in ongoing racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and
related intolerance. Despite the difficulties and barriers, people of Asian descent have
contributed and continue to contribute significantly to the economic, social, political,
scientific and cultural life of the hemisphere.167

Regarding women, the declaration noted that “racism, racial discrimination and
xenophobia reveal themselves in a differentiated manner for women, causing their living
conditions to deteriorate, generating multiple forms of violence, and limiting or denying
them the benefit and the exercise of their human rights” while the plan of action:
urge[d] States to incorporate a gender-perspective into all programme of action against
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and to consider the burden
of discrimination that particularly falls on indigenous women, women of African descent,
women migrants and women from other disadvantaged groups, ensuring their access to the
resources of production on an equal footing with men, as means of promoting their
participation in the economic and productive development of their communities.168

Last, the declaration addressed the problem of racism targeting Jews and Arabs.
Considering that the politics of the Middle East would come to be a dominating and
divisive issue on the agenda of the World Conference, it is notable that the discussion at
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the Regional Conference of the Americas reached consensus on one paragraph addressing
Jews and one addressing Arabs. One paragraph “confirm[ed] with deep concern the
increase in anti-Semitism and hostile acts against Jews in some countries in the region
and in other parts of the world, as well as the emergence of radical and violent
movements based on racism and discriminatory ideas concerning the Jewish community”
while a separate paragraph “also confirm[ed] with deep concern the existence of
Islamophobia and hostile acts against Arabs, which are evidenced in some countries in
the region and in other parts of the world.”
In sum, the Regional Conference of the Americas was an important part of both
Canada’s and the region’s preparations for the World Conference against Racism. The
declaration and plan of action adopted at the conference contained many proposals that
helped to feed into what would eventually become the Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action. At times, however, the regional conference was a difficult process.
Geopolitical differences between the United States and Canada, on the one hand, and
states in Latin America and the Caribbean, on the other, played out on more than one
occasion, and ultimately prevented consensus on key issues concerning indigenous
peoples and people of African descent. The dissenting views of the United States and
Canada proved to be not only a source of tension between states, but also between
Canada and the various Canadian NGOs and Aboriginal organizations in attendance. To
many Canadian civil society members in attendance, Canada’s dissenting views served as
an indication of the limits of their influence in shaping the government’s policy positions.
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4.3 - Other Regional Preparatory Meetings
In addition to the Regional Conference of the Americas, other regional
conferences were held in Europe, Africa and Asia. Although Canada did not participate in
the negotiations at these events, it did hold observer status at the meetings in Europe and
Asia. Moreover, Canada closely followed the developments at each meeting as they
greatly impacted the content of the World Conference agenda. Like the Regional
Conference of the Americas, each of the other regional meetings addressed the issues that
states deemed most important to their respective region. Taken together, the four regional
conferences provided states with important opportunities to help shape the agenda of the
World Conference, but also served to draw attention to the geopolitical divisions that
existed regarding the most contentious issues. It is therefore useful to briefly review key
developments at each of the three regional meetings in order to contextualize the debates
that occurred throughout the spring and summer of 2001 and at the World Conference
itself.
The European Conference against Racism was organized by the Council of
Europe and held in Strasbourg, France, from October 11 to 13, 2000.169 The final
document adopted at the conference expressed alarm at “the continued and violent
occurrence of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and related
intolerance, including contemporary forms of slavery, in Europe and in other regions of
the world” and the fact that “such occurrences target, notably on grounds related to
language, religion or national or ethnic origin, persons such as migrants, asylum-seekers,
refugees, displaced persons, non-nationals, indigenous peoples; or on grounds related to
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belonging to minorities, persons such as Roma/Gypsies and Travellers.” The document
further discussed a variety of legal and political measures to be taken to combat racism
and racial discrimination in Europe. However, on the issue of reparations, the document
reflected the position adopted by European states at the First Preparatory Committee
Meeting in May 2000. Thus, the only reference to the slave trade and colonialism was a
single sentence noting that the “suffering caused by slavery or which arose from
colonialism must be remembered.” The omission of any reference to international
remedies or reparations was a clear indication that European states did not wish to discuss
these issues at the World Conference.
The Regional Conference for Africa was held in Dakar, Senegal, from January 22
to 24, 2001.170 African states adopted both a declaration and programme of action that
addressed various issues of concern for states in the region. Understandably, they placed
significant focus on the slave trade and colonialism. The declaration “recall[ed] the
historical fact that among the most hideous manifestation of racial discrimination the
African continent and Diaspora have suffered, namely the slave trade, all forms of
exploitation, colonialism and apartheid, were essentially motivated by economic
objectives and competition between colonial Powers for strategic territorial gains,
appropriation, and control over and pillage of natural and cultural resources.” The
declaration also “affirm[ed] that the slave trade, particularly of Africans, is a unique
tragedy in the history of humanity” and a “crime against humanity which is
unparalleled.” In the programme of action, African states called for the creation of an
“International Compensation Scheme” that “should be set up for victims of the slave
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trade, as well as victims of any other transnational racist policies and acts, in addition to
the national funds or any equivalent national mechanisms aimed at fulfilling the right to
compensation.” African states also called for the creation of a “Development Reparation
Fund ... to provide resources for the development process in countries affected by
colonialism.” The programme of action indicated that “on a collective basis, such
reparation should be in the form of enhanced policies, programmes and measures to be
adopted by States which benefit materially from these practices in order to rectify,
through affirmative action, the economic, cultural and political damage which has been
inflicted on the affected communities and peoples in the full implementation of their right
to development.” However, the declaration and programme of action did not refer to the
existence of present-day slavery and slavery-like conditions throughout countries in
Africa.
The Asia Preparatory Meeting was held in Tehran, Iran, from February 19-21,
2001.171 Although the declaration and plan of action adopted at this meeting addressed
several issues, it was most notable for its references to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The
declaration:
affirm[ed] that a foreign occupation founded on settlements, its laws based on racial
discrimination with the aim of continuing domination of the occupied territory, as well as
its practices which consist of reinforcing a total military blockade, isolating towns, cities
and villages under occupation from each other, totally contradict the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and constitute a serious violation of
international human rights and humanitarian law, a new kind of apartheid, a crime against
humanity, a form of genocide and a serious threat to international peace and security. 172

The declaration also:
recall[ed] with deep regret the practices of racial discrimination against the Palestinians as
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well as other inhabitants of the Arab occupied territories which have an impact on all
aspects of their daily existence such as to prevent the enjoyment of fundamental rights,
express our deep concern about this situation and call for the cessation of all the practices
of racial discrimination to which the Palestinians and the other inhabitants of the Arab
territories occupied by Israel are subjected.173

Overall, the four regional preparatory conferences served to help states organize
their positions in advance of the next round of international negotiation in Geneva, but
also served to reinforce geopolitical divisions as states in each region highlighted the
issues that mattered most to them while ignoring or downplaying any issues that they did
not wish to address. When states subsequently met in March 2001 in the first plenary
meeting following the completion of the four regional meetings, it became abundantly
clear that states faced an uphill battle in their effort to reach consensus language
addressing reparations and the Middle East.
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CHAPTER 5: THE DOMESTIC PREPARATIONS
Canada’s domestic preparations for the World Conference began following the
completion of the first Preparatory Committee meeting. Throughout the summer of 2000,
Canadian Heritage set out to lay the groundwork for the domestic consultations. During
this time, Hedy Fry and other officials from Canadian Heritage held preliminary
discussions with members of Canadian civil society organizations to seek input on how
the government should structure its upcoming consultation process. Additionally, the
government established three key ad hoc institutions that would help guide Canada’s
preparations for the World Conference: The Canadian Secretariat for the World
Conference against Racism, the Civil Society Advisory Committee and the Aboriginal
Advisory Committee. The formal domestic consultation process began in September
2000 when the government held a series of regional consultations across Canada, which
culminated in a national consultation in February 2001. Three more consultation
meetings were held in the spring and summer of 2001—a northern consultation was held
in March, an Aboriginal consultation took place in April, and a youth consultation was
organized for July.
Although the domestic consultations provided a valuable forum for dialogue
between the government and numerous civil society organizations, there was concern
among many participants that the process provided them with only limited influence with
regard to the government’s policy positions at the World Conference against Racism.
Aboriginal organizations, in particular, were among the strongest critics of the process
and generally viewed it as an empty gesture on the part of the government. Although
some other civil society groups were more satisfied with the process, it is nonetheless fair
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to say that, on balance, the government approached key issues with a pre-determined
agenda rooted in its view of the national interest, and little interest in incorporating the
input of Canadian civil society.

5.1 - Roundtable with civil society on consultations process (May 15, 2000)
The first leg of the Canadian domestic preparations for the World Conference
against Racism occurred immediately following the first Preparatory Committee meeting
in Geneva. On May 15, 2000, Canadian Heritage held a one-day roundtable meeting in
Ottawa to begin an ongoing discussion between government and civil society about how
to structure the government’s formal consultation process. In deciding which civil society
members to invite, Canadian Heritage sought out individuals with personal experience in
the field of anti-racism work. Twenty individuals from civil society attended. Canadian
Heritage established four objectives for the meeting, which were to:
1) discuss how best to engage civil society around the complex issue of race;
2) define sections of civil society who would make a meaningful contribution to
the consultation process;
3) discuss a range of consultative models which will meet four basic principles
of transparency, inclusiveness, accessibility and accountability; and
4) recommend options for the best model or models or consultation to be used in
Canada.174
Considering that the meeting was only the first stage of the consultation process,
it is fair to say that the meeting succeeded in achieving these objectives. Following
introductory remarks by Judith A. LaRocque, the Associate Deputy Minister of Canadian
Heritage, Hedy Fry delivered an address in which she discussed the politics of
multiculturalism and highlighted the importance of youth involvement in the World
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Conference, while noting that racism remains a problem in Canada, particularly in the
form of hate speech on the internet and elsewhere. Responding to concerns from some
NGOs that Canada was late to begin its preparations for the World Conference, Fry said
that the first Preparatory Committee meeting had only just concluded and that Canada’s
preparations were a priority for her. Following Fry’s remarks, a DFAIT official provided
an update about key developments at the first Preparatory Committee meeting as well as
some relevant background information about the context in which the World Conference
would take place. The DFAIT official noted that the two previous UN racism conferences
ended in discord, but expressed optimism that the global political environment had since
improved. She also discussed the role of NGO participation at the World Conference,
explained the accreditation process, and mentioned that the government would be able to
provide NGOs with some financial assistance to help cover the costs of attending the
World Conference and related preparatory events.
Participants at the meeting then began the discussion about Canada’s domestic
consultation process. They first addressed the issue of who the stakeholders of the
consultations were, and suggested that the process should involve a diverse set of
individuals and groups, including immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, women, human
rights groups, churches, and individuals representing historically marginalized
communities in Canada. Participants also suggested that the consultations should include
elite groups, such as business councils, members of the legal and medical professions,
and others who help shape employment policies and practices. In addition, it was
suggested that the consultation process needed to recognize the unique situation of
Aboriginals in Canada and discuss the issue of self-determination. More generally,

117

participants suggested that Canada needed to address the darker sides of its history,
including, for example, the practice of slavery in pre-Confederation Canada. As one
participant said, “on an international level, Canada could help by being honest about its
own situation.”175
The meeting then discussed organizational and procedural issues related to the
consultation process. Several recommendations for the government emerged from these
discussions. Among them were that Canadian Heritage should issue a statement of
values and ethical guidelines to shape the consultation process; establish a working
committee composed of both government officials and civil society groups to organize
the consultations; host a series of regional consultations that would feed into a subsequent
national consultation; complete the consultations prior to the next UN preparatory
meeting scheduled for January 2001 so that the results could be incorporated into
Canada’s positions at the meeting; and grant Aboriginal peoples flexibility in determining
the nature of their participation, including the possibility of creating a parallel process
alongside the civil society consultations.
Hedy Fry and the Associate Deputy Minister concluded the meeting by
announcing that Canadian Heritage planned to use the results of the discussion to produce
a framework paper that would provide greater detail about the structure and goals of the
domestic consultations, and that the paper would be released within two weeks. They also
said Canadian Heritage would act on a recommendation from the meeting to prepare a
“framework document that would include both research from academia and detail the
experience of NGOs” as well as “contain an update in terms of the status of the
implementation of the recommendations of relevant reports and commissions, and a
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presentation of good practices and achievements.”176
On balance, the May 15 meeting resulted in a constructive dialogue between
government and members of civil society. In the coming months, Canadian Heritage
would implement many of the meeting’s recommendations regarding the stakeholders
and organizational structure of the consultation process. In this sense, the government
demonstrated a fair degree of openness and flexibility at least with respect to the process
by which the domestic consultations would unfold.

5.2 - Civil society consultations framework paper
About two weeks later, Canadian Heritage publicly released the framework paper
on the civil society consultations. Whereas the May 15 roundtable meeting was attended
by fewer than two dozen individuals, the framework paper was made widely available to
all interested members of civil society. The paper provided civil society with information
about the political processes that would shape Canada’s preparations for the World
conference and explained the roles and responsibilities of DFAIT and Canadian Heritage
in preparing Canada’s positions for the World Conference. The framework paper
formally announced the government’s decision to host consultations with Canadian civil
society, and said the consultations would discuss “both world and domestic pressures” in
the struggle against racism in Canada and abroad. More specifically, Canadian Heritage
stated that the domestic consultations would be designed to achieve three purposes:
1) Stimulate domestic discussion on the issues raised by the World Conference
and ensure lasting benefits here in Canada.
2) Seek input into the development of the official positions and priorities which
176
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Canada will bring to the World Conference
3) Facilitate dialogue among civil society groups interested in the World
Conference, while assisting in the development of independent positions in
support of a strong NGO presence at the parallel Forum. 177
The framework paper announced both a list of principles and a set of ethical guidelines
that would underlie the consultation process. Canadian Heritage promised that the
consultation process would be governed by the principles of transparency, accessibility,
inclusiveness and accountability. Thus, the government pledged to communicate clearly
with civil society about the goals of the consultations; mitigate against geographic and
linguistic barriers to participation; invite a broad and diverse set of individuals and groups
to participate; and ensure that participants were assigned a clear mandate and that
information would flow effectively between government and civil society. In addition,
Canadian Heritage promised that the consultative process would adhere to four ethical
guidelines. Thus, Canada would “recognize the past” and work to provide an honest and
accurate account of the political and historical context linked to the Canadian present;
“inform and explain” to participants about UN processes to ensure that attendees of the
World Conference had a realistic understanding of what the event could—and could
not—achieve; “engage and co-operate” with civil society to seek consensus whenever
possible and compromise where necessary; and “provide resources” to civil society in
recognition of their need for financial and other support in order to effectively participate
in the consultations.
The framework paper also indicated Canada’s plans to make “special
commitments” to youth and Aboriginal peoples. The government pledged that youth
would play an important role throughout the preparatory process and at the World
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Conference itself, and that youth would be included on the Canadian delegation to the
World Conference. Further, the government accepted the advice it received from civil
society and members of Aboriginal groups to establish a distinct consultation process for
Aboriginal peoples. The consultation process would “allow Aboriginal peoples to decide
how they want to reach their own members” and “accommodate the inclination among
certain groups to be part of the general conversation from the very beginning, while
retaining and exercising the ability to put issues on the agenda in their own right.” It
would also “make room for First Nations, Métis and Inuit to decide at which point they
want to join in the general discussion with members of civil society.”178
Last, the framework paper provided a rough timeline of how Canada’s domestic
preparations were expected to unfold. Canadian Heritage planned to hold a roundtable
meeting in July with representatives from ethno-cultural organizations to discuss
important issues in advance of the consultations. The regional consultations were planned
between August and November and would be followed by a national consultation in
December. At the national consultation, the government would seek consensus on a
discussion paper on Canada’s positions that would be used to guide Canada’s
participation at the January 2001 inter-sessional working group meeting in Geneva.
As it turned out, this schedule did not come to fruition exactly as planned due to
the government’s decision in October to dissolve the 36th Canadian Parliament and call a
general election, which was held on November 27, 2000. Although the snap election did
not disrupt Canada’s preparations as much as it could have—the Liberal Party of Canada
retained its majority government and Hedy Fry won re-election in her riding—it did have
a negative consequence on the process. Canada’s domestic preparations for the World
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Conference effectively came to a halt during the five week campaign, which resulted in
the national consultation being postponed until February 2001. The delay meant Canada
would have to attend both the regional preparatory meeting of the Americas and the intersessional working group meeting in Geneva without having completed the domestic
consultation process. This sequencing of events was a source of major frustration for
many civil society groups involved in the domestic consultations, as they felt that their
input was being marginalized by the government.
Overall, however, the framework paper provided civil society with valuable
information and served as an important part of the government’s larger effort to dialogue
with civil society about Canada’s preparations for the World Conference.

5.3 - Second roundtable with civil society on consultations process (July 5, 2000)
On July 5, 2000, Canadian Heritage held its second roundtable meeting with civil
society groups, this time with individuals representing national ethno-cultural
organizations in Canada.179 A few dozen participants attended. The main purpose of the
meeting was to begin a more substantive discussion between government and civil
society about Canada’s domestic preparations for the World Conference in light of the
five themes decided upon at the first Preparatory Committee meeting. The roundtable
began in a similar fashion to the earlier meeting in May, and brief statements were made
by the Associate Deputy Minister of Canadian Heritage, an official from DFAIT, the
executive director of Canada’s WCAR Secretariat, and Hedy Fry. The DFAIT official
provided background information about the World Conference, summarized key
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developments at the first Preparatory Committee meeting and the role played by DFAIT,
and discussed DFAIT’s relationship with Canadian NGOs. In her address, Hedy Fry
suggested that the World Conference would provide Canada an opportunity to “look at
our past history and practices, but also to look into the future and what we hope to
achieve.” She also discussed the creation of the Advisory Committees and reiterated the
government’s commitment to include youth and Aboriginal peoples throughout the
World Conference process.
To begin the substantive discussions, civil society participants were asked to form
five groups, each of which discussed one of the five themes of the World Conference and
proposed suggestions for how Canada should address each theme. The group addressing
the first theme—on the sources, causes, forms and contemporary manifestations of
racism—suggested that Canada needed to acknowledge its past, such as the internment of
Japanese Canadians during the Second World War and the treatment of Chinese
Canadians during the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway. The group also
suggested that the government take leadership in promoting multicultural policies and
work with labour and trade unions to promote a more inclusive workforce. The group
addressing the second theme—identifying victims of racism—noted that victims in
Canada include Aboriginal peoples, visible minorities, religious groups, and migrants.
The group emphasized that victimization occurs throughout government policy and lack
of access to decision-making as well as in the workforce and in the media.
The group addressing the third theme—measures of prevention, education and
protection—discussed the need for inclusive education curricula in the school system,
greater representation of diverse cultures and viewpoints in the media, increased
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communication between different communities in Canada, and enhanced human rights
legislation. The group stressed that “racism is the responsibility of the whole society, not
just the ones being affected.” The group addressing the fourth theme—remedies,
recourse, redress and [compensatory] measures—suggested that Canada could examine
best practices used in the past, such as the 1988 redress agreement for Japanese
Canadians, as a model for future efforts. It also expressed concern that the civil society
consultation framework paper discussed “individual issues of racism” but did not
properly address “systemic and collective issues.” Last, the group addressing the fifth
theme—strategies to achieve full and effective equality—highlighted the impact of
economic inequality underlying racism in Canada and abroad, and suggested that the
government could create an intergovernmental committee in Canada to combat racism as
well as increase its cooperation with the United Nations.
The groups then merged to hold a plenary discussion, during which they
discussed the issues addressed by each group. Participants suggested that it would be
useful for them to meet again in December following the regional and national
consultations to discuss the results prior to Cabinet’s finalization of the government’s
positions, but Hedy Fry indicated that it would be unlikely that the government’s
schedule could accommodate this request. Once again, participants raised the issue of
government funding for NGO participation in the World Conference. Hedy Fry
responded that the government would provide financial resources to assist NGOs, but
since funding was limited, the government would be more likely to fund organizations
that worked collaboratively rather than those that worked independently. The government
reiterated that it would also provide NGOs with information tool kits to help them
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navigate through the UN bureaucracy and procedures. On balance, as was the case with
the May 15 meeting, the second roundtable provided an early forum for constructive
dialogue between government and civil society members.

5.4 - Discussion paper for Canada’s preparations for the World Conference
In September 2000, Canadian Heritage released a discussion paper “to support
domestic consultations to prepare Canada’s position” for the World Conference.180 The
September paper reiterated most of the key information provided in the May discussion
paper about the political processes by which the domestic consultations would unfold, but
also moved the process forward by initiating a more in-depth discussion about the
substantive content of Canada’s political positions for the World Conference. It provided
consultation participants with a series of questions about how they felt the government
should prepare for the World Conference in the context of the five themes established at
the first Preparatory Committee meeting, and invited participants to send written
submissions to the Canadian Secretariat for its consideration. In addition, the paper
served as the government’s first attempt to inform civil society members about its own
approach to these themes, including past Canadian efforts to combat racism and the
recognition of the ongoing need to review Canadian policies and laws addressing racism
to ensure their maximum effectiveness.
Regarding the first theme, the government noted that efforts to combat racism
needed to acknowledge the past, and recognize that racism can exist in both “everyday
individual behaviors” as well as a result of “policies and practices of our organizations
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and institutions” and can be “expressed overtly or in a covert or subtle way.” The
government further discussed the need to “examine whether there are systemic barriers
produced by beliefs and behaviors borne of racism and intolerance in vital areas like
housing, employment, health, justice and policing, education and social services” and to
counter “denial of the past, hate motivated activity, derogatory or stereotyped media
portrayal, barred or limited access to decision making and to professions and trades,
under-representation in key sectors, and mistrust of newcomers.” The paper stated that
participants at the domestic consultations would be asked for their input on several
questions concerning Canada’s ability to discuss its history “honestly and in a balanced
way,” important lessons learned about the Canadian experience, and “economic factors
that contribute to racism.”
On the second theme, the government noted that victims of racism in Canada
include “Aboriginal peoples and racial minorities such as Canadians of African descent.”
The government stated that it was important to examine the impact of racism on different
groups and noted that “marginalization created by racism, racial discrimination, or
xenophobia is frequently compounded by intolerance based on gender, age, sexual
orientation, disability, religion, language or other factors.” The paper asked participants
of the consultations to consider who the victims of racism are in Canada, the
consequences of racism for these affected individuals and groups, and the additive impact
of racism on victims who are also marginalized in other ways, such as “women, youth,
gays, lesbians, persons with disabilities, senior citizens, or members of a religious
minority.”
On the third theme, the government discussed policies and laws designed to
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prevent racism and protect affected individuals and groups, and also discussed the role of
education and the media in the effort to combat racism in Canada. Regarding policies and
laws, the government noted key documents, such as the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
the Canadian Human Rights Act, the Employment Equity Act, the Official Languages Act,
the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, the Immigration Act, and sections of the Criminal
Code that address hate propaganda. It further noted that “making equality a reality
requires more than constitutional measures and legislation” and highlighted additional
efforts to promote equality, such as the work of domestic human rights commissions, the
Canadian Race Relations Foundation, and programs designed to assist Aboriginal
peoples, newcomers to Canada and immigrants. Participants were asked to comment on
the effectiveness of current Canadian legislation, related mechanisms, and rights
instruments and to offer suggestions for improvement where needed.
Regarding educational measures to combat racism, the government discussed the
need to ensure that education curricula better reflect the diversity of the Canadian
population. The government also mentioned its efforts to engage and educate youth
outside of the classroom and further noted the value of “life-long learning” and
promoting education and training in the workplace. Participants were asked to consider
ways that schools and education curricula could be used to combat racism, provide input
on public education campaigns and comment on the intersection between diversity and
anti-racism education. Regarding the media, the government recognized the important
role that the media play in shaping attitudes and opinions, and discussed efforts to include
more diverse perspectives in the media as well as efforts to combat hate speech on the
internet and elsewhere. Questions addressed the portrayal of Aboriginal peoples and
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racial minorities in the Canadian media, including news, advertising and programming.
Questions also addressed the effectiveness of measures to eliminate barriers to the
participation of Aboriginals and racial minorities in the media, and strategies to counter
hate speech online.
On the fourth theme, the government acknowledged that “it is important to have
in place the necessary remedies, recourse, redress and other measures” to alleviate the
impact of racism on victims. Notably, the government was careful to downplay reference
to the contested term “compensatory,” which at the time remained unresolved at the
international negotiations. Nonetheless, the government stated that “while our record in
recognizing the rights of all peoples is far from perfect, many instruments and
mechanisms define basic rights in Canada and provide redress when individuals or
communities believe their capacity to function has been unfairly infringed upon or
restricted.” The government cited examples involving the legal system such as the Court
Challenges Program and the Native Court Worker Program as well as examples from
outside the court system, such as those created by the Canadian Human Rights Act.
Questions addressed the adequacy of these institutions and mechanisms in responding to
the needs of victims of racism in Canada and sought suggestions for reform or
improvement. The government also discussed issues under the heading of “healing to
promote social cohesion and forward progress” and referred to efforts such as the creation
of the Canadian Race Relations Act and the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.
Participants were provided questions about efforts to address systemic racism, and asked
to provide suggestions about how best to recognize the contributions to Canadian society
of Aboriginal peoples and minority communities.
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Last, the government addressed the fifth theme by discussing the “new and
emerging forces at play attributable to the impacts of globalization and new technologies
that are challenging our current capacity to promote equality.” Discussing Canada’s
policies of supporting open markets and free trade, the government noted that it needed
“to do more to equip all Canadians with the skills and competencies they need to thrive
and prosper in a future that promises to be increasingly competitive and fast-paced.” For
example, it discussed the challenges facing some immigrants whose educational and
professional qualifications and certifications are not recognized in Canada, and also
issues of discrimination in education, training and employment. Questions addressed
efforts to combat racism and ensure that Canada’s increasing integration in the global
economy does not create or exacerbate divisions in Canada.

5.5 - Early efforts to engage Canadian youth
The government’s emphasis on including Canadian youth in the World
Conference against Racism occurred as part of its larger effort to include civil society in
the process, as well as part of the government’s broader effort to engage and educate
youth about the issue of racism and include youth in the Canadian political process more
generally. For example, in 1996, Canadian Heritage established an annual national video
competition in which youth are invited to produce home-made short videos discussing
their ideas on how to eradicate racism in their communities. The government’s youth
component for the World Conference began in March 2000, when Canadian Heritage,
working in partnership with the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) and the
Boys and Girls Clubs of Canada, hosted a meeting in Ottawa of approximately 120 youth
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from more than 24 countries as part of the government’s “Racism. Stop It! Action 2000”
campaign. Selected for their previous engagement in anti-racism advocacy, youth
participants shared their experiences and worked to establish national and international
networks of youth committed to fighting against racism. The Action 2000 campaign also
facilitated their travel across Canada to share their experiences with a wider audience of
Canadian youth.
The capstone event of the Action 2000 campaign occurred in August, when
Canada took the lead in organizing and funding the International Youth Forum against
Racism, held at the Canadian Pavilion at Expo 2000, in Hannover, Germany. 181 The
eight-day event was attended by 55 youth from 14 countries, including 29 from Canada,
and was designated by the United Nations as an official satellite event of the World
Conference against Racism. In addition to providing educational activities and
networking opportunities for participants, the forum produced a final report that was
presented to the United Nations Office for the High Commission for Human Rights
(UNHCHR), the government of South Africa, and Hedy Fry. The report contained three
key recommendations: the creation of a youth council against racism within the
UNHCHR, the establishment of a parallel youth forum in Durban alongside the World
Conference, and UN recognition of youth civil society members as full participants in the
World Conference against Racism.
In sum, the meetings in Ottawa and Germany provided some members of
Canada’s youth with an early opportunity to provide their input into Canada’s
preparations for the World Conference, and also helped them to better prepare for their
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participation in the domestic consultation process that would soon follow in the autumn
of 2000. In addition, some Canadian youth participants at the two meetings were later
selected to serve as members of the two Advisory Committees, and subsequently, as
members of the Canadian delegation at the World Conference.

5.6 - Creating the domestic institutional framework
In the summer of 2000, Canadian Heritage created three key ad hoc institutions
that served to help guide Canada’s domestic preparations: The Canadian Secretariat for
the World Conference against Racism, the Civil Society Advisory Committee, and the
Aboriginal Advisory Committee. The Canadian Secretariat consisted of 10 officials from
Canadian Heritage. Gilbert Scott, a career federal public servant and a former Director
General of Multiculturalism, served as executive director. He was accompanied by
individuals with policy experience in the areas of multiculturalism and Aboriginal issues,
as well as others working in the communications field. The Secretariat performed five
key functions throughout the preparatory process. It served as a liaison between Canadian
Heritage and the two Advisory Committees; helped organize the domestic consultations;
commissioned academic research reports surveying past government policies and
recommendations addressing racism in Canada; administered the governmental process
of providing funding for Canadian NGOs to attend the World Conference and the various
domestic and international preparatory meetings events; and served as a general
information clearing house to disseminate information about Canada and the World
Conference to all interested members of Canadian civil society and the general public.
Two Advisory Committees were also established to advise Hedy Fry throughout
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the domestic preparatory process. The Civil Society Advisory Committee was composed
of 23 individuals who, as a group, represented diverse cultural backgrounds and had
extensive experience working in the field of anti-racism research and advocacy.
Committee members included representatives of NGOs, ethnocultural organizations,
Aboriginal peoples, youth, academia, labour, business and municipalities. The committee
was chaired by Dr. Karen Mock, National Director of the League for Human Rights of
B’nai Brith Canada. The mandate of the Civil Society Advisory Committee consisted of
seven objectives:
1) advise on planning and implementation of the broad consultation process;
2) review and comment on input from the consultations;
3) help establish Canada’s position for the WCAR and identify the elements of a
renewed action plan to combat all forms of racism;
4) facilitate civil society preparations for WCAR
5) encourage participation by non-governmental organizations in the parallel
Forum in South Africa;
6) contribute to the development of Canadian views on key international
documents; and
7) support Canadian Heritage’s UN Conference Secretariat in its role as an
information clearing house for activities leading up to WCAR.182
In recognition of the unique experiences of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples, a separate
Aboriginal Advisory Committee was established to address issues of concern to First
Nations, Métis and Inuit peoples. The Aboriginal Advisory Committee was composed of
12 individuals representing a variety of Aboriginal organizations in Canada and was
chaired by Michèle Audette of the Quebec Native Women’s Association. The Aboriginal
Advisory Committee was assigned five main objectives:
1) Advise on planning and implement further consultations with Aboriginal
peoples;
2) Provide guidance and assistance on key Aboriginal issues;
3) Review the Aboriginal component of the research initiative;
182
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4) Continue an open dialogue with the Department of Heritage and;
5) Review and comment on input from the consultations.183
To coordinate their respective efforts, each Advisory Committee held a series of
teleconference and in-person meetings with its members throughout the autumn of 2000
and spring of 2001. Members of the two Advisory Committees attended the regional and
national domestic consultations, as well as the regional and international preparatory
committee meetings and the World Conference. They also met with Hedy Fry, various
officials in Canadian Heritage and other government departments, assisted civil society
members in participating in the consultation process, and offered their own comments
about Canada’s positions on key issues on the Durban conference agenda. Lastly, the
Civil Society Advisory Committee produced a series of research reports addressing issues
such as hate propaganda and hate groups, past wrongs perpetrated by governments that
have gone unaddressed, globalization and human rights, efforts to engage the private
sector in promoting diversity, the criminal justice system, the role of education, and
issues related to immigration, refugees and migrant workers.
The Advisory Committees faced several challenges in their respective efforts to
fulfill their mandate. These challenges concerned the level of funding that each received
from the government, the logistics of holding regular meetings with Committee members
located throughout the country, the selection process by which individuals members of
the Committees were chosen (and not chosen) to serve, the perception from some that the
Advisory Committees lacked autonomy from the government, and the degree to which
the Committees held meaningful influence over government policy outcomes.
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5.7 - The domestic consultations
The government’s domestic consultation process with civil society began in
September, 2000 when Canadian Heritage—via the Canadian Secretariat for the World
Conference against Racism—organized a series of two-day regional consultation
meetings held across Canada. Seven regional consultations were held in Edmonton
(September 5-6), Vancouver (September 8-9), Winnipeg (September 11-12), Halifax
(September 22-23), Toronto (September 24-25), Montreal (October 20-21), and Iqaluit
(March 24-25, 2001). The discussions at each of the regional consultations were then
used to guide a subsequent national consultation, which was held in Ottawa (February 2324, 2001). In addition, the government organized an Aboriginal consultation in Winnipeg
(April 6-7, 2001) and a youth consultation in Ottawa (July 13-15, 2001). According to
Canadian Heritage, 1,115 people attended at least one meeting of the domestic
consultations, including 487 Aboriginals, 102 youth and 38 Aboriginal youth.184
Participants came from diverse backgrounds, and included individuals from NGOs,
ethnocultural organizations, Aboriginal organizations, youth, academia, labour, business,
and human rights commissions. Also in attendance were various members of the two
Advisory Committees as well as some of the key government officials in Canadian
Heritage and Foreign Affairs who had attended the international preparatory meetings in
Geneva and Santiago. Following the completion of the domestic consultations, the
government planned to use the feedback received to help construct a domestic declaration
and plan of action to combat racism and racial discrimination in Canada.
Each of the consultations was structured in a similar manner and featured a mix of
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plenary meetings and separate workshops focused on specific issues, such as navigating
the UN bureaucratic system and developing strategies for building national and
international alliances with likeminded individuals and groups. Hedy Fry and other
members of the Canadian delegation delivered remarks about Canada’s participation in
the international preparations for the World conference, and responded to questions from
the audience. Tensions between government and various consultation participants were
put on display on several occasions during these exchanges as a result of the divergent
priorities between government, Aboriginal organizations and civil society members.
Government speakers emphasized the inherent difficulties of reaching consensus at large
UN conferences in which state participants come from all over the world and bring to the
table conflicting interests and values. Accordingly, the tendency for UN conferences was
often to produce consensus only on language at the lowest common denominator. Hence,
the government of Canada explained that everyone involved would have to adopt
reasonable expectations about what could be accomplished in Durban. Aboriginal
organizations and civil society members countered that Canada needed to do all that it
could to influence the international outcome and to use the opportunity to develop its
domestic plan of action to combat racism. Thus, the domestic consultation process was, at
times, a contentious process that brought to the forefront significant tensions between the
government, Aboriginal peoples, and civil society groups on issues related to the politics
of race and racism in Canada.
Throughout the consultations, members of the two Advisory Committees served
as facilitators in the discussions. While they found some success in this effort, they also
proved to generate tension as well, as some NGOs representatives viewed the Advisory

135

Committees not as neutral interlocutors between government and civil society, but rather
as de facto representatives of the government itself. As a result, some NGOs challenged
the legitimacy and independence of the Advisory Committees and criticized them for
governmental decisions over which the Advisory Committees had no power, particularly
decisions involving NGO funding for participation in the World Conference.
Additionally, some NGOs criticized the Civil Society Advisory Committee because its
members served in their individual capacity rather than as representatives of the NGOs
with which they were affiliated. For these reasons, some consultations participants
created a separate NGO Committee designed to directly represent the collective voices of
NGOs as such during the domestic preparatory process. The NGO Committee helped to
disseminate information about the World Conference to the NGO community in Canada
and helped NGOs prepare for the conference. Although the creation of the NGO
Committee as a distinct institution served as an indication of the diverse and sometimes
conflicting views held within Canada’s NGO community about how to address the issues
of race and racism in Canada, the work of the NGO Committee and the Civil Society
Advisory Committee generally complemented each other as the various institutions had
far more in common than not.
The Aboriginal Advisory Committee, however, faced additional challenges
related to the many long-standing political and legal issues concerning the relationship
between the Canadian government and Aboriginal peoples in Canada. In general, the
committee expressed skepticism toward the government and its domestic preparatory
process for the World Conference, which it felt was organized on government terms and
meant to serve government interests rather than the various interests of Aboriginal
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peoples in Canada. One member of the Aboriginal Advisory Committee described the
collective mood of the committee as “very distrustful” of the Canadian government. For
its part, the government recognized the weakness of its relationship with the Aboriginal
Advisory Committee, although offered an alternate explanation. Hedy Fry expressed the
view that both she, and the government, “didn’t have a strong relationship with the
committee because the committee was mostly what we felt were really a bureaucratic
body coming out of the First Nations administration”185
In addition to attending plenary meetings, consultation participants were
organized into separate caucuses designed to focus on different communities and groups
in Canada. Thus, there was an Aboriginal peoples caucus, an African-Canadian caucus,
an Asian-Canadian caucus, an Immigrant and Refugee Issues caucus, a Labour caucus,
and a Women’s caucus, among others. The division into caucuses served to help
participants focus their work on issues of concern to their communities, and each caucus
produced various written statements and resolutions highlighting their respective core
issues and preferences for government action. At the same time, the caucus structure also
had the unintended effect of somewhat inhibiting cross-cultural advocacy, and some
participants indicated that they would have preferred more opportunities to work
collaboratively. Participants emphasized that their community’s struggle against racism
was intrinsically linked to the nation-wide, and indeed global, efforts to eradicate racism.
Hence, while each caucus highlighted the concerns of their own respective community,
most addressed topics relevant to many individuals and groups in Canada, such as
employment equity laws, media representation of diverse communities, and immigration
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and refugee policy, among others. In many cases, caucus statements provided policy
analysis and recommendations that were highly critical of the government and went far
beyond what the government was willing to accept in terms of concrete policy changes.
The Aboriginal caucus, which consisted of the major Canadian national
Aboriginal organizations, appeared to be the most critical of the government. The caucus
noted that while Canada itself had acknowledged in its 1999 report to the UN Human
Rights Committee that the situation of Aboriginal peoples was “the most pressing human
rights issue facing Canadians,” the government had consistently failed to take appropriate
steps to address the situation. The caucus stated that:
Whereas in the colonization of Canada, indigenous peoples have been subjected to
genocide and are subject to continuous dispossession of their lands and resources; the
minimization, denial and extinguishment of their fundamental rights including the right of
self-determination; deprival of their own means of subsistence; suppression of their systems
of governance and languages; the taking of whole generations of their children; forced
relocation; systematic economic exclusion; environmental destruction; disproportionate
imprisonment; and many other forms of racism. 186

Citing Article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, the caucus demanded that the Canadian government:
acknowledge the historic and ongoing practices of genocide, such as ‘causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group’, “deliberately inflicting on members of
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part’, ‘imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group’, and ‘forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group.’ ”187

To rectify this situation, the Aboriginal caucus demanded, among other things, that the
government implement the recommendations of the 1996 Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples, fulfill its obligations arising from various UN human rights treaties,
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assume a leadership role in the international negotiations related to the UN Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and provide redress to Aboriginal peoples in Canada
for racist government policies of the past, such as the use of residential schools.
In addition to protesting historical and present-day policies affecting Aboriginal
peoples in Canada, the Aboriginal caucus further protested the entire domestic
consultation process itself, which it viewed as inadequate and merely an effort by the
government to promote the appearance of consultations without actually responding to
the concerns and demands made by Aboriginal peoples. In advancing this view, the
caucus noted that the government had already heard many of the concerns of Aboriginal
peoples following previous consultation processes and had yet to fully address the
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. Thus, in a statement
addressing “appropriate Aboriginal participation” in Canada’s preparations for the World
Conference, the Aboriginal caucus noted that “the government of Canada’s ‘consultation’
process was designed by others, and has seriously suppressed our voices by official
refusal to fully acknowledge our history, our status, our rights, and the causes and
disproportionate effects of continuing colonialism and racism against our Peoples” and
that “the most marginalized and dispossessed among us are distant from and unaware of
these consultations processes, as they try to face mass poverty and unemployment,
shelterlessness, disproportionate incarceration, ill health and suicide.”188 As a result, the
Aboriginal caucus asserted the “illegitimacy of this process” and challenged its
fundamental premise by stating that “we are aware of the government of Canada’s need
to attend in South Africa and indicate that it consulted with a broad sector of civil society,
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including Aboriginal peoples. We are regrettably unwilling to assist Canada in this
pretence or to legitimate this ‘consultation’ by our presence.”189 Thus, “the government
of Canada will not legitimately be entitled to claim in South Africa that it consulted
broadly or effectively with Aboriginal Peoples.”190
The African Canadian caucus also issued a statement that was strongly critical of
the government. 191 The caucus stated that “despite higher levels of education, African
Canadians are still plagued by problems of poverty, overrepresentation in the criminal
justice system, and underrepresentation in middle and upper level management positions
within the public, parapublic and private sectors.” The caucus called on the government
to “officially recognize the reality and legacy of slavery, segregation and systemic racism
in Canada” and to “implement specific measures to compensate African Canadians for
the experiences and legacies of slavery, discrimination and other related injustices as the
Canadian Government has done for Japanese Canadians.” The caucus also called for
greater representation of African Canadians in the Canadian public sector, judicial
system, and media. It additionally called for Canada to ensure that its “immigration and
refugee legislation, policies and practices do not discriminate against peoples of African
descent, especially in the selection and deportation processes” and that its “foreign policy
does not favour Europe over Africa and the Caribbean in the areas of foreign aid and
accreditation.”
The Asian-Canadian caucus referred to their communities’ “long and deeply
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racialized history in Canada” that continues “to live with the impact of that racist past.
These incidents include the head tax and other forms of Asian exclusion, the JapaneseCanadian uprooting and internment, and the Komagata Maru incident, the effects of
which linger in our communities today.”192 The caucus also noted that while their
communities “continue to live with the effects of past racist experiences, new Asian
communities face new forms of racism, which include the creation of myths of the
dangerous foreigner, and the discourse over an ‘Asian Invasion’.” The caucus called for
measures addressing “effective implementation of employment equity practices, fair
immigration policies and practices, equal access to accurate representation in the media,
effective human rights mechanisms to counter anti-Asian as well as all forms of racism,
redress for the head tax and other historical wrongs, labour legislation that protects
migrant workers [and] ratification of conventions on the rights of migrant workers and
their families.”
The youth caucus emphasized the logistical challenges facing youth who strive to
engage in impactful anti-racism advocacy and provided recommendations that would
ease these efforts.193 For example, the caucus called on Canadian Heritage to establish a
“national and potentially international” network of youth that would coordinate research
and advocacy and provide resources such as a website, newsletter, discussion group, and
a database of youth generated anti-racism materials and workshop guides. Additionally,
the network could fund exchange programmes and scholarships and host youth-oriented
anti-racism conferences in Canada. The youth caucus also called on the government to
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expand the March 21 campaign.
The Immigration and Refugee caucus spoke of the need for the government to
amend Canadian laws where needed to ensure harmonization between domestic laws and
international human rights standards, and to amend the Immigration Act to ensure that it
provides effective court protection for individuals facing immigration and deportation
procedures.194 The caucus also called for mandatory anti-racism workplace education for
government employees working in the areas of immigration and refugee policy. It also
asked Canada to ratify the UN Convention on Migrant Workers. The Canadian Labour
Caucus recommended that the government develop a national anti-racism framework to
review key legislative acts and to provide Parliament with annual reports addressing
policy efforts to eliminate racial discrimination in Canada. The caucus also asked the
government to support the use of the term “compensation” in the five themes of the
World Conference against Racism, and for the government to “include in its program of
action statements which link Globalization and racism.”
The Women’s caucus noted the intersection between racism and gender
discrimination and sought to ensure that all issues be viewed “through a gendered
lens.”195 It called for inter-caucus liaisons to ensure that women’s issues were being
considered within all caucuses and for resources to be provided “to produce a report
documenting the experiences of women and their children and formulating
recommendations to be incorporated into Canada’s plan of action.” Similarly, the Lesbian
and Gay caucus called for greater focus on the intersection between racism and
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homophobia and for the government to adopt a “critical anti-racist, anti-sexist and antihomophobic analysis” throughout its domestic plan of action.196
Other concerns were also raised outside of the consultation caucus structure.
During the question and answer period of one presentation, a representative of the
Canadian Arab Federation discussed the issues of racial profiling and negative
stereotypes directed toward Arabs and Muslims in Canada, and the importance of
effective employment equity laws. The representative also raised concerns about
Canadian foreign policy toward Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict.197
Although the Aboriginal caucus strongly challenged the legitimacy of the
government’s consultation process, several representatives of civil society organizations
representing other communities found the process to be effective at least insofar as it
provided them with some degree of access to government officials and opportunities to
dialogue with them. For example, Karen Mock, who attended the consultations both as
chair of the Civil Society Advisory Committee and as a representative of B’nai Brith
Canada, noted that dialogue between government and civil society was “exactly what [the
consultations] were about ... There were bilateral meetings, there were private meetings ...
so there was definitely access. There was formal access. There was informal access.
There would be dinners, there would be lunches. There would be displays to look at,
there would be social down time.”198 Margaret Parsons, of the African Canadian Legal
Clinic, noted that the consultations “created dialogue with government, between
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government, but also between NGOs ... They heard from the African Canadian
community our position on reparation and anti-black racism. I think for the most part that
dialogue really helped them to better understand why we wanted these positions.”199
Similarly, Keiko Miki, of the National Association of Japanese Canadians, said that “I
really felt positive about it ... I did feel that they did a good job of trying to invite diverse
groups and trying to get input from as many different NGOs, but also organizations, just
the grassroots organizations ... I felt that it was a good process.”200
At the same time, several representatives of civil society organizations that
participated in the consultations raised concerns that the dialogue they had with
government did not necessarily translate into effective policy action from the
government. As Karen Mock lamented, “when people do that kind of work and give their
time ... and then, if the secretariat staff and others can’t take that information and turn it
into something meaningful, that’s where we felt let down ... my feeling is that they didn’t
want to take that risk.”201 Margaret Parsons, discussing Canada’s position on the issue of
reparations, noted that several African Canadian NGOs expressed “disappointment” with
the government. “We expressed the lack of support we felt on that particular issue
because that’s important to our community and we weren’t backing down on it ... we
really did feel betrayed and we felt let down by our government on that.”202
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Two weeks after the completion of the national consultation process, the
government announced a decision that stunned many civil society organizations and left
them questioning the government’s commitment to translating the domestic consultation
process into a concrete set of policies at the federal level to combat racism and racial
discrimination. In March 2001, the government decided to abandon its original plan to
produce a domestic plan of action in advance of the World Conference. In its place, the
government released only a short list of 12 priorities, which addressed the following
areas:
1) Acknowledging the Past
2) Recognizing Victims and Groups Vulnerable to Racism
3) Intersectionality and Multiple Discrimination
4) Redress and Remedies
5) Globalization
6) Holistic and Forward Looking Approach to Racism and Diversity
7) Hate and Bias
8) Role of the Media
9) Role of Civil Society
10) Youth
11) Cooperation at the International Level
12) Education and Other Concrete Preventative Strategies203
In effect, the 12 priorities were little more than a modified version of the 10 priorities that
Canada had previously announced at the Regional Conference of the Americas. Civil
society organizations raised two major concerns about the government’s 12 priorities.
First, as a matter of procedure, the government decided to abandon the efforts to create a
domestic plan of action without informing any of the civil society organizations that had
just participated in the consultation process. Civil society organizations were thus
blindsided by the government’s change in plans and many felt that the government had
simply walked away from the promises it had made to establish an open line of
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communication with them. Second, as a matter of policy substance, the government
phrased the 12 priorities only in general terms and made clear that it would not be
establishing any new policies or enhancing existing policies. No new funding would be
forthcoming. Indeed, the government specifically ruled out the possibility of
implementing any form of domestic redress and remedies for past racially-motivated
injustices by arguing that:
In Canada, we have taken a multi-faceted approach to the issues of remedies and redress
and do not believe that granting financial compensation for historical action is appropriate.
Canada has addressed historical actions through measures such as repealing legislation,
establishing the Canadian Race Relations Foundation, formally acknowledging and
regretting historical action in a Statement of Reconciliation, supporting activities such as
the production of films, academic research and other means of commemoration, as well as
developing policies that contribute to the beginning of institutional change. While we
continue to address the past through such initiatives, we believe that government resources
should be used to invest in the future, in the creation of a more equitable society now and a
better future for generations to come. 204

As Karen Mock, chair of the Civil Society Advisory Committee, explained in her final
report on the Committee’s work, the government’s 12 priorities were “more vague than
the previous approach, and thus the expectations of the Advisory Committee, NGO
community and other stakeholders were not met, resulting in frustration, disappointment
and tension. Many members of the NGO community felt a sense of distrust, betrayal and
disillusionment with the Canadian government.”205
In the end, the government’s domestic consultation process produced its share of
both successes and shortcomings. On a positive note, the process provided a diverse
group of civil society organizations with an opportunity to meet with government
officials and share their concerns about key issues that impact their communities. The
process also provided opportunities for likeminded organizations to interact with each
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other, share their knowledge and experiences, and form broader networks of civil society
organizations committed to combating racism and racial discrimination in Canada and
abroad. In this sense, many participants found the process to be a useful and constructive
one. On a negative note, the process failed entirely to establish a meaningful dialogue
between government and Aboriginal organizations, as Aboriginal organizations felt that
the government was more interested in creating the appearance of consultation rather than
engaging in substantive efforts to revise government policies impacting Aboriginal
communities. In addition, civil society organizations also raised concerns about the extent
to which government was prepared to translate the consultation dialogue into action. The
fact that the national consultation was delayed until after the Regional Conference of the
Americas already left civil society organizations with a feeling that the government
tended to view their input as an afterthought. The government’s subsequent decision to
abandon the domestic plan of action further reinforced the view that the government’s
decision making process did not leave much room for civil society input.
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CHAPTER 6: THE INTERNATIONAL PREPARATIONS (PART II)
The four regional preparatory meetings held in late 2000 and early 2001 provided
states with an initial opportunity to formulate some ideas that could be fed into the
negotiations at the international level scheduled for the first half of 2001. In January,
states gathered in Geneva to hold a two-day informal consultation. In March, the intersessional open-ended working group met for four days to discuss a draft declaration and
programme of action prepared by Mary Robinson. An informal meeting of the working
group was held in early May. By this stage in the preparatory process, the overall tenor of
the debate had become very contentious and polarizing, particularly with regard to
debates on the Middle East and the reparations issue. The preparatory process began to
fall behind schedule as states were unable to reach agreement on large portions of the
draft declaration and programme of action. By March, articles in the Canadian media
began to take note of the slow and divisive nature of the process. In late May, states
gathered to hold the Second Preparatory Committee Meeting, which was originally
scheduled to be the last one in advance of the World Conference, but the lack of progress
made at the meeting required states to schedule a Third Preparatory Committee Meeting,
which was held in early August. Even with this additional effort, the most contentious
issues remained unresolved throughout the preparatory process and were left for states to
confront in Durban.

6.1 - The Meetings of the Inter-sessional Working Group
On January 15-16, 2001, states gathered in Geneva for a brief “informal
consultation.” At the time, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson,
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was still in the process of preparing a first draft of the declaration and programme of
action designed to help guide states during the negotiations. At the January meeting,
Robinson’s office circulated an information paper containing a short “vision statement,”
selected excerpts from the two previous UN racism conferences as well as excerpts from
five “expert seminars” that had been held during the past year. Her office also circulated
various suggestions from states that had been sent to her office, including some
suggestions from Canada. The brief meeting had the modest goal of providing states with
an opportunity to present some initial views about the emerging agenda of the World
Conference. Accordingly, the Canadian delegation at this meeting was smaller than the
delegation sent to previous international preparatory meetings for the World Conference,
and consisted of three DFAIT officials, one Canadian Heritage official and two
representatives from the province of Quebec.
The international negotiations continued to reveal clear differences between states
on many issues, and in particular, regarding the Middle East and the reparations issues.
The suggestions presented to Robinson’s office by the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC) referred to the Middle East by stating that:
The World Conference recognizes Jerusalem as a city of reverence and religious sanctity
for three major religions of the world, which can serve as a land for cultural, civilizational
and religious dialogue and the epitome of tolerance, conclusion and understanding. It calls
for an international endeavor to bring foreign occupation, together with all its racist
practices to an end, mainly in holy shrines dear to the three religions, such as the case in the
occupied city of Jerusalem which is being exposed to practices aimed at altering its
geographic, demographic and institutional characteristics, and Judaizing this city, in total
violation of the principles of international law, international humanitarian law and the
multiple resolutions of United Nations General Assembly, Security Council and the
Commission on Human Rights and to refrain from any measures leading to its recognition.
In this context, the World Conference urges the international community to refrain from
taking any measure leading to the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. 206
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The OIC suggestion also discussed the slave trade and colonialism, noting that:
States which peruse racist policies should also assume the responsibility of, and provide
compensation, including an apology, for their policies based on racial superiority, such as
colonialism, ethnic cleansing and slave-trade.207

By contrast, Canada and other Western states emphasized the importance of remembering
the past, but rejected the calls for compensation. Canada’s discussion of historical racism
stated that “it is necessary to acknowledge the past and recognize the full range of causes
and forms of racism existing in society today” while the European Union stated that it
“recognizes the importance of remembering the suffering caused by slavery or which
arose from colonialism.” Neither Canada nor the European Union addressed the Middle
East at all.208
The suggestions from India regarding racism and the caste system introduced
another controversy into the agenda of the World Conference. India stated that it was
“strongly opposed to attempts in certain quarters to include issues, not related to racism,
in the agenda of the World Conference” and referred to “calls by certain NGOs to include
the caste system in the agenda of the Conference.” The term caste, India stated “is not
based on race.”209 As the preparatory process continued, the issue of the caste system
continued to be raised by international NGOs, but India’s position did not move.
Not surprisingly, the two-day informal consultation did little to bridge the gap
between states on the most divisive issues. However, due to the limited goals of the
meeting, Canada left the event feeling that “the objectives of this informal meeting were
met.” In its report on the meeting, DFAIT noted that the event “provided a relatively non207
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confrontational atmosphere for States to highlight their priorities and concerns for the
WCAR” and that the “frank presentation of views was useful in underlining the risks to
the success of the WCAR from an excessive focus on the issue of inter-state
compensation for historical injustices.” In recognition of the challenges facing states in
their effort to reach consensus, the report further noted “the need to develop and discuss a
draft declaration and plan of action during the intersessional period so that efforts can be
made to resolve this and other contentious issues in advance of Durban.”210
The next international meeting during the inter-sessional period occurred from
March 6 to 9, 2001. By this time, all four regional preparatory meetings had been held.
As a result, states were better prepared to present their positions on key issues, but had
also become further entrenched in their own views. Thus, the negotiations only grew
more polarized as time went on.
Similar to the informal consultation, Canada sent a small delegation, which
consisted of three DFAIT officials and two Canadian Heritage officials. Canada also
sponsored eight Aboriginal organizations and Canadian NGOs to attend. Canada’s goal
for the meeting was to present its 12 point priorities for the World Conference, which it
did on the first day of the meeting. As mentioned, the 12 priorities were a slightly
expanded version of the 10 priorities presented at the Regional Conference of the
Americas, amended to include Canada’s position against reparations. Canada’s statement
highlighted the need for the World Conference to address indigenous peoples, people of
African descent and people of Asian descent. Canada also stated that “the issues of antiSemitism, Islamophobia, discrimination against Roma, and anti-Arab bias also need to be
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addressed at this conference. It is for that reason that we propose that the text of the
declaration include a number of paragraphs that draw attention to the particular barriers
these people face.” Canada also highlighted “the particular challenges of multiple
discrimination” and suggested that “the declaration and program of action address in a
more consistent manner the marginalization of people who face discrimination based on
gender, age, sexual orientation, physical or mental ability and barriers based on social or
economic status.”211
The principal objective of the March meeting was for states to discuss the draft
version of the declaration and programme of action that Mary Robinson’s office had
released in late February.212 However, the draft proved to be deeply problematic for states
and was ultimately counterproductive in moving the agenda forward and promoting
consensus. Robinson’s draft sought to incorporate language from each of the four
regional preparatory meeting documents, the Vision Statement, the five expert seminars
and the UN’s previous racism conferences. While the Robinson draft contained many
laudable normative statements about the need to eradicate racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance, it was more notable for its omissions: the draft
document made only brief mention of the slave trade and colonialism and did not discuss
the Middle East at all. The document was also inconsistent with respect to indigenous
issues, at various times using the terms “indigenous peoples,” “indigenous people” and
“indigenous populations.”
211

Government of Canada, “Working Group of the Preparatory Committee of the World Conference on
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance: Statement by the Canadian
Delegation,” (March 6, 2001).
212

World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, “Draft
Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference: Elements for a Draft Declaration and
Programme of Action for the World Conference, Note by the Secretary-General.” A/CONF.189/WG.1/3.

152

The document’s sole reference to colonialism merely noted that the World
Conference “salute[s] the memory of all victims of racism and racial discrimination and
apartheid all over the world.” The document’s sole reference to the slave trade noted that
the World Conference “affirm[s] that the slave trade, particularly of Africans, was an
appalling tragedy in the history of humanity, not only because of its abhorrent barbarism
but also in terms of its enormous magnitude, its institutionalized nature, its transnational
dimension, and especially its negation of the essence of the victims, and further note that
the practice of slavery is now recognized as a crime against humanity.” Additionally,
while the Robinson draft contained subheadings addressing specific victimized groups
and issues, such as women; children; migration and trafficking; asylum seekers, refugees
and internally displaced persons; minorities; Romas; indigenous issues; it notably
excluded separate subheadings for people of African descent or for persons of Asian
descent.213 As a result, states in Africa, the Caribbean and the Middle East strongly
rejected the document as a basis for negotiation, and most of the March meeting was
devoted to a debate, split along North-South lines, about whether the Robinson draft
would be maintained as a basis for negotiation or scrapped altogether. In addition to
continued debate about the reparations issue, the March meeting marked the beginning of
the acrimonious debate about the Middle East that would come to dominate much of the
agenda of the World Conference for the next six months.
The March meeting concluded without states having performed a “first read” of
the document, meaning that states did not reach consensus on any portion of the
document and thus left the entire document open for negotiation at subsequent meetings.
In addition, states unhappy with the Robinson draft used the March meeting as an
213
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opportunity to propose additional paragraphs in the text, resulting in a revised draft
document that was substantially longer, but no more likely to generate consensus. One
DFAIT official involved in the negotiations described the Robinson draft by observing
that her office “tried to judge where they thought there could be agreement and developed
a draft document. And soon people were just submitting proposals and it just grew to this
enormous size text, very unwieldy. So it was a bit of a very chaotic time ... It was
probably ill-advised to come forward and put this text which really didn’t satisfy
anybody.”214 Thus, the March meeting failed completely to achieve its objectives and
served only to escalate conflict between states.
The Canadian delegation to the meeting took note of these developments in its
report.215 It observed that the meeting “unfortunately quickly transformed itself into a
North South confrontation as the G77 closed ranks and decided to oppose the draft
Declaration and [Programme of Action] which, they considered, unacceptably omitted
their issues.” The report described how “instead of the planned consideration of the draft,
the first two-and-half days were taken up with procedural wrangling over method of
work, and by the related political posturing by hard-liners within the Asian and African
Groups.” In recognition of the slow progress, the report noted that the inter-sessional
working-group would hold another meeting in May, but that it was at the time “not clear
exactly how work will proceed.” Although Canada remained firmly aligned with the
Western positions on reparations and the Middle East, and was not willing to accept
many of the suggestions offered by African and Middle Eastern states, Canada
214
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nonetheless appeared to recognize that the Robinson draft as presented was effectively a
non-starter. For example, Canada’s report characterized the Robinson text as “hastily
assembled from the less contentious paragraphs of the four regional intergovernmental
preparatory meetings” and noted that the draft Programme of Action did not include “any
extensive references to ‘Africans and people of African descent.’ ” This omission “only
lent credibility to those who argued these were ‘Western Group’ drafts.”216
In the aftermath of the March meeting, Canadian media began to take note of the
divisive nature of the debates. A Globe and Mail article noted concerns that the language
being used bordered on a revival of the accusation that Zionism was a form of racism.217
Media reports also indicated that the United States had already begun considering the
possibility of boycotting the World Conference to protest the language used to describe
Israel. Canada adopted a milder tone; a spokesperson for DFAIT was quoted by the
National Post as saying that Canada “oppose[d] attempts to equate Zionism as racism,
but we haven’t yet decided if we’ll attend should this debate be on the agenda.”218 An
editorial in the National Post advised Canada to avoid the World Conference.219
In the weeks following the March meeting, Mary Robinson’s office worked to
revise the draft declaration and programme of action in an effort to respond to the
criticism leveled against the document. On May 2, a few days before the next and final
meeting of the inter-sessional working group, her office released a compilation document
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that brought together the proposals contained in her office’s earlier document as well as
language from each of the four regional preparatory meetings.220 At more than 100 pages
of text, the revised document was substantially longer than the original draft released by
her office. This length reflected the limited progress that had been made at the previous
meetings and focused attention on the need for states to begin to reach consensus on a
slimmed down version of the document. However, the May meeting of the inter-sessional
working group proved to be no more successful than previous meetings. On the contrary,
it served only to highlight how far apart states remained and how much work remained to
be done.
The Canadian delegation to the May meeting consisted of three DFAIT officials
and three Canadian Heritage officials. Five Aboriginal organizations and civil society
groups were sponsored by the government to attend as well. As the Canadian report on
the meeting indicated, progress at the May meeting was slow.221 Overall, Canada noted
that the meeting “neither eased our concerns about the potential of the WCAR to dissolve
around the issues of ‘Zionism as racism’ and compensation for historical injustices, nor
reduced the enormity of the task ahead to produce an acceptable and meaningful
declaration and programme of action.” The Canadian report described negotiations on the
draft declaration as full of “polemic and political posturing” and “[c]learly not a proper
negotiation ... The result was an increase in the length of the declaration from the original
41 paragraphs to 226!” Similarly, negotiations on the programme of action were
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characterized as “excruciatingly slow” as states spent an entire three hour session
discussing a single paragraph.222 Negotiations also bogged down on procedural matters as
states debated how to rationalize the lengthy text and about whether the declaration and
programme of action should be negotiated in sequence or concurrently. Overall, the
week-long meeting accomplished little.
Throughout the meetings of the inter-sessional working group, Canada remained
firmly opposed to introduction of the Middle East as an item on the World Conference
agenda, and especially the efforts to equate Zionism with racism. In a statement to the
May meeting, the Canadian delegation indicated that it was “very concerned by some of
the proposals that have been made, particularly with respect to the situation in the Middle
East, and which have had the immediate effect of politicizing the debates and
considerably slowing down our work.”223 For example, several states belonging to the
Organization of the Islamic Conference requested language condemning “the genocide of
ethnic Arabs in historic Palestine” and the “racist practices of Zionism.” Email
correspondences between the Canadian delegation in Geneva and DFAIT officials in
Ottawa revealed the growing pressure facing Canada as it sought to balance its desire to
remain involved in the World Conference and work toward a positive outcome with its
desire to forcefully combat the language being used to describe Israel. The possibility of a
Canadian withdrawal from the entire Conference was never off the radar of the Canadian
delegation. As one DFAIT official said to the Canadian delegation:
the tone and substance of debate will be factored into any consideration of Canada’s
222
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participation in the preparatory work of the Conference itself. At present, we remain
committed to working towards a forward-looking global commitment to eradicate racism
and racial discrimination. At this time we continue to believe that this is the best way to
positively influence Conference outcomes. However, you should be clear, if asked, in
stating that the form and level of Canadian participation at the Conference will be further
evaluated after the next preparatory meetings as we continue to watch the evolution of the
debate, and when we have a clearer understanding of what the conference outcomes might
be.224

Members of the Canadian delegation continued to meet regularly with Aboriginal
organizations and Canadian NGOs throughout the inter-sessional working groups
meetings. Government officials provided updates about key developments related to the
negotiations while Aboriginal organizations and NGOs offered input into Canada’s
positions. The meetings provided additional opportunities for dialogue between
government, Aboriginal organizations and Canadian NGOs on a variety of issues related
to the World Conference agenda, including issues about which the involved actors did not
always agree. In general, the overall tenor of these meetings was similar to the meetings
held at previous World Conference preparatory meetings.
In sum, the informal consultation and meetings of the inter-sessional working
group served to highlight the divisions between states, but did little to bridge them. The
issue of the Middle East, which had previously gone unmentioned at the First Preparatory
Committee meeting, emerged as a major issue on the agenda. The first draft document
released by Mary Robinson’s office at the March meeting proved to be completely
unworkable and was strongly rejected by states throughout Africa, Asia, South and
Central America, the Caribbean, and the Middle East, which felt that the document
ignored their concerns as expressed in the texts of their respective regional preparatory
meetings. This misstep by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
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brought the negotiations to a halt and left Robinson and her office with no choice but to
abandon their first attempt and begin anew with a substantially longer document that
simply incorporated large portions of the text from all four regional preparatory meeting
documents. At the end of the final meeting of the inter-sessional working group, states
had cobbled together a lengthy and unwieldy draft declaration comprised more than 200
paragraphs and a draft programme of action comprised of more than 300 paragraphs.225
All of the most contentious issues remained unresolved and the growing sense of urgency
was felt by all states involved as well as the office of Mary Robinson.

6.2 - The Second Preparatory Committee Meeting
The limited progress made at the meetings of the inter-sessional working group
underscored the difficulties that lay ahead for states as they began the second meeting of
the Preparatory Committee, which was held in Geneva from May 21 to June 1, 2001.226 It
was at this point that states began serious negotiations over the draft declaration and
programme of action following the procedural debates and politicized rhetoric that
dominated most of the inter-sessional working group meetings. Nonetheless, the Second
Preparatory Committee meeting accomplished less than what was hoped. Although
originally scheduled as the final preparatory meeting in advance of the World
Conference, the meeting concluded with large portions of the draft documents left
unresolved, forcing states to schedule a Third Preparatory Committee Meeting in August.
225

World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, “Draft
Declaration and Programme of Action: Proposals Made at the First and Second Intersessional Open-Ended
Working Groups, held from 6 to 9 March 2001 and 7 to 11 May 2001,” A/CONF.189/PC.2/27.
226

World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, “Report
of the Preparatory Committee on its Second Session,” A/CONF.189/PC.2/30.

159

The meeting was attended by 134 states as well as by representatives from the
Holy See and Palestine. Also in attendance were various UN branches, human rights
bodies and mechanisms (such as the UN Development Programme and the various UN
committees that enforce international human rights treaties), specialized agencies and
related organizations (such as the International Labour Organization and the World
Health Organization), and intergovernmental organizations (such as the European Union,
the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference). In
addition, hundreds of NGOs from around the world participated.
The central objective of the Second Preparatory Committee meeting was to
consider the draft declaration and programme of action that had been assembled at the
inter-sessional working group meetings. The meeting opened with an address by Mary
Robinson that was notably less optimistic in tone than the address she delivered to open
the First Preparatory Committee meeting one year before. Though trying to put a positive
spin on developments, Robinson conceded that “a lot still remains to be achieved.
Progress on drafting the final declaration and programme of action has been slower than
many had hoped.”227
In recognition of the importance of the Second Preparatory Committee meeting,
the Canadian delegation was larger than the one sent to each of the previous World
Conference preparatory meetings. It consisted of five DFAIT officials, seven Canadian
Heritage officials, one official from Indian and Northern Affairs, and two from the
Department of Justice. The delegation also included two representatives from the
province of Quebec. Five representatives from Aboriginal organizations and Canadian
227
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NGOs were selected as observers of the delegations and an additional 23 NGOs and
Aboriginal organizations were sponsored by the government to attend the meeting.
Not surprisingly, the Second Preparatory Committee meeting did not proceed as
hoped. Most of the first two days of the meeting were lost to a debate about the
accreditation of six NGOs, a rather straight-forward procedural issue that should have
been resolved routinely.228 Only four of the scheduled fifteen hours of the first two days
were devoted to negotiations and only three paragraphs out of approximately 600 were
adopted during this time. States began discussions on whether to continue negotiations in
the plenary or to divide their work into two committees, one for the draft declaration and
another for the draft programme of action.
On the third day, states began more serious negotiations. Because of the lengthy
and unfocused nature of the draft texts before them, states decided to establish a working
group of 21 states (group of 21) that would meet outside of the plenary and work to
rationalize the draft declaration and programme of action. The membership of the group
consisted of South Africa, which served as chair, and four states from each of the five
geographical regions in the UN system. The membership consisted of: Barbados, Brazil
Chile, and Mexico (Latin America and the Caribbean); Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and
Tunisia (Africa); India, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan (Asia); Czech Republic, Croatia, the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Russia (Eastern Europe); France, Sweden,
the United States and Canada (Western Europe and Others). The formal mandate of the
group of 21 was:
1) To regroup or cluster paragraphs of the draft declaration and programme of
228
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action by theme, idea and subject;
2) To identify duplicated language;
3) To make proposals to the Preparatory Committee on the rationalization and
restructuring of both the draft declaration and the programme of action and the
possible merging of paragraphs whose elements belong together; this would help
to simplify the text and present it in a manner which would make it negotiable.229
The group was given clear instructions that it had to provide explanations for each of its
proposals to either delete or merge text. Moreover, it was specifically structured not to be
a negotiating body, as such decisions could be made only by all states involved in the
preparatory process. The group convened throughout the third and fourth day and then
met with the remaining states on the fifth day to provide them with their proposals to
revise the two draft texts. The UN report on the Second Preparatory Committee meeting
specifically noted the role played by Brazil, Canada and Sweden at the group of 21.
Concurrently with the work of the group of 21, EU states worked with Mexico to
streamline the draft texts and offer suggestions for revisions.
With these various proposals in hand, states spent the second week of the meeting
convening in two working groups, one for the draft declaration and another for the draft
programme of action. Although the pace of work remained very slow, some limited
progress was made, and by the end of the week, the two working groups had adopted a
total of 38 paragraphs—24 by the working group on the draft declaration and 14 by the
working group on the draft programme of action.230 However, the adopted paragraphs
addressed only the less contentious issues on the agenda, and consisted of general
statements condemning the existence of racism and calls for states to eradicate it. Most of
the adopted paragraphs from the declaration were those of the preamble. The more
229
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contentious issues related to the Middle East and reparations were left unresolved. For
example, a paragraph on slavery and colonialism that had been discussed, but not
adopted, read:
The World Conference recognizes that slavery, the slave trade, colonialism, and apartheid
are major historical sources and manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia
and related intolerance, and that Africans and peoples of African descent, peoples of Asian
descent and indigenous peoples and [sic] have been and continue to be victims of their
consequences, and urges States and the international community to adopt appropriate
remedial measures in order to halt and reverse the consequent marginalization, poverty,
underdevelopment and socio-economic exclusion still affecting many such peoples in many
parts of the world, in particular in developing countries. 231

Similarly, a proposed paragraph indirectly addressing the Middle East read: “reaffirming
that colonization by settlers and foreign occupation constitute sources, causes and forms
of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.”
Western states generally sought to avoid discussion of these two issues at the
Second Preparatory Committee meeting and for the time being, wanted to focus only on
the less contentious issues. There were two reasons for this tactical approach. First,
European Union states had yet to formulate a common position on the reparations issue
as some states were more willing than others to compromise and offer a statement of
apology for the slave trade. Naturally, the states least willing to offer an apology were
among those that most heavily engaged in the practice—the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. Second, European states appeared to want to ‘run out
the clock’ on the issue by delaying discussion until the Conference date drew nearer in
the hope that states in Africa and the Middle East would be forced to compromise on
their demands due to time constraints. As an official from DFAIT observed:
Notwithstanding that resolution of the difficult issue of
compensation/redress/remedies/positive measures will be essential if the WCAR in Durban
is to be successful, there was limited formal discussion of it at this second PrepCom
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meeting in Geneva. This was not altogether surprising given the numerous other issues to
be grappled with and the understandable desire of many western delegations to tackle the
less contentious issues first. Efforts to address the only two paragraphs that arose which
touch on this issue were resisted by the EU, which even at this late stage has not formulated
a common position on this and many other issues.232

Canada further suggested that the European Union’s “inability to engage at this point is
already being characterized by some delegations and NGOs as a lack of political will.”
The EU “risks losing whatever moral ground it has going into the conference’ and “also
risks forfeiting the advantage of unified positions with key partners who ostensibly have
less at stake politically and will not be willing [to] accept blame for EU intransigence.”233
Notwithstanding Canada’s professed concern for Europe’s “moral ground,” it is
important to note that Canada’s position was not that different from the various positions
being debated within the European Union:
The position of Canada with respect to compensation for the historical injustices of slavery
and colonialism is that it is not appropriate. We acknowledge and regret that colonialism
and slavery were historical sources and manifestations of racism, such acknowledgement
(e.g. through education programmes, public awareness campaigns, museums, monuments)
is essential to reconciliation and to ensuring these injustices are not repeated, however, we
consider that resources should be used in forward-looking, comprehensive
programmes/activities aimed at eradicating racism in all its contemporary forms. 234

Other issues on the agenda remained divisive as well. States were unable to agree
on a list of victims to be identified in the declaration. A proposed sentence referring to
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance also identified
“religious intolerance, anti-Arabism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, Negrophobia” as
additional forms of intolerance to be condemned. Some Arab and Muslim states insisted
that any reference to anti-Semitism be followed by the phrase “including Zionist
232
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practices” on the basis that the Palestinians were also of Semitic origin. India continued
its opposition to any reference to the Dalits as victims of racism. Meanwhile, African
states, upset at the refusal of Western states to compromise on the issue of reparations,
suggested that the list of victims should contain a hierarchy that placed Africans and
people of African descent at the top.
Thus, the limited accomplishments of the Second Preparatory Committee meeting
were overshadowed by the divisiveness that remained between states and the large
number of issues that were left unresolved. As a result, states agreed near the end of the
Second Preparatory Committee meeting to schedule a third meeting, which was held in
late July and early August. In addition, states agreed that the group of 21 would meet
throughout June to continue its efforts to streamline the draft texts. In her closing address
to the Second Preparatory Committee meeting, Mary Robinson reflected on the
“worryingly slow” progress and asked of states: “Can we dare hope that the third session
will manage to reach a consensus on at least 80 to 85 per cent of the proposals? I recall
that I said in my opening remarks to the [meeting] that the clock is ticking. That is even
more the case now and if we are to have a successful conference we must make faster and
better progress.”235
Both the Canadian delegation and the Canadian civil society groups in attendance
were very active at the Second Preparatory Committee meeting, given the circumstances.
Canada’s selection as a member of the group of 21 gave it some additional leverage to
shape the negotiations, and Canada continued to work with the group of 21 in the weeks
following the Second Preparatory Committee meeting. Canada also made a constructive
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effort to address the question of identifying victims. A Canadian proposal on the issue
contained separate paragraphs that each identified a particular group, such as Jews,
Muslims, Arabs, Africans and people of African descent, Asians and people of Asian
descent, and Roma/Sinti and Travellers. The proposed paragraphs acknowledged that
each group has been impacted by racism and called for greater awareness and
preventative measures at the national and international level.236 Given the challenging
political climate in which states negotiated these issues, the Canadian suggestion was a
helpful effort to address the concerns of many states and impacted groups.
Meanwhile, Canadian civil society groups were also very active at the meeting.
The Canadian delegation held various formal and informal meetings with Aboriginal
organizations and civil society groups, during which time government officials provided
briefings about diplomatic developments and responded to questions asked. As was the
case at previous Geneva meetings, Aboriginal organizations, Canadian NGOs, and
Canadian youth groups did not always see eye-to-eye with each other and with the
government, and thus experienced their share of challenges in coordinating their efforts
and lobbying the government to adopt positions favourable to their interests. Issues
related to the flow of information and accessibility of the Canadian government
continued to be raised, particularly following the last-minute decision to organize a Third
Preparatory Committee meeting, which raised questions about NGO funding and access
to the meeting. Questions were also raised about the government’s ambiguous
commitment to implement a domestic plan of action to combat racism in Canada.
Despite these challenges, several participants in attendance described the
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meetings favourably. A report on the Second Preparatory Committee meeting by Karen
Mock, the chair of the Civil Society Advisory Committee, noted that the “staff of the
Mission, our negotiators, and the staff of the Canadian Secretariat who attended were just
wonderful, keeping track of everyone, always accessible, and ensuring that we all got as
much information as possible.”237 In a separate report, Donna Scott, a representative from
the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission described the government meetings by
noting that the “opportunity to be briefed and ask questions [was] particularly useful.”238
Another report by Gerald Gall, a member of the Civil Society Advisory Committee,
commented that the “Canadian contingent of NGOs was briefed regularly on the detailed
conduct of negotiations, was encouraged to provide input to the Canadian negotiating
team and to freely participate in caucuses and other events surrounding the official
negotiations. The Canadian NGOs were treated with hospitality and respect at the
Canadian Mission and throughout by the Canadian negotiating team.”239
The Canadian contingent of Aboriginal organizations and civil society groups also
used the meeting to network with international NGOs. Mock indicated that there was a
“strong Canadian presence” within the global civil society community, and Canadian
groups actively participated in various meetings with international NGOs to discuss a
range of issues, such as those concerning Aboriginal peoples, Africans and people of
African descent, Asians and people of Asian descent, youth, and many others.240 Scott
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noted that the “Canadian NGOs also found the opportunity to network useful. It allowed
us to share information and helped us to understand how we might better support each
other. Canada’s NGOs plan to continue to communicate with each other, both in the time
leading to the World Conference, and following, in order to be part of any action plan
Canada or the world adopts.”241 Chief Margaret Penasse-Mayer of the Nipissing First
Nation noted that as an:
indigenous representative from Canada, I attended Indigenous meetings that took place
everyday at 6:30 p.m., and also on May 24th, we had a working meeting regarding the
wording of the Indigenous paragraphs for half a day. There was also another meeting of
Indigenous Caucus on Saturday, May 26th to review the NGO document and again to
review the indigenous section of the Declaration and the Plan of Action documents. The
Indigenous caucuses also had a meeting with the European Union to address issues and
concerns of the caucus.242

The Canadian delegation also hosted a youth caucus that was attended by Mary
Robinson and many youth delegates from Canada and abroad. In general, the Canadian
youth caucus worked diligently with youth caucuses from other countries to help
coordinate the draft declaration and programme of action for the parallel youth forum
scheduled for late August. In addition, Canadian youth continued to prepare for Canada’s
domestic national youth forum, scheduled to be held in Ottawa from July 13-15, 2001.
The chair of the Canadian Youth Forum, Asha Noel, noted that the “Canadian Youth
Caucus accomplished a great deal in terms of developing a draft agenda and proposal for
the National Youth Gathering/PrepCom.”243
In the end, the limited progress made by states at the Second Preparatory
Committee Meeting in negotiating the draft declaration and programme of action
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highlighted the seriousness of the divisions between them. The challenges facing states
was magnified by the fact that they had only a shrinking amount of time with which to
work if they hoped to go to Durban with a relatively complete and solid foundation for
discussion. In this context, Canada’s ability to shape the outcome was limited, but it did
offer several useful suggestions, particularly during the discussions that sought to identify
lists of victims. Canada’s work as a member of the group of 21 was also productive and
continued in the weeks between the second and third preparatory meeting. Meanwhile,
the government’s relations with Aboriginal organizations and civil society groups
continued along the path established at previous Geneva meetings. While the
government’s decision to fund more than two dozen Aboriginal organizations and civil
society groups to attend served as an indication of the government’s willingness to
include diverse voices from outside government, disagreements between them and the
government remained on several key issues on the agenda.

6.3 - The Group of 21: Between the Second and Third Preparatory Committee
Meetings
The Group of 21 met throughout the month of June to continue its work of
streamlining the lengthy texts before them. No NGOs were granted access to the
meetings of the group. Although the smaller membership of the group permitted it to
have a more focused discussion than was possible at the plenary, the group nonetheless
faced challenges due to the limited nature of its mandate and the differences that
remained between states. Its work proceeded slowly at first, but ultimately, it made
significant progress in shortening the texts and better preparing them for negotiation at
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the Third Preparatory Committee Meeting.
During the first week of the group’s meetings, it reviewed almost the entire draft
declaration and made several suggestions to cluster similar paragraphs together in order
to edit them into a shorter and more manageable text. However, many of these
suggestions could not be agreed upon. Indeed, the very first suggestion to merge two
similar paragraphs addressing colonialism resulted in a lengthy debate that was resolved
only when the chair of the group decided to adjourn the group and seek greater
clarification about its mandate. When it was clarified that none of the decisions made by
the group of 21 were final and that all texts remained open for negotiation, states were
able to proceed more effectively, albeit in a manner described by Canada as “fits and
starts.”244 Concurrently, as a result of a Canadian suggestion, some states of the group of
21 formed a smaller group to begin discussion of the draft plan of action. By the end of
the week, this smaller group had completed a review of the plan of action and proposed
deletion of 105 paragraphs.
The second week was, according to Canada, “in some ways better than the
previous one” although states continued to negotiate in a “very difficult atmosphere.”245
During this time, states made good progress toward completing a read of the entire draft
declaration and had trimmed the text down to approximately 20 pages. Disagreements
remained about the ordering of the paragraphs. Some developing world states wanted
paragraphs addressing globalization to appear at the beginning of the declaration, while

244

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Report – WCAR Group of 21 – Week of 6-8
June,” (June 8, 2001).
245

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “WCAR Report of the Group of 21 (11-15
June), June 15, 2001).

170

Western states felt that doing so would shift the focus toward broader global economic
matters and away from issues of racism and racial discrimination. Canada described this
specific debate as “in many ways, indicative of the main challenge we face in this
meeting and in the [Preparatory Committee meetings]—an ongoing battle to keep the
discussions focussed on racism and the documents short and forward looking.”
Additionally, states from Africa and the Caribbean continued to emphasize the
reparations issue and insist that the documents clearly acknowledge the causal link
between the slave trade, colonialism and the present-day political and economic situation
in Africa and the Caribbean. As Canada suggested, “this is probably in response to the
lack of desire or ability of the EU to engage substantively on these issues.”246
While these debates continued into the third week, states continued to make
progress, working in a “business-like manner” and completing a review of the entire draft
declaration and two-thirds of the draft programme of action.247 The ordering of
paragraphs continued to be a point of contention, although states ultimately decided on a
list of victims that referred to “Africans and people of African descent followed by
indigenous peoples, migrants, refugees, Mestizos, other victims, women and children and
multiple discrimination.” This decision occurred over objections from Western states
against what Canada called “developing a hierarchy of hurt or any other list based on a
wholly subjective method.”248
Due to time constraints, the group of 21 stopped meeting before it was able to
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complete a reading of the remaining portions of the programme of action which were left
to be negotiated at the Third Preparatory Committee Meeting in late July and early
August. Nonetheless, the group made significant progress in streamlining the draft texts
and easing the workload of the plenary in the coming weeks. As a Canadian delegate
involved in the group said of its work, “I think it was helpful ... If that hadn’t happened,
then we would have ended up with a document in August that would have been hundreds
of pages of square brackets, and you just can’t negotiate that in a large group.”249

6.4 - The Third Preparatory Committee Meeting
The fact that states needed to quickly schedule a third meeting of the preparatory
committee meeting in the first place was a testament to the divisions between them and
the significant amount of work that remained to be done in the final weeks before states
assembled in Durban in late August. The last-minute decision to hold the meeting created
logistical challenges for both states and non-state actors. Because Canada had set aside a
fixed amount of funding for Aboriginal organizations and civil society groups to
participate in the World Conference, any funding for these groups to attend the third
meeting would have to come at the expense of money designated to fund travel to Durban
to attend the World Conference. For this reason, Canada provided funding for only a few
(seven) domestic groups to attend, although many others made the trip at their own
expense. Canada also sent a slightly smaller delegation to the meeting, which consisted of
six DFAIT officials, two Heritage officials, one Justice official, and one official from
Indian Affairs and Northern Development. At the international level, attendance was
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similar to the two previous preparatory committee meetings. One hundred and thirty-nine
states attended, along with representatives from Palestine and a variety of UN human
rights bodies and specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations, national
organizations, and others.
Once again, the meeting got off to a slow start, as states got bogged down in a
debate about NGO accreditation.250 In a close and controversial vote that split mostly
along North-South lines, states decided to deny NGO accreditation to the International
Lesbian and Gay Alliance. States also established two working groups to address the
draft declaration and draft programme of action, respectively. The chair of the group of
21 presented its recommendations to these two groups for their consideration. In addition,
three working groups were established to address key contentious issues—one group to
address the Middle East, another on issues relating to the past, and a third on the listing of
victims. By this stage in the preparatory process, the fault lines of the debate had been
clearly established and thus the major contentious issues on the agenda remained divisive
and unresolved. For example, several paragraphs containing language that assigned a
causal link between historical slavery and colonialism and present-day political and
economic challenges in Africa and the Caribbean remained bracketed for further
discussion. But states did make considerable progress agreeing on less contentious
language and ultimately adopted 138 paragraphs of text at the Third Preparatory
Committee meeting—57 in the declaration and 81 in the programme of action. Many of
these paragraphs addressed substantive issues concerning Africans and people of African
descent, Asians and people of Asian descent, Roma/Gypsy/Sinti/Travellers, Mestizo
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populations, migrants and refugees.251
For example, states adopted several paragraphs addressing Africans and people of
African descent, including one that “recognize[d] that people of African descent have for
centuries been victims of racism, racial discrimination and enslavement and of the denial
by history of many of their rights, and assert that they should be treated with fairness and
respect for their dignity and should not suffer discrimination of any kind.” States also
agreed to a paragraph addressing contemporary forms of slavery, noting that they
“strongly condemn the fact that slavery and slavery-like practices still exist today in parts
of the world and urge States to take immediate measures as a matter of priority to end
such practices, which constitute flagrant violations of human rights.” Further, while the
issue of reparations remained contested, states agreed to language “request[ing] States,
supported by international cooperation, as appropriate, to consider positively
concentrating additional investments in health-care systems, education, public health,
electricity, drinking water and environmental control, as well as other affirmative or
positive action initiatives in communities of primarily African descent.”252
States also agreed to language “recogniz[ing] that in many parts of the world,
Asians and people of Asian descent face barriers as a result of social biases and
discrimination prevailing in public and private institutions and express our commitment
to work towards the eradication of all forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia
and related intolerance faced by Asians and people of Asian descent.” States adopted
several paragraphs addressing Roma/Gypsies/Sinti/Travellers, including one that
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“encourages States to adopt appropriate and concrete policies and measures and to
develop implantation mechanisms, where these do not already exist, and exchange
experiences, in cooperation with representatives of the Roma/Gypsies/Sinti/Travellers in
order to eradicate discrimination against them...” One paragraph addressing Mestizo
populations noted that states “recognize the presence in many countries of a Mestizo
population of mixed ethnic and racial origins and its valuable contribution to the
promotion of tolerance and respect in these societies, and we condemn discrimination
against them, especially because such discrimination may be denied owing to its subtle
nature.”253
States also adopted several paragraphs addressing both migrants and refugees.
One paragraph on migrants:
note[s] with concern and strongly condemn[s] the manifestations and acts of racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance against migrants and the stereotypes
often applied to them, and reaffirm the responsibility of States to protect the human rights
of migrants under their jurisdiction and the responsibility of Governments to safeguard and
protect migrants against illegal or violent acts, in particular acts of racial discrimination and
crimes perpetrated with racist or xenophobic motivation by individuals or groups, and
stress the need for their fair, just and equitable treatment in the society and in the
workplace.254

A paragraph on refugees:
urges States to comply with their obligations under international human rights, refugee and
humanitarian law relating to refugees, asylum-seekers and displaced persons, and urges the
international community to provide them with protection and assistance in an equitable
manner and with due regard to their needs in different parts of the world, in keeping with
principles of international solidarity, burden sharing and international cooperation to share
responsibilities.255

In addition, states adopted several paragraphs addressing indigenous peoples.
These paragraphs were controversial because they accepted the qualifications used at the
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Regional Conference of the Americas. Indeed, many of the paragraphs adopted at the
Chile conference were transferred verbatim into the declaration and programme of action.
Thus, references to indigenous peoples qualified the meaning of the term “peoples” in a
manner that stripped the term of its meaning under international law and thus situated
indigenous rights entirely within the framework of each sovereign state’s domestic laws
and policies. As the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC) said of the consensus
among states about the status of indigenous rights:
Indigenous Peoples were still in struggle in the United Nations over the basic recognition of
their collective rights as peoples. Worse, the WCAR mis-stated international standards
recognizing Indigenous Peoples as the owners of their traditional lands, territories and
natural resources. It declared Indigenous lands and natural resources subjects of domestic
law, “encouraging” (but not requiring) compliance with domestic and not international
standards, and only “whenever possible.”256

Amidst the shortcomings of the language addressing the rights of indigenous peoples
were a few bright spots, such as a positive reference to the creation of the UN Permanent
Forum on Indigenous Issues. Overall, however, the widely-held perception among most
of the indigenous peoples who participated in the World Conference was that the entire
event marked a major step backwards in their struggle for human rights and equality
under the law.
Regarding the Middle East, the issue continued to loom large over the preparatory
process and states were not able to agree on any language addressing the situation or
whether the issue belonged on the agenda in the first place. Several controversial and
bracketed paragraphs continued to circulate during the negotiations. These paragraphs
included language that referred to the “Zionist movement, which is based on racial
superiority” and “Zionist practices against Semitism.” States debated whether to refer to
the Holocaust with a capital H or a lower-case H, and whether to refer to it in the singular
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or the plural (i.e. Holocaust vs. holocausts).257 In her concluding remarks to the Third
Preparatory Committee Meeting, Mary Robinson addressed these issues, noting the need
for:
Understanding of the historical wounds of anti-Semitism and of the Holocaust, on the one
hand, and of the accumulated wounds of displacement and military occupation on the other.
Two fraternal peoples are locked in conflict, and we must help them deal with their mutual
assertion of the right to exist and prosper, and with perceptions of inequality and injustice.
Seen from these perspectives, the pronouncements of the Conference will require careful
negotiation, and I appeal for understanding and cooperation on the part of everyone. I am
pleased that in the current discussions everyone understands that there can be no return to
an issue settled by the General Assembly, the former Zionism-racism problem. This is
encouraging in itself.258

Although Robinson intended for such remarks to serve as a bridge between divided
delegates by acknowledging the concerns of both Western states and developing world
states, her remarks were not well received by Western states and many Jewish
organizations, which felt that she had drawn a moral equivalence between Israel’s
treatment of the Palestinians and Nazi Germany’s treatment of Jews. As a result,
Robinson’s remarks had the impact of only throwing more fuel on the fire.
Following the conclusion of the Third Preparatory Committee meeting, the United
States announced that it would be sending only a lower-level delegation to the World
Conference and that it was strongly considering the possibility of boycotting the World
Conference altogether. While the United States objected to the inclusion of both the
reparations issue and the Middle East, it was particularly unhappy with the discussions of
the latter. On August 24, 2001, President George W. Bush stated that “We have made it
very clear ... we will not participate in a conference that tries to isolate Israel and
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denigrates Israel.”259
Within Canada, there were similar debates about the content of the World
Conference and the nature of Canada’s participation in the event. As the summer
progressed, the Canadian media devoted greater coverage to the World Conference. The
editorial boards of several newspapers discussed the possibility that Canada should
boycott the Conference while several officials representing Aboriginal organizations and
Canadian NGOs discussed particular issues relevant to their constituents. A Globe and
Mail op-ed by Keith Landy, president of the Canadian Jewish Congress, “urge[d] Canada
to continue its efforts to ensure that the WCAR will be a racism-free zone” while arguing
that “should the anti-Semitic and anti-Israel attacks be part of the Durban agenda,
however, Canada and like-minded nations must be prepared to re-evaluate their
participation in a conference that could end up sanctioning the very racism it purportedly
seeks to end.”260 In another op-ed, David Matas, senior legal counsel to B’nai Brith
Canada stated that “there is no legal basis on which to justify the anti-Israel and antiJewish resolutions under discussion for the WCAR. One can only attribute them to
motivations that are themselves racist.”261 In a response to Matas, John Farah, director of
the National Council on Canada-Arab Relations, argued that the issue of Zionism was an
appropriate topic for discussion at the World Conference:
To the extent that Zionism, through past and current Israeli policies, has injured, denied
and deprived the indigenous Palestinian population of its human, legal and moral rights, it
has deviated from the legitimacy conferred on it and must therefore stand to account ... To
achieve peace, those extolling the virtues of Zionism must return the movement to its
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original intent: a means of ensuring Jewish self-determination without forcing
Palestinians to pay the price for it. Otherwise, Zionism will continue to attract allegations
of illegality and racism.262

The issue of reparations and the Canadian position was also discussed in the
Canadian media in the weeks preceding the World Conference. A Toronto Star article
quoted African-Canadian activist Antoni Shelton saying that “the issue of reparations and
economic equality is going to be the biggest issue for the African Canadian contingent in
Durban.”263 A feature article in Now Magazine discussed the issue of reparations and the
World Conference against Racism in the context of Canada’s domestic history, noting the
existence of slavery in pre-Confederation Canada and the more recent history of the
razing of Africville, Nova Scotia, in the 1960s. Agnes Calliste, a professor at St. Francis
Xavier University, highlighted some of the issues that she hoped Canada would address
in Durban. “We can still see the effects of slavery today very clearly in Nova Scotia ...
The black loyalists who fought with the British side in the American Revolution were
promised freedom and land, but many of them did not get land. Some got land in
isolated areas, and if you look at the Nova Scotian black communities today, you can
see that some of them don’t even have paved roads.”264
Aboriginal leaders also discussed their views on the World Conference and the
manner in which indigenous peoples had been addressed. In a Globe and Mail editorial,
Ted Moses, the Grand Chief of the Grand Council of the Crees, spoke of the “cruel
irony” in which “the United Nations has been engaged in deliberate racism against
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indigenous peoples” by denying their status as peoples under international law and
limiting their rights to only those decided by states and their respective domestic laws. As
a result, “rather than pursuing the advancement of [indigenous] rights, the energies of
indigenous peoples at the conference will be focused on preventing retrogressive
measures.”265
Against the backdrop of the various issues and controversies surrounding the
World Conference, the government of Canada was forced to consider the nature of its
own involvement in the event. Amidst rumors that the United States would boycott the
Conference—and subsequent confirmation that it would attend, but send only a lower
level delegation headed by Michael Southwick, the deputy assistant secretary of state for
international organizations—Canada publicly maintained that it had yet to reach a
decision regarding the level of its own participation, but that it was nonetheless
committed to attend the event in order to push back against language that it found
unacceptable. On August 30, one day before the start of the World Conference, Canadian
Foreign Affairs Minister, John Manley, announced that he would not attend the World
Conference, and that Canada’s delegation would be led by Hedy Fry. The press release
issued read, in part:
Canada is participating fully in this important conference. We are represented by a strong
delegation led by Hedy Fry who, because of her portfolio responsibilities, is well placed
to represent Canada and share with the international community our own experience in
building a multicultural and tolerant society ... Canada feels it can make a positive
contribution to the Conference and I continue to hope that the Conference can reach a
renewed and forward-looking global commitment to eradicate racism.266
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Although his office tried to downplay the significance of this decision, it was a clear
indication that Canada had lost a lot of its faith in the ability of the World Conference to
produce a satisfying outcome. At the same time, the decision not to boycott the World
Conference altogether represented Canada’s preference to nonetheless try to influence the
outcome from within rather than simply withdraw altogether and let the agenda be shaped
by others. In this sense, Canada’s decision to attend was shaped by its longstanding
policy of multilateral cooperation within the United Nations system. An additional
consideration for Canada was its relationship with the African continent and, in
particular, with South Africa. The decision to host a major international conference in
South Africa only seven years following the end of apartheid was an important event for
the country. That the conference focused specifically on the issue of racism only raised
the stakes for South Africa and the importance that the host nation attached to the event.
Thus, Canada’s decision to participate was also motivated by a desire to maintain friendly
relations with South Africa.

6.5 - Conclusion
The months leading up to the World Conference against Racism were a difficult
time for both states and non-state actors alike. Early efforts during the spring to establish
the broad parameters of the agenda ultimately produced more discord than consensus.
The first draft of the declaration and programme of action produced by Mary Robinson
and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights was a non-starter from the
very beginning. The overwhelming view from developing world states was that the draft
failed to take into consideration the issues that were most important to them. Even
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Western states not eager to discuss the Middle East and the issue of reparations sensed
that the Robinson draft was fatally flawed. This left states with no choice but to abandon
the Robinson draft and begin anew, which meant that states had only a weak foundation
for discussion. The result was a revised draft text of bloated length and little narrative
coherence. Subsequent weeks and months of negotiations resulted in some progress in
editing the text to a more manageable document, but occurred at the expense of tackling
the most contested issues. Thus, states went to Durban with a half-completed document
and the most divisive issues still on the agenda.
During this time, Canada continued to do what it could to rationalize the draft
texts and work toward a consensus document. Canada’s participation in the group of 21
helped to eliminate much of the duplicative language contained in the draft texts. Canada
also worked to resist the efforts to revive the issue of Zionism as racism. However,
Canada also refused to budge on its opposition to reparations for the slave trade and
colonialism, and made no effort to remove the qualifying language addressing indigenous
peoples. Regarding its relationship with Aboriginal organizations and Canadian NGOs,
the Canadian delegation continued to maintain open lines of communication, but it was
clear that these groups possessed limited ability to influence the government’s priorities.
With respect to the key issues on the agenda, the government’s positions did not change
during the preparatory process. However, Aboriginal organizations and Canadian NGOs
did make productive use of the preparatory committee meetings insofar as it provided
them with opportunities to work with one another to share information and form larger
advocacy networks working toward common goals. But in the end, it was the government
that set its own agenda during the international preparatory process.
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CHAPTER 7: THE WORLD CONFERENCE AGAINST RACISM, RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION, XENOPHOBIA AND RELATED INTOLERANCE
As delegates from around the world travelled to Durban to put a good face on the
event, it was clear to many that the World Conference against Racism was unlikely to
produce meaningful consensus or serve as a foundation for subsequent national and
international efforts to address the issues of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and
related intolerance. Following months of difficult preparatory negotiations regarding the
Middle East and the issue of reparations, many states—on all sides of the issues—
approached the World Conference in a damage control mode. Though not explicitly
stated, the goal for many was simply to reach an agreement containing the lowest
common denominator language, and then to head home declaring victory.
Compounding the challenging environment facing states as they arrived for day
one of the World Conference were the results of two parallel events that were held in
Durban in the last week of August: The International Youth Summit and the NGO
Forum. In theory, each event was intended to contribute, in part, to the promotion of a
more transparent, accessible and democratic process of global governance by widening
the circle of actors that participate in the process to include those outside of government.
In turn, these additional actors strive to place new issues on the public agenda that
governments prefer not to discuss and also to reframe issues on the agenda in ways that
challenge the dominant perspective advanced by governments. While the Youth Summit
and the NGO Forum did bring together, respectively, hundreds of youth and thousands of
NGO officials, neither event succeeded as planned. Both events were marred by
procedural and substantive shortcomings that resulted in each gathering producing a final
declaration and programme of action that did more to promote conflict than they did to
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combat it. As a result, both events only added to the divisive political environment that
existed throughout the week-long gathering in Durban.

7.1 - The International Youth Summit
The World Conference against Racism Youth Summit was a two-day event held
in Durban from August 26 to 27, 2001.267 The decision to hold a youth summit as part of
the World Conference emerged as a result of the August 2000 youth forum, which was
organized by Canada and held at the Canadian pavilion at Expo 2000, in Hannover,
Germany. Canada played a central role in organizing the Youth Summit by providing
both financial and organizational resources. For Canada, the Youth Summit was intended
to serve as a component of the government’s broader effort to include youth in politics at
both the domestic and international level. Approximately 700 youth participated in the
event, the majority of whom represented Western states. The government of Canada
sponsored 14 Canadian youth to attend. Canadian youth participants represented a diverse
cross-section of the country and included Aboriginal peoples, African-Canadians, Arab
and Muslim-Canadians, and Francophone Canadians, among others. Several of these
individuals had participated in the regional and national domestic consultation process
and attended some of the international preparatory meetings in Santiago and Geneva.
In a keynote address to the Youth Summit, Hedy Fry referred to the event as a
“powerful example of how Governments and the UN have responded to your call for
youth participation” and that governments around the world “need to hear how you want
to tackle issues such as hate on the internet, globalization, the role of the media,
267
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education, health, [and] poverty.” According to Fry, Canada felt that it was “essential that
the intergovernmental conference hear your message as well.”268 Mary Robinson also
addressed the Youth Summit with similar remarks about the importance of youth
involvement in the World Conference and in the struggle against racism throughout the
world.
Following these remarks, youth participants devoted the next two days to the task
of drafting their own Youth Declaration and Programme of Action. The youth summit
was organized around several panels and thematic working groups in which participants
discussed and debated each of the various issues on the agenda. Eight thematic working
groups were established to address the following issues:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)

Minority Rights, Human Rights and Citizenship
Colonialism, Foreign Occupation and New Forms of Apartheid
Justice
Health and the Environment
Education, Media and New Information Technologies
Globalization
Young Women and Multiple Forms of Discrimination
Slavery and Reparations269

As the above list illustrates, the Youth Summit addressed many of the same issues
addressed by states at the World Conference. In particular, the issue of slavery and
reparations was an especially important topic for the Youth Summit, as was the Middle
East, which participants discussed as part of the second agenda item addressing
colonialism, foreign occupation and new forms of apartheid. The Youth Summit also
addressed a variety of issues that states could not agree to discuss, including the issue of
caste in India and neighbouring countries; the political status of Tibet; political and
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military conflicts in Sudan, Swaziland, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the
United States embargo of Cuba, and institutional reform of the United Nations, among
other issues. Additionally, the Youth Summit discussion of slavery and the slave trade
offered some acknowledgement of the role played by states outside of Western Europe
and North America. The Youth Summit discussion of the Middle East contained language
strongly critical of Israel and far beyond what states could accept at the World
Conference.
The Youth Summit was also hindered by logistical challenges related both to
organizational capacity and time constraints. Some youth participants complained that too
many adults played too active a role in the process, thus marginalizing the input of the
youth involved. The Youth Summit was preceded by youth organizing events at the
international preparatory committee meetings in Geneva, as well as at the various
regional preparatory meetings in Europe, the Americas, Africa and Asia. In addition,
national youth preparatory meetings were held in several countries, including Canada.
Despite these preparatory efforts, youth participants in Durban were unable to resolve all
negotiations about the content of the Youth Declaration and Plan of Action during the
limited time allocated. As a result, negotiations continued behind the scenes throughout
the following week and the final documents were not released until September 4, 2001.
Understandably, some youth participants responded negatively to this development and
perceived a lack of transparency and accountability in the negotiation process. From a
procedural level, there were many problems with the organization of the Youth Summit.
Regarding the substantive content of the Youth Declaration and Plan of Action,
participants did not shy from using strong language to address the most controversial
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issues on the agenda. The language used satisfied some participants, but left others
feeling disappointed with the one-sided approach taken to some issues.
On the Middle East, one paragraph in the Youth Summit:
demand[ed] from state actors who continue to oppress and subject peoples under foreign
occupation, colonialism and new forms of apartheid, particularly Israel to cease and desist
from the excessive and lawful [sic] use of force against Palestinian civilians, especially
children and young people, we demand from the United Nation member states provide
immediate measures including economic and trade sanctions, embargoes, cutting off all
sporting, diplomatic and other ties until the abolishment of foreign occupation,
colonialism and new forms of apartheid.270

On the issue of slavery and the slave trade, the text “demand[ed] that perpetrator nations
mainly in the north, involved in slavery, slave trade foreign occupation and colonialism
formerly [sic] apologies [sic] to victims and descendents with a just and fair
compensation and reparations such as the immediate withdrawal from the occupied
territories, the right of return to peoples own land, social development programs,
cancellation of the foreign debt and any other form of reparations considered appropriate
by victims.” In a brief recognition of the global scale of the slave trade, the Youth
Summit document also stated that “All states that were actively involved in slavery
(notably the United States, Western Europe and Middle Eastern countries) or colonial
practices must compensate enslaved peoples (and their descendents) for the damages
inflicted upon them and must create, implement, financially support programs designed to
empower these peoples.”271
Regarding some of the other issues on the agenda, the Youth Summit recognized
“that the people of Tibet continue to suffer institutionalized forms of discrimination under
the Chinese regime.” It expressed “solidarity with the people of Palestine, Southern
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Sudan, Swaziland” and “with the people of Cuba,” and it called on the United States to
lift its economic embargo of Cuba. It noted that “the war in the Democratic Republic of
Congo and in other parts of the African Continent has destabilized and restricted growth
in the entire African Continent.” It called on the global community to “put pressure on
the government of Afghanistan to demand the rights of human rights workers particularly
women.” Regarding the Dalits and the caste system, the Youth Summit “repudiate[d] the
systematic and continuous discrimination faced by the Dalits, and other significant
groups in the world population (260 millions in South Asia)” and noted that “Dalit people
have been subjected to discrimination based on their work, descent, caste system for a
long period, and as a result are suffering from humiliation based on various forms of
castism and untouchability and gross violation of their human rights in India and in many
other countries in the Asian region.”272 Thus, the Youth Summit addressed many issues
that states were unable to address at the World Conference due to the preference of
certain states to oppose any effort to discuss political questions that they deemed to fall
within their domestic jurisdiction and outside of the agenda of the Conference.
In the end, however, Canadian youth participants generally found the Youth
Summit to be less productive and rewarding than they had hoped. Although they found
the experience educational and appreciated the opportunities it created for networking
with other youth in Canada and abroad, the summit’s organizational challenges and
heated debate on some issues weighed heavily on the overall experience. Some of their
experiences were subsequently recorded in an issue of Tiny Giant Magazine, a
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publication produced by the Students Commission of Canada.273One Canadian participant
observed that “many youth identified problems with the Youth Summit” such as “the
perception that the Youth Caucuses was being lead by a small group of individuals, who
were concerned with only their agenda; that there were not enough resources for
translation; that one day was not enough time to formulate a youth declaration; [and] that
too many adults interfered and attended the youth summit.” Another Canadian youth said
that the Youth Summit was “very disorganized and a disappointment on some levels.”274
A third participant noted that “many youth were sadly disappointed about the lack of
resources and time for the Youth Summit.”275
The Canadian government expressed a similar sense of being let down by the
Youth Summit. According to an August 29 report from the Canadian government
delegation, the “youth gathering was not a success. It was dominated by the Palestinian
issue; the Israeli delegation walked out on the proceedings, and no agreement was
reached on a declaration.”276 Although, as mentioned, delegates did eventually reach an
agreement on a youth declaration and plan of action, the week-long delay in producing
the text, along with other procedural shortcomings and the contentious language used to
discuss the Middle East resulted in the Youth Summit failing to live up to the hopeful
expectations of its organizers. From the point of view of both the Canadian government
and many of the Canadian youth participants, the Youth Summit was a missed
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opportunity.

7.2 - The NGO Forum
While the Youth Summit proved to be divisive and beset by various
organizational and substantive challenges, it was a fairly small and contained event that
made little splash among governments and the media. By contrast, the procedural
challenges and polarized debate that occurred throughout the NGO Forum made
international headlines. Although the NGO Forum addressed a wide variety of topics, it
devoted considerable attention to the Middle East and advanced a distinctly one-sided
narrative of the issue. More problematically, anti-Semitic literature—such as The
Protocols of the Elders of Zion—was circulated at the event and Jewish participants were
subjected to anti-Semitic verbal assaults. In addition, the adoption of the 473 paragraph
NGO Forum Declaration and Programme of Action277 was marred by procedural flaws
and occurred late in the event after most NGO officials had left. Only about 100
individuals were present at the adoption of the text, prompting complaints that the
document represented the views of only a small segment of civil society. Due to the
language used to characterize Israel, Mary Robinson refused to endorse the NGO Forum
Declaration and Programme of Action and declined to recommend it to states for their
consideration at the World Conference. The NGO Forum thus ended in complete discord.
Among Canadian participants, it produced strong divisions within the NGO community
on the issues of whether the NGO Forum could be considered a success and whether
Canada should have withdrawn from the World Conference in protest.
277

WCAR NGO Forum Declaration and Programme of Action, (September 3, 2001).

190

The NGO Forum was held in Durban at the Kingsmead Cricket Ground from
August 28 to September 1, 2001 and was attended by approximately 3,000 NGOs from
around the world, although the majority came from Western states. The NGOs in
attendance included many of the major international human rights groups, such as
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Oxfam, as well as many smaller
organizations. Canada provided financial aid for 64 Aboriginal organizations and
Canadian NGOs to attend. A few dozen other Canadian civil society groups attended at
their own expense, bringing the total number of Canadian domestic groups in attendance
at approximately 100. Collectively, the Canadians groups in attendance represented a
wide cross-section of Canadian society. Among those present at the NGO Forum were
the Assembly of First Nations, the Métis National Council, the Congress of Aboriginal
Peoples, the Canadian Jewish Congress, B’nai Brith Canada, the Canadian Arab
Federation, the Canadian Council of Muslim Women, the African-Canadian Legal Clinic,
the Jamaican Canadian Association, the Canadian Hispanic Congress, the Canadian
Ethnocultural Council, the Canadian Labour Congress, the Canadian Union of Public
Employees, the Canadian Auto Workers Union, the National Action Committee on the
Status of Women, the National Association of Women and the Law, the United Nations
Association of Canada, the Filipino-Canadian Youth Alliance, the Ukrainian Canadian
Congress, the National Congress of Italian Canadians, the Portuguese Canadian National
Congress, the National Association of Japanese Canadians, the Federation of Korean
Canadian Association, the Chinese Canadian National Council, and Equality for Gays
and Lesbians Everywhere.
The agenda of the NGO Forum was broadly similar to that of the Youth Summit
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and the World Conference itself. Among the issues addressed by NGOs were the Middle
East, the trans-Atlantic slave trade and colonialism, indigenous peoples, Africans and
people of African descent, Asians and people of Asian descent, Jews, Arabs, Muslims,
migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons, among others. Like the Youth
Summit, the NGO Forum also addressed issues that states did not wish to discuss, such as
the Dalits and the caste system in India and neighbouring countries, and the issue of
Tibet.
In order to structure the proceedings, NGO participants were organized into
various caucuses, each designed to represent a particular group or thematic issue.278 The
caucuses represented racial and ethnic groups such as indigenous peoples, Africans and
people of African descent, Asians and people of Asian descent, Roma, Dalits, Jews,
Arabs and Palestinians, as well as other groups, such as women, youth, and migrants.
Thematic caucuses addressed issues such as labour, criminal justice, health, HIV/AIDS,
poverty, the media, and the environment, among others. Although this organizing
principle was useful in allowing different groups to focus on the issues that mattered most
to them, it also had the impact of somewhat inhibiting dialogue between different
caucuses. The NGO Forum was also organized around a series of panels and workshops,
in which members of the various caucuses were given opportunities to network with one
another, make public presentations about issues impacting their communities, distribute
pamphlets and information booklets, and work to help draft the NGO Forum declaration
and plan of action. In addition, individual NGOs were able to set up small tents and
booths in the plenary to distribute information to interested participants.
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Canadian NGOs were active participants in many of the workshops, panels and
caucus groups at the NGO Forum. For example, Canadian Jewish groups played a leading
role within the Jewish Caucus, and Karen Mock, from B’nai Brith Canada, was a co-chair
of the thematic commission addressing anti-Semitism. Margaret Parsons, of the AfricanCanadian Legal Clinic, and Sandra Carnegie-Douglas, of the African-Canadian Coalition
against Racism, served as Canadian representatives on the caucus for Africans and people
of African descent. The Canadian Labour Congress spoke at several panels and
workshops addressing labour rights and globalization. The Canadian Council of Muslim
Women organized a panel in which they called attention to the racism experienced by
Muslim women in Canada, and distributed an information booklet discussing these
stories.
Understandably, given the wide range of issues on the agenda, there were
numerous points of contention between Canadian NGOs and the government as well as
within the NGO community itself. For example, many Canadian NGO groups continued
to protest Canada’s position against reparations. On the last day of the NGO Forum, the
Chinese Canadian National Council, the African Canadian Legal Clinic, and the National
Association of Japanese Canadians organized a joint press conference that strongly
denounced Canada on this issue.279 Whereas most of the debate on reparations at the
World Conference focused on the issue at the international level—that is, as a matter of
bilateral and multilateral relations between states—the Canadian NGOs highlighted the
issue of reparations as a domestic Canadian issue. They argued that “people of colour
have been subjected to racist government policies and laws for over a century and the
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Canadian government has yet to acknowledge its responsibility.” Referring to Canada’s
policy of charging a head tax on Chinese immigrants in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, the NGOs noted that the law “resulted in a profit of over 23 million
Canadian dollars to the Government of Canada between 1885 and 1923 ... the surviving
Head Tax payers and their families have been demanding redress for over twenty years.
Their just demands have been consistently denied by the Government that profited from
racism.”280
Aboriginal organizations in Canada also strongly denounced the government of
Canada for its policies toward Aboriginal peoples. The Grand Council of the Crees
distributed an information booklet discussing the many challenges facing Aboriginal
communities in Canada and the impact of racism on their lives. The report, entitled
Pushed to the Edge of Extinction: Racism Against Indigenous Peoples in Canada,
referred to the situation facing indigenous peoples as “Canada’s hidden shame” and
contrasted “the Canada the world knows vs. the Canada indigenous peoples live in” by
providing data on issues such as unemployment, poverty, health, education and land
rights.281 In addition, Matthew Coon Come, National Chief of the Assembly of First
Nations, delivered a speech at the NGO Forum in which he strongly criticized the
qualified use of the term “indigenous peoples” in the draft documents negotiated by states
and Canada’s policies toward Aboriginal peoples.282 In a noteworthy portion of the
speech, Coon Come suggested a parallel between the situation of Aboriginal peoples in
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Canada and the situation faced by black people in South Africa under apartheid:
In the early 1980’s, my generation of Cree people in northern Canada learned of the
struggle against apartheid in South Africa. We invited an African National Congress
Representative to address our Cree Annual Assembly in Eeyou Istchee, our subarctic
traditional territory. We heard of systematic oppression, dispossession, discrimination and
violation of human rights. The courage of the people struggling against apartheid inspired
us. But the story we heard from South Africa also saddened us because this oppression was
being undertaken so massively against the black population in South Africa. We also
recognized the racist and colonial syndrome of dispossession and discrimination that was
taking place in South Africa from our own experience. As indigenous peoples in North
America, this is our story too.283

Coon Come’s remarks were widely reported in the Canadian media and strongly
criticized by the government of Canada. Indian Affairs Minister Robert Nault went so far
as to demand that Coon Come apologize for suggesting that Canada’s policy toward
Aboriginal peoples was comparable to apartheid. Coon Come stood by his remarks.
The discussion of the Middle East at the NGO Forum also generated tensions
between Canadian NGOs and the government as well as within the Canadian NGO
community itself. The problems with the NGO Forum’s discussions of the Middle East
were numerous. During the opening ceremony, a representative of SANGOCO—the
South African National NGO Coalition and the main organizer of the NGO Forum—
wore a keffiyah and called on the international community to “free Palestine,” a gesture
which was interpreted by Jewish NGOs as a signal of support for one side of the conflict
when the organizing body was supposed to have been neutral on all issues. Throughout
the NGO Forum, a small number of NGOs based in the Middle East distributed antiSemitic cartoons portraying Jews with hooked noses, fanged teeth that dripped blood, and
wearing military uniforms displaying the Nazi swastika alongside the Star of David. A
poster was distributed that rhetorically asked what the world would look like had Nazi

283

Ibid.

195

Germany won the Second World War and stated that the Middle East would be a better
place because Israel would not have been created.284 One NGO booth sold copies of The
Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Jewish caucus meetings were routinely interrupted by
hecklers. A large political rally held on September 1 in support of Palestine eventually led
protestors to gather outside the Durban Jewish Club, a non-political Jewish
organization.285
When the Jewish caucus informed Mary Robinson of these developments, the
High Commissioner spoke to the plenary and condemned the anti-Semitic behaviours in
strong terms: “This conference is aimed at achieving human dignity. My husband is a
cartoonist, I love political cartoons, but when I see the racism in this cartoon booklet, of
the Arab Lawyers’ Union, I must say that I am a Jew—for those victims are hurting. I
know that you people will not understand easily, but you are my friends, so I tell you that
I am a Jew, and I will not accept this fractiousness to torpedo the conference.”286 Despite
the High Commissioner’s pleas, many felt that the displays did torpedo the conference.
Given the extreme nature of the incidents, the international media understandably
devoted considerable coverage to this aspect of the NGO Forum.
These developments polarized many within the Canadian NGO community. To be
clear, Canadian NGOs were unanimous in their condemnation of the anti-Semitic
literature and pamphlets that were being distributed at the NGO Forum. Both the
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government and Canadian NGOs agreed that a strong response was needed to counter
these views. Where Canadian NGOs differed among themselves was on the issue of what
form that strong response should take, specifically whether Canada should withdraw
entirely from the World Conference. Whereas Jewish Canadian NGOs felt that the
government should consider withdrawing, some other NGOs felt that the government had
an obligation to stay at the conference in order to address the many issues on the agenda
other than the Middle East.287
On the final day of the NGO Forum, participants adopted the NGO Forum
Declaration and Programme of Action. Given the many problems that had plagued the
NGO Forum, it was not surprising that this process was fraught with numerous
procedural problems. First, as mentioned, many NGO participants did not stay for the
entire event and thus only a small number of NGOs were present during the adoption of
the NGO Forum Declaration and Programme of Action. Second, in order to structure the
adoption process, it was decided that each caucus would submit their own set of
paragraphs addressing the issues that they deemed most relevant to them. Thus, the
indigenous peoples caucus submitted paragraphs pertaining to indigenous peoples, while
the labour caucus submitted paragraphs pertaining to labour rights, etc. This system was
designed to ensure that each caucus group at the NGO Forum was able to have its issues
represented in its own words in the document. However, when the Jewish caucus
submitted paragraphs addressing anti-Semitism and Zionism, some caucuses objected to
the inclusion of these paragraphs. In a bizarre procedural move, it was decided that
caucus groups would vote on the matter. Each caucus as a whole was given a vote on
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whether to include or remove the paragraphs submitted by the Jewish caucus, and the
majority voted to remove them. No other caucus was subjected to this treatment and
members of the Jewish caucus walked out in protest. Effectively, the NGO Forum
Declaration and Programme of Action represented the voices of all victims of racism
except the voices of the Jewish people.288
Despite these problems, it is worthwhile to review the substantive content of the
NGO Forum Declaration and Programme of Action. Naturally, the most contentious
portions of the document were those that addressed the Middle East. The Declaration
referred to Israel as a “colonialist” state that is engaged in a “systematic perpetration of
racist crimes including war crimes, acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing” against the
Palestinians, which amounts to “Israel’s brand of apartheid.” One paragraph stated: “We
declare Israel as a racist, apartheid state in which Israel’s brand of apartheid as a crime
against humanity has been characterized by separation and segregation, dispossession,
restricted land access, denationalization, ‘bantustanization’ and inhuman acts.” The
Programme of Action called for “the reinstitution of UN resolution 3379 determining the
practices of Zionism as racist practices” and “the establishment of a war crimes tribunal”
to investigate Israel. It further called for the international community “to impose a policy
of complete and total isolation of Israel as an apartheid state as in the case of South
Africa which means the imposition of mandatory and comprehensive sanctions and
embargoes, the full cessation of all links (diplomatic, economic, social, aid, military
cooperation and training) between all states and Israel.”289
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Understandably, this language polarized NGO participants, many of whom felt
that the language was either factual or legally incorrect or else unfairly singled out Israel
while downplaying the policies of other states and non-state actors in the region. For
example, the document does not mention Hamas or Hezbollah, nor does it mention Libya,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. Further, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey are each mentioned
only once in a paragraph in the Declaration that read, in part: “we are appalled at the
situation of thirty million Kurdish people scattered in several countries including Turkey,
Iraq, Iran and Syria, who are oppressively prevented from exercising their national
legitimate rights of self-determination. We deplore the policies of genocide and practices
of ethnic cleansing against the Kurds.” Notwithstanding these remarks, the Programme of
Action did not call for any political or legal measures to be taken to address the situation,
such as the establishment of an international tribunal or the implementation of sanctions.
Thus, the NGO Forum’s discussion of the Middle East was viewed by many as one-sided
and inappropriate. One bright spot, however, was the inclusion of strong language
condemning anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial. The Declaration noted that:
Antisemitism is one of the oldest, most pernicious and prevalent forms of racism which still
exists and is even increasing in many areas of the world; recognizing the dehumanization,
persecution and genocide of Jews in the Holocaust, as well as other minorities during and
before World War II; deeply alarmed by the continued activities of proponents of
Holocaust denial and Holocaust revionism, Holocaust trivialization, Holocaust
minimization and by the channelling of racist rhetoric and calls to violence on the Internet;
noting with distress that Jewish people still suffer from persisting prejudices and are
victims of a deeply rooted antisemitism in many countries throughout the world.290

The NGO Forum also addressed the issue of reparations for slavery and
colonialism. One paragraph noted that the:
Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, slavery and colonialism is a crime against humanity because of
its abhorrent barbarism, its magnitude, long duration, numbers of people brutalized and
murdered and because of their negation of the very essence of humanity of their victims,
therefore, reparations programs must be comprehensive enough in addressing all areas of
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concern including economic, educational, health, land ownership and possession as well as
the racially biased systems of administration of justice that brutalize Africans and people of
African Descent.291

In a notable departure from the way in which states had discussed the issue of slavery and
the slave trade, the NGO Forum also acknowledged the trans-Saharan slave trade and the
trans-Indian Ocean slave trades. The declaration noted that the “Trans-Saharan and
Trans-Indian Ocean Slave Trades and slavery must also be acknowledged and recognized
as crimes against humanity, which brutalised communities and stripped people of their
dignity, and for which those communities must receive justice and redress.” It further
acknowledged the existence of contemporary forms of slavery, noting that the “TransSaharan Slave Trade continues unabated to this day, despite international agreements that
condemn slavery, and that the trafficking of African men, women and children for forced
labour and enslavement is still ongoing in Cameroon, Mauritania, Niger and Sudan.”292
Regarding indigenous peoples, the NGO Forum adopted a position strongly at
odds with the position adopted by states. The NGO Declaration stated that “Indigenous
Peoples are peoples within the full meaning of international law. Indigenous Peoples have
the right to self-determination by virtue of which they freely determine their economic,
social, political and cultural development and the inherent right to possession of all their
traditional and ancestral lands and territories.” In a direct response to the language being
used by states, the NGO Forum Programme of Action further stated that “any
qualification of the right of Indigenous Peoples to self-determination is racist and is
contrary to the fundamental principles of international law. The proposed caveat
paragraph (current paragraph 27) of the official WCAR State Declaration is a
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manifestation of racism against Indigenous Peoples and should be deleted in its
entirely.”293
Some of the other issues on the agenda included Asians and people of Asian
descent, the Roma, and impact of the caste system on the Dalits. The document noted that
“Asians and Asian Descendents face deep-seated racism and xenophobia, lack access to
political, economic and social opportunities, are denied civil rights and liberties, and are
victims of especially violent hate crimes, racial profiling, discriminatory employment and
unjust immigration policies and practices.” Regarding the Roma people, the document
noted that “Anti-Tziganisms is a specific form of racism and racial discrimination against
Roma, manifested by stigmatization, flagrant violations of their fundamental human
rights, denied access to public services, education, employment, denied participation to
decision-making processes at local and central administration levels, persecution, abuse,
violence, forced deportation, ethnic cleansing, extermination and ethnocide.” Regarding
the Dalits, the document noted that “the practice of untouchability, rooted in the caste
system, stigmatizes 260 million Dalits in South Asia as ‘polluted’ or ‘impure’, thereby
denying them entry into places of religious worship, participation in religious festivals,
assigning them menial and degrading work including cleaning toilets, skinning and
disposal of dead animals, digging graves and sweeping, and the forced prostitution of
Dalit women and girls though the traditional system of temple prostitution.”294
Thus, the NGO Forum Declaration and Programme of Action addressed a variety
of diverse issues from around the world. In many cases, this language helped to raise
awareness about the impact that racism and racial discrimination have on many
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communities and provided many groups with an opportunity to share their stories and
experiences with a wider audience. The various positive aspects of the NGO Forum thus
made it all the more unfortunate that the event’s problems concerning the treatment of
Jewish participants and the discussion of the Middle East had the effect of tarnishing the
entire event. A few days following the conclusion of the NGO Forum, organizers of the
event were scheduled to present the NGO Forum Declaration and Programme of Action
to Mary Robinson. However, due to the language in the document relating to Israel and
Zionism, the High Commissioner for Human Rights declined to recommend it for states
for their consideration.295 This marked the first time such a decision had been taken at a
UN conference.
In sum, the NGO Forum was a difficult experience for Canada and brought to the
forefront a number of divisions between the government and NGOs as well as within the
NGO community itself. The remarks by Matthew Coon Come caught the government by
surprise and put it on the defensive. Following the earlier national consultation process,
which Aboriginal organizations felt was a disingenuous effort by the government more
concerned about appearances than reality, the public admonishment by the leader of the
Assembly of First Nations further highlighted how the World Conference process had
failed to herald the beginning of a new relationship between the government of Canada
and Aboriginal communities in Canada. NGO criticisms of Canada’s opposition to
reparations further highlighted the divide between the expectations of NGOs and the
policy positions of the government. Finally, the anti-Semitic displays at the NGO Forum
as well as the Declaration and Programme of Action’s hostile language regarding Israel
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created considerable tension within the NGO community, as NGOs were divided on how
the government should respond. In the end, the NGO Forum probably did more to
fracture the NGO community in Canada than it did to unite them in a common effort to
fight racism and racial discrimination in Canada and abroad. Developments at the NGO
Forum further contributed to the government’s increasingly skeptical attitude toward the
entire World Conference and helped inform Foreign Affairs Minister John Manley’s
decision not to attend the event and send in his place a lower level delegation.

7.3 - The World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia
and Related Intolerance
On the eve of the World Conference, Canada was still considering its options
regarding its level of participation in the event. More than a year of contentious debate at
the three preparatory committee meetings had given Canada a sense that much of the
World Conference was going to be an exercise in damage control, rather than a
constructive effort to advance global efforts to combat racism and racial discrimination.
Certainly, developments at the NGO Forum did not quell Canada’s concerns, but served
to reinforce Canada’s skeptical attitude toward the entire event. Throughout August,
Canada publicly stated its concern about discussions pertaining to the Middle East, and
said it was carefully reviewing the nature and scope of its participation in the World
Conference. The government’s approach to the World Conference was summarized by
John Manley at the August 30 press conference in which he announced his decision not to
attend the event. At the time, Manley stated that “we’ll do everything we can to get it
back on track, but at this moment, certainly, I’m very concerned with the direction that

203

it’s going and somewhat pessimistic.”296
Thus, as mentioned earlier, Hedy Fry replaced John Manley as head of Canada’s
delegation. As the minister who had led Canada’s domestic preparations and headed the
delegation at the Regional Conference of the Americas in Chile, Fry was certainly
familiar with the various issues and controversies surrounding the World Conference and
capable of playing a key role in Durban. At the same time, because Hedy Fry’s portfolio
as Secretary of State (Multiculturalism)(Women) concerned domestic issues, it was
decided that the delegation should also include a senior official whose responsibilities
encompassed foreign policy and multilateral diplomacy. For this reason, John Manley
asked Paul Heinbecker, the Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations
and a seasoned veteran of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, to
serve as an alternate head of the delegation. In addition, two members of parliament—
Jean Augustine and Irwin Cotler—were selected to serve as senior advisors on the
delegation alongside Pat Lorje, the Saskatchewan Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and
Lucie Edwards, the Canadian High Commissioner to South Africa, who also served as
advisors. The delegation also consisted of 11 officials from the Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade, 14 officials of the Department of Canadian Heritage, two
officials from the Department of Justice, one official from the Department of Indian
Affairs and Northern Development, one from the Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA), and eight officials from the Canadian embassy in South Africa. Also
serving on the delegation were three officials representing Canadian provinces and two
representing Canadian municipalities. Outside of government, the delegation included
nine officials representing NGOs, Aboriginal organizations and academia, and four
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officials representing the Canadian Human Rights Commission. In total, the delegation
consisted of 61 members, representing one of the largest delegations sent by any country
to the World Conference.
The World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and
Related Intolerance was held from August 31 to September 8, 2001 and was attended by
representatives from 170 countries, including 16 heads of state, 58 foreign ministers and
44 other ministers.297 Most of these senior figures, however, came from non-Western
states, which was indicative of the divisive nature of the preparatory process and the
unequal levels of enthusiasm that different states had for the event. More than half of the
Heads of State in attendance represented African countries. As was the case at the three
Preparatory Committee meetings, various non-state actors also attended the World
Conference. These attendees included Palestine; various regional and international
organizations, such as the Council of Europe, the Commonwealth, the League of Arab
States, the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of American States, the
Organization of the Islamic Conference, etc; various UN organs, bodies and programmes,
such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Children’s Fund,
the UN Development Programme, the UN Development Fund for Women, etc; and
several national human rights commissions. Approximately 1300 NGOs were also given
accreditation to attend the World Conference, including several dozen from Canada.298
Opening addresses were delivered by several key UN officials, including
Secretary General Kofi Annan and High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary
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Robinson. South African political leaders, such as President Thabo Mbeki, also made
introductory remarks. While each of these addresses emphasized the potential of the
World Conference to serve as a catalyst for renewed efforts to combat racism and racial
discrimination in the new century, some were more willing than others to directly discuss
the more contentious issues on the agenda and the difficulties that states had in
addressing them. In recognition of the possibility that divisions over the Middle East had
the potential to derail the entire World Conference from its central purpose, Kofi Annan
encouraged states to “admit that all countries have issues of racism and discrimination to
address. Rather than pick on any one country or region, let us aim to leave here with a
commitment from every country to draw up and implement its own national plan to
combat racism, in accordance with general principles that we will have agreed.”299
Organizationally, the World Conference included plenary sessions in which
representatives of each state could directly address the entire World Conference. The
Conference also included a drafting committee responsible for structuring the
negotiations on the draft declaration and programme of action. As was the case at the
preparatory meetings, the drafting committee created two working groups—one for the
draft declaration and one for the draft programme of action. In general, addresses to the
plenary, which were spread out over the course of the entire conference in order to
accommodate all states in attendance, were mostly political exercises in which each state
re-affirmed its abhorrence of racism and commitment to eradicate racism while
downplaying the existence of the problem within its own borders. Thus, African and
Caribbean states emphasized the historic wrongs of the slave trade and colonialism and
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spoke of the need for compensation from Western states for these sins, but said little
about contemporary forms of slavery and slave-like conditions and other modern-day
manifestations of racism on the African continent. Arab and Muslim states aired their
grievances with Israel and its treatment of the Palestinians, but said nothing of the human
rights situation in their own backyards. Western states conceded that their past actions
contained much to be ashamed of, but emphasized their preference for what they called a
forward-looking agenda. Some speeches were more provocative than others. For
example, Yasser Arafat addressed the World Conference on the opening day and referred
to Israel as a “racist” and “colonialist” state, among other things.300 The speech was
criticized by many Western states, including Canada, which said that the language was
“totally unacceptable” and constituted “incitement and provocation.”301
Canada’s address touched on important issues concerning the government’s
historical and present-day treatment of many ethnic groups in Canada.302 Taken at face
value, Canada’s speech was one of the more self-critical speeches delivered to the
plenary of the World Conference. While speaking proudly of Canada as a bilingual and
multicultural nation, Hedy Fry also said that “Canadians would acknowledge that our
history has not always been one of inclusion and respect.” Fry acknowledged the history
of “displacement and assimilation” facing Aboriginal peoples that “eroded their social,
economic and governance structures.” She spoke of immigrant communities who “came
to Canada to escape discrimination, marginalisation and exclusion” only to find that they
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often “faced these challenges on arrival.” Fry also stated that “visible minorities, in
particular African Canadians, still face barriers to full participation in the economic life
of Canada.”303 At the same time, domestic NGOs critical of Canada’s human rights
record noted that victims of racism in Canada needed more than speeches from the
government, but concrete policies designed to confront and eliminate racism in Canada.
The main work at the World Conference happened at the two working groups of
the drafting committees, where daily negotiations took place on the substantive content of
the World Conference Declaration and Programme of Action. The Middle East and the
issue of reparations remained the two dominating issues on the agenda, while the issue of
indigenous peoples also received considerable attention. To help organize these three
debates, it was decided that individual states would serve as facilitators to help maintain
open dialogue between divided states. Thus, Norway facilitated the debate on the Middle
East; Kenya and Brazil jointly facilitated the debate on past injustice, which included the
issue of slavery and reparations; while Mexico facilitated the debates on the list of
victims, which included efforts to maintain the consensus that states had reached on
indigenous peoples.
Although states had completed the negotiations on the rights of indigenous
peoples at the Third Preparatory Committee meeting, the issue remained at the forefront
due to indigenous peoples’ widespread opposition to the language used in the texts. Led
by prominent human rights figures, such as Nobel laureate Rigoberta Menchú, indigenous
peoples continued to protest the qualified use of the term peoples contained in the World
Conference Declaration and Programme of Action. States responded that they were
unable to re-open the negotiations completed during the previous meetings because of
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their concern that any effort to change one part of the agreed upon text might result in
other demands—from states and non-state actors alike—to change other portions of the
text. With so many controversial issues still left unresolved, states were unwilling to reopen issues that they believed were closed. Thus, while the issue of the rights of
indigenous peoples remained widely discussed and contested throughout the World
Conference, almost no new paragraphs were added to the language agreed upon at the
Third Preparatory Committee meeting, and none that addressed the core issue of the
status of indigenous peoples under international law. According to a report by the
Canadian delegation, the Canadian view at Durban was that the “substance of WCAR
documents is strong and marks real progress and most importantly was adopted by
consensus at [the] third prepcom.” The delegation added that the “saving clause” was
“not required by Canada” but necessary in order to maintain the approval of other
countries.304 Understandably, Canada’s timid opposition to the so-called saving clause
left Aboriginal organizations in Canada deeply unhappy with the government, although
they recognized that Canada’s evolving position on the matter was a step in the right
direction.
The second major issue on the agenda was the reparations issue. Front and centre
were the demands of African states for Western states to accept that the transatlantic
slave trade was a crime against humanity and to establish a framework for offering
financial compensation to impacted states in Africa. Enoch Kavindele, the Vice-President
of Zambia and representative of the African Union, said that African states wanted “the
establishment of an international compensation scheme for victims of the slave trade and
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a development restoration fund to provide additional resources for the development of
countries affected by colonialism.”305 Although Western states steadfastly refused these
demands, there was some discussion among them about whether to offer a symbolic
apology for their role in the slave trade, albeit one phrased in such a manner as to
concede nothing that could be used against them in any judicial setting that may arise.
Within Europe, there was a schism between the most hard line states—the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal—who generally opposed any effort to
address their role in the slave trade and were generally unwilling to offer even the nonbinding symbolic apology, and the remaining European states, that were willing to offer
some form of an apology. As the World Conference progressed, European states
proposed several possible paragraphs on how to address the issue, some of which
included an apology. One suggested proposal read “on behalf of those who have
practiced, benefited or unjustly enriched themselves from slavery and the slave trade, the
World Conference apologizes unreservedly to the victims of those past tragedies.”306
Nonetheless, divisions with Europe and opposition from the hard line states ultimately
prevented such language from finding its way into the final World Conference
documents.
Both the United States and Canada remained entirely opposed to any concession
on the reparations issue and refused to support even a symbolic apology. Proposed
language by the United States, Canada, Norway, Japan, Australia and New Zealand stated
only their “profound regret” for the slave trade, but did not offer a formal apology for the
305

CBC News, “Reparations for Slavery Back on Agenda at UN Racism Conference,” CBC News.
September 4, 2001.
306

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “WCAR: Interim Report: Sept 01-Sept02,”
September, 2 2001.

210

practice. The Canadian position, as expressed in the September 8, 2001 statement of
reservation, was that “under international law there is no right to a remedy for historical
acts that were not illegal at the time at which they occurred.”307 Although Canada did not
support efforts to offer an apology for slavery and the slave trade, and did not offer any
such apology for its own past practices of slavery, Canada did state that it “believes that
the transatlantic slave trade was morally repugnant and is a stain on the fabric of history”
and also that Canada believes that “widespread and systematic enslavement directed
against a civilian population today constitutes a crime against humanity, and if the
transatlantic slave trade occurred today it would constitute a crime against humanity.”
Several Canadian NGOs strongly objected to Canada’s position of opposing any
form of reparations. Throughout the preparatory process, Canada had maintained that it
should adopt a forward-looking approach to rectifying past injustices. It should adopt a
“multi-faceted approach to the issues of remedies and redress” and “does not believe that
granting financial compensation for historical action is appropriate.” The government
added that:
Canada has addressed historical actions through measures such as repealing legislation,
establishing the Canadian Race Relations Foundation, formally acknowledging and
regretting historical action in a Statement of Reconciliation, supporting activities such as
the production of films, academic research and other means of commemoration, as well as
developing policies that contribute to the beginning of institutional change. While we
continue to address the past through such initiatives, we believe that government resources
should be used to invest in the future, in the creation of a more equitable society now and a
better future for generations to come.308

However, for NGOs, such as the National Association of Japanese Canadians (NAJC),
this position was viewed as fundamentally contradictory. The NAJC, which had played a
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central role in pressuring Canada in the late 1980s to establish reparations for the
government’s treatment of Japanese-Canadians during the Second World War, noted that
the government was effectively reversing its previously adopted position on reparations.
Moreover, the group noted, the Canadian Race Relations Foundation was itself
established as part of the 1988 Japanese Canadian Redress Agreement.309 In other words,
in arguing that Canada should focus only on moving forward and in citing examples of its
efforts to do so, the government had, in fact, promoted one of the more significant efforts
it had taken to implement redress for historic injustices. As the President of the NAJC
said:
I find that Canada has taken a completely dismissive and hypocritical stance in taking credit
for the establishment of the Canadian Race Relations Foundation as an example of its
approach to addressing historical actions. In truth, when Japanese Canadians achieved
redress, a negotiated term of the agreement was that Canada establish the Canadian Race
Relations Foundation. In receiving redress Japanese Canadians believed that Canada was
capable of resolving past injustices with fairness, respect and responsibility. 310

Other Canadian NGOs similarly express frustration at the government’s position. Indeed,
when Paul Heinbecker delivered Canada’s statement of reservation to the World
Conference, several Canadian NGOs, particularly some of the ones representing AfricanCanadians, publicly booed and heckled the speech. Such a public display of
dissatisfaction with the government made clear how far the government’s relationship
with the NGO community had soured over the course of the World Conference.
If the reluctance by Canada and other Western states to support reparations and
accept any meaningful responsibility for the transatlantic slave trade and its legacy was a
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clear indicator of these states’ pursuit of their own political and economic self-interest,
the inability of African states to discuss modern-day slavery and other human rights
abuses on the African continent indicated that there was plenty of geo-political posturing
to go around. The issue of contemporary slavery in Africa was brought front and centre
on the third day of the World Conference during one of the several opportunities
provided for individuals and non-state actors to address the World Conference directly. A
17-year old girl from Niger harrowingly described how she and her mother lived as
slaves in the West African country, despite domestic laws prohibiting the practice.311 The
address was a powerful rejoinder to the self-interested debates between governments on
all sides of the issue and helped to highlight the disconnect between the debates that were
taking place within the halls of the United Nations and what was occurring on the ground
throughout the world.
After several days of intense negotiations at the World Conference, states did
eventually reach a compromise on language addressing slavery and the slave trade.
Overall, African states received almost none of what they had wanted. The Declaration
and Programme of Action did not issue an apology for the transatlantic slave trade, nor
did it demand the establishment of new international mechanisms to address legal and
financial reparations between states. It also did not refer to the historic slave trade as a
crime against humanity. The document did, however, “acknowledge that slavery and the
slave trade, including the transatlantic slave trade, were appalling tragedies in the history
of humanity not only because of their abhorrent barbarism but also in terms of their
magnitude, organized nature and especially their negation of the essence of the victims,
and further acknowledge that slavery and the slave trade are a crime against humanity
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and should always have been so, especially the translatlantic slave trade...”312 The World
Conference also made a connection between the impact of colonialism and many of the
challenges facing modern day Africa. The Declaration “recognize[d] that colonialism has
led to racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, and that Africans
and people of African descent, and people of Asian descent and indigenous peoples were
victims of colonialism and continue to be victims of its consequences ... We further regret
that the effects and persistence of these structures and practices have been among the
factors contributing to lasting social and economic inequalities in many parts of the world
today.”313
The document made some reference to the historic slave trade that existed
throughout Africa and across the Indian Ocean. A paragraph of the Programme of Action
invited states and other actors to work with the UNESCO project “Breaking the Silence,”
which sought to document the “history of slavery and the trans-Atlantic, Mediterranean
and Indian Ocean slave trades.” Although the World Conference did not issue an apology
for the historic slave trade, the Declaration did “acknowledge and profoundly regret the
untold suffering and evils inflicted on millions of men, women and children as a result of
slavery, the slave trade, the transatlantic slave, apartheid, genocide and past tragedies”
and further noted that “some States have taken the initiative to apologize and have paid
reparation, where appropriate, for grave and massive violations committed.” The
Declaration also “call[ed] on all of those who have not yet contributed to restoring the
dignity of the victims to find appropriate ways to do so and, to this end, appreciate those
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countries that have done so.” Last, the Declaration addressed contemporary practices of
slavery and slavery-like conditions. The document “strongly condemn[ed] the fact that
slavery and slavery-like practices still exist today in parts of the world and urge States to
take immediate measures as a matter of priority to end such practices, which constitute
flagrant violations of human rights.”314
The last major issue on the agenda of the World Conference was the Middle East.
Although other issues on the agenda provoked strong emotions and created sharp
divisions between states, none were more contentious than the issues related to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Despite the many months of preparations for the World
Conference, states entered Durban having agreed on nothing involving how the
Conference should approach the Middle East, or even if it should at all. Not surprisingly,
states did not reach a meaningful consensus at the World Conference on this contested
matter. Arab and Muslim states continued to argue that Israel was an apartheid state
guilty of genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. By contrast, Western
states maintained that these allegations were false and that the World Conference should
not single out one country when there were many others with comparable or worse
human rights records. While Arab and Muslim states viewed the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict as a racial one, Western states maintained that the conflict was political in nature.
After a few days of heated negotiations, and as an indication of how difficult the
negotiations had become, Norway withdrew its effort to facilitate the discussions on the
Middle East. South Africa replaced Norway in this regard.
Throughout the entire World Conference, there were rumours circulating that the
United States, Israel and other Western states might withdraw entirely from the event. On
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September 3, the United States and Israel confirmed that they would be leaving the World
Conference to protest the language being used to characterize Israel. US Secretary of
State Colin Powell defended this decision by saying that:
following discussions today by our team in Durban and others who are working for a
successful conference, I am convinced that will not be possible. I know that you do not
combat racism by conferences that produce declarations containing hateful language, some
of which is a throwback to the days of ‘Zionism equals racism;’ or supports the idea that we
have made too much of the Holocaust; or suggests that apartheid exists in Israel; or that
singles out only one country in the world—Israel—for censure and abuse.315

Critics of the United States withdrawal suggested that the decision was also motivated by
a desire to avoid addressing the reparations issue. Whatever the reasons, the decision had
a significant impact on the dynamic of the World Conference. Both supporters and critics
of the United States knew well that the impact of the World Conference would be
diminished if it did not have the support of the world’s most powerful country. Moreover,
the decision of the United States to withdraw increased the probability that other Western
states might leave as well, further damaging the Conference. Overall, as Camponovo
notes:
It is difficult to gauge the effect of the departure of the United States from the Conference
... some would argue that had the United States stayed in Durban and delayed its threats of
departure, it would have been in a stronger position to negotiate acceptable language on this
issue. The departure of the United States, on the other hand, provided something of a wake
up call to hard-liners, as well as to the South African host, that a compromise was necessary
or they would risk Canada and the European Union walking out. 316

Indeed, Canada faced daily questions from the domestic media about the nature of
its participation at the World Conference and whether it was considering withdrawing.
These questions were asked prior to the withdrawal of the United States and Israel and
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only increased in frequency following their exit. Although Canada never publicly
threatened to withdraw from the World Conference, members of the Canadian delegation
did hold several discussions among themselves addressing this possibility. The final
authority on the decision, however, remained in the hands of Prime Minister Jean
Chrétien. Like most heads of state, particularly those from Western countries, Chrétien
did not attend the World Conference. But in recognition of the controversial nature of the
event, the Prime Minister made sure to be informed daily about each development at the
World Conference. To this end, Hedy Fry and Paul Heinbecker spoke directly to the
Prime Minister every day of the Conference. Although the Prime Minister agreed that the
contentious language used to characterize Israel was offensive and inappropriate, he also
believed that Canada had an obligation to support multilateral diplomacy at the United
Nations and to maintain positive relations with the host country, South Africa. Thus, he
made the decision that Canada would stay at the World Conference and work to influence
the outcome as much as possible to delete the contentious language that Canada found so
unacceptable. As explained by Deborah Chatsis, a senior member of the Canadian
delegation in Durban and First Secretary of the Canadian Mission to the United Nations,
leaving the Conference “was something that was considered” but that “ultimately the
Prime Minister decided that we would stay in order to try and influence the outcome of
the conference.”317 Hedy Fry similarly stated that:
Mr. Chrétien made the decision that we would go. He said that if we don’t go we don’t bear
witness, if we don’t go we don’t get an opportunity to change that document, to speak
against it, and to make sure that what passed the United Nations in the end as a declaration
and plan of action was indeed consistent with stopping racism, discrimination, xenophobia,
etc, because he wanted that to be a successful document. The Prime Minister was very
much about multilateralism and about the world working together to change itself as
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opposed to sort of going on what he felt were things in which we should not shy away from
controversy, but Canada had a role to go there and change the story and change the
outcome.318

Of course, not everyone agreed with this view. Some senior members of the delegation
privately believed that Canada should withdraw. Paul Heinbecker recalled that “I thought
we should withdraw. I thought we should withdraw because I thought it was turning into
a circus.”319
One particularly noteworthy aspect of this issue concerns the interactions between
Canada and Israel at the World Conference and discussions between the two countries on
the issue of staying or withdrawing from the event. Although Canada’s principal reasons
for staying concerned the government’s positive view of multilateralism and its relations
with both the United Nations and South Africa, key members of the Canadian delegation,
as well as key members of the Israeli delegation, indicate that Israel preferred that Canada
stay to help combat the combative language pertaining to the Middle East. While Canada
empathized with Israel’s decision to leave, Israel recognized that there were advantages
to having some of it allies remain at the World Conference to help influence the outcome.
Thus, an additional reason that Canada stayed at the World Conference was to help
continue the work that Israel was no longer in a position to do itself. That Israel wanted
Canada to remain at the World Conference was confirmed by all members of the
Canadian delegation interviewed for this project. Hedy Fry stated that:
When we talked to Israel, Israel was glad that we were staying because, they felt, and at
that time Canada had that reputation, that Canada would not agree to any document that
was hateful or that was discriminatory or that vilified anybody. That was not Canada’s way,
and that, in fact, Canada was going to be—they agreed on the state of the language to use
was to bear witness to what was happening and to walk away saying this was a failure, this
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was bad, this was terrible, but they also felt that Canada was always trying to change
things. So we went.320

Paul Heinbecker stated that “the issue of whether the Israelis wanted us to stay, that is the
case, that is my clear recollection of the Israelis.”321
In addition, this account is confirmed by a senior member of the Israeli delegation
at the World Conference. In a letter to the editor published in The National Post, Israel’s
deputy foreign minister and head of Israel’s delegation to the World Conference Michael
Melchior noted that:
after the Israeli delegation had left, I requested from the Canadian delegation that they lead
and coordinate the work at Durban to combat the dangerous anti-Semitic language in the
final resolution. The Canadian delegation, with its fine record on issues of human rights and
combating anti-Semitism and xenophobia, made a remarkable contribution in rallying an
unprecedented majority—in UN terms—to remove the hate language from the final official
resolution.322

The removal of this language was no easy task for Canada and other Western
states as the protracted debates on the Middle East lasted until the figurative eleventh
hour and beyond. The World Conference was originally scheduled to end on September
7; however, when the day approached and states had yet to finalize the language on the
Middle East, they were left with no choice but to extend the Conference by an extra day.
This result was an extraordinary reflection of the challenges facing the World
Conference. In the end, the sustained efforts of Canada and other states to combat the
critical language used to characterize Israel resulted in the removal of almost all of it. The
most inflammatory language, which suggested that Israel was a racist and apartheid state
guilty of committing genocide and crimes against humanity against the Palestinian
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people, did not make it into the final document. The Middle East conflict is mentioned
only twice. One paragraph in the Declaration states:
We are concerned about the plight of the Palestinian people under foreign occupation. We
recognize the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to the
establishment of an independent State and we recognize the right to security for all States in
the region, including Israel, and call upon all States to support the peace process and bring
it to an early conclusion.323

Additionally, a paragraph in the Programme of Action states:
As for the situation in the Middle East, calls for the end of violence and the swift
resumption of negotiations, respect for international human rights and humanitarian law,
respect for the principle of self-determination and the end of all suffering, thus allowing
Israel and the Palestinians to resume the peace process, and to develop and prosper in
security and freedom.324

The document also contains language addressing racism against Jews, Arabs and
Muslims. One paragraph in the Declaration states that “we recognize with deep concern
the increase in anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in various parts of the world, as well as
the emergence of racial and violent movements based on racism and discriminatory ideas
against Jewish, Muslim and Arab communities.” A paragraph in the Programme of
Action “calls upon States, in opposing all forms of racism, to recognize the need to
counter anti-Semitism, anti-Arabism and Islamophobia world-wide, and urges all States
to take effective measures to prevent the emergence of movements based on racism and
discriminatory ideas concerning these communities.” The Holocaust is mentioned once,
in a stand-alone sentence, and is referred to in the singular with a capital letter H: “We
recall that the Holocaust must never be forgotten.”325
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The removal of almost all of the language addressing the Middle East was a
significant accomplishment for Western states that felt that the World Conference should
not be used to address specific conflicts and states. At the same time, Western states
remained dissatisfied that any references to the Middle East remained in the document. In
its statement of reservation issued on the last day of the World Conference, Canada
devoted considerable time to expressing its strong disapproval of the references to the
Middle East in the Declaration and Programme of Action. Canada stated that it was “not
satisfied with this Conference” because “too much time has been spent on an issue that
does not belong here.”326 After deciding not to withdraw from the Conference over this
issue, the government affirmed that:
Canada is still here today only because we wanted to have our voice decry the attempts at
this Conference to de-legitimize the State of Israel and to dishonour the history and
suffering of the Jewish people. We believe, and we have said in the clearest possible terms,
that it was inappropriate—wrong—to address the Palestinian-Israel conflict in this forum.
We have said, and will continue to say, that anything—any process, any declaration, any
language—presented in any forum that does not serve to advance a negotiated peace that
will bring security, dignity and respect to the people of the region is—and will be—
unacceptable to Canada.327

Canada also faulted some of the document’s references to refugees because Canada
interpreted them to be indirectly about the Middle East conflict. Canada opposed what it
believed to be an effort by the World Conference to endorse a unilateral Palestinian “right
of return” in a manner outside of the framework of a negotiated settlement involving all
of the relevant actors in the Middle East peace process. As a result of these objections,
Canada concluded by noting that “the Canadian delegation registers its strongest
objections and disassociates itself integrally from all text in this document directly or
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indirectly relating to the situation in the Middle East. We state emphatically that this text
is ultra vires; it is outside the jurisdiction and mandate of this Conference.”328 Although
various other Western states issued their own statements of reservation faulting the World
Conference’s discussion of the Middle East, Canada’s public statement was among the
strongest and most critical. It left no room for doubt about Canada’s dissatisfaction with
the manner in which the World Conference approached the Middle East.
While the Middle East, the issue of slavery and reparations, and the rights of
indigenous peoples were among the more controversial issues on the agenda of the World
Conference, and the ones that received the most attention from states, the final
Declaration and Programme of Action addressed various other issues as well. The World
Conference adopted language addressing Asians and people of Asian descent,
Roma/Gypsies/Sinti/Travellers, migrants, refugees, and internally displaced persons, and
Mestizo populations. As noted earlier, much of the final language was agreed upon at the
Third Preparatory Committee Meeting, and does not need to be repeated here. In general,
this language did not provoke heated debate between states and made a helpful
contribution to the efforts to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance impacting these diverse communities.

7.4 - Conclusion
The World Conference against Racism was a difficult experience for Canada.
While the government had hoped to use the event as an opportunity to showcase the
diversity and multiculturalism of modern-day Canada, and to help build a global
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consensus in an effort to combat racism and racial discrimination, it instead discovered
that much of its efforts would be diverted toward diplomatic damage control.
Domestically, Canada had to contend with a variety of Aboriginal organizations and
NGOs that were deeply unhappy with the government’s policy positions pertaining to
historical injustices and the issue of reparations. For many of these groups, the
government’s policy of adopting a forward-looking agenda indicated that it was not
serious about addressing the political and economic legacy of racist policies, such as the
establishment of residential schools, the practice of slavery in pre-Confederation Canada,
the implementation of the Head Tax, and the destruction of Africville, among other such
policies. This fundamental divide between the government, NGOs, and Aboriginal
organizations was simply too big to resolve at the World Conference. Internationally, the
dominance of the Middle East on the agenda meant that Canada had to devote
considerable time and effort to ensuring that the most inflammatory language was
removed from the final documents. The World Conference was never going to be a forum
that brought people together in a common effort to promote the Middle East peace
process, but it did have the potential to drive them further apart. Thus, for Canada,
diplomatic success was defined by the degree to which failure was avoided.
The World Conference was also a difficult experience for Canadian NGOs. The
Youth Summit was too disorganized to have much of an impact on Canadian and
international politics. The NGO Forum was a disaster; the positive work of so many
Canadian and international NGOs was ultimately overshadowed by the efforts of a few
groups to use the event to promote anti-Semitism and a one-sided political agenda
pertaining to the Middle East. The discussion of the Middle East at the NGO Forum and
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at the World Conference publicly exposed deep divisions between Canada and many
Canadian NGOs, and likewise produced significant tensions within the Canadian NGO
community. Whereas many Jewish-Canadian NGOs believed that Canada should take a
hard-line against those who wished to use the World Conference to target Israel, and that
Canada should have more seriously contemplated withdrawing from the event, many
other groups felt that the government had an obligation to remain at the World
Conference in order to address the myriad of other issues on the agenda. While all
Canadian NGOs strongly condemned the anti-Semitic language that occurred throughout
the NGO Forum, there were strong differences about how they wanted Canada to
respond. These differences remained in the NGO community well after the conclusion of
the World Conference. For both the government of Canada and the NGO community, the
World Conference was a missed opportunity that likely caused more problems than it
solved.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
While Canada’s participation at the World Conference against Racism was a
difficult experience for both government and non-government officials, it also serves as
an illustrative case study on the foreign policy making-process in Canada and the role
that Canada can play on the world stage in helping to shape negotiations at the United
Nations. In chapter 2, I reviewed some of the literature addressing both the domestic and
international sources of Canadian foreign policy. Two key research questions were posed.
First, to what extent was the Canadian state autonomous from civil society and non-state
actors during the creation and implementation of its policy toward the 2001 United
Nations World Conference against Racism? Second, what role did Canada play
internationally during the negotiations that led to the Durban Declaration and Programme
of Action and how can this role be assessed against competing theories of Canada’s role
on the world stage? In the subsequent chapters, I presented the evidence of the case study
examining Canada’s role at the World Conference. The goal of this last chapter is to
assess the two research questions in the context of the evidence provided.
The first question concerns the question of state autonomy in the Canadian
foreign policy-making process. In exploring this issue, I drew upon three inter-related
debates in the literature on this topic. The first debate addressed the tripartite discussion
between liberal-pluralist theory, Marxian theory and statist theory. The second addressed
the role of interest groups and NGOs in Canadian foreign policy. The third addressed the
issue of the “democratization” of Canadian foreign policy. Although each debate
addresses a distinct set of questions, there is considerable overlap between each of the
three debates. Broadly, all are concerned with the interaction between state and non-state
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actors in the making of Canadian foreign policy. The second question concerned the role
of Canada within the international system. In examining this issue, I drew upon the
debates between views of Canada as either a middle power state, a satellite/dependent
state, or a principal power state. Taken together, the two questions address both the
domestic and international sources of Canadian foreign policy. Because Canada’s
preparations for, and participation at, the World Conference against Racism involved a
mix of domestic preparations and international negotiations, it provided a good case study
to explore these two research questions.

8.1 - State autonomy and the domestic determinants of Canadian foreign policy
Canada’s domestic consultation process for the World Conference began in May
2000 when the government met with about two dozen individuals from the NGO
community, and culminated in February 2001, with a national consultation that involved
hundreds of NGO officials. Seven regional consultations were held across Canada as was
a separate consultation meeting for Aboriginal peoples. Many of the NGOs and
Aboriginal organizations that participated in these consultations also accompanied the
government delegation to various international meetings—in Santiago, Geneva and, of
course, the Durban Conference itself. The Department of Canadian Heritage also
established two Advisory Committees to assist Hedy Fry in her domestic preparations for
the World Conference. Thus, the government established a variety of mechanisms
intended to include domestic non-state actors in the World Conference process. What can
this overall experience tell us about state autonomy, interest group activity and
democratization in the Canadian foreign policy-making process?
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Overall, Canada’s experience with the World Conference against Racism fits the
expectations of statist theory. While the domestic consultation process provided
numerous opportunities for dialogue between government and various domestic
stakeholders, this process did not ultimately provide NGOs with significant influence
over the government’s actual decision making-process. The most important decisions
made by the government occurred behind closed doors and were publicized to domestic
stakeholders in a manner that left them feeling like their voices had not been given much
weight. Five key points during the World Conference process illustrate this conclusion.
First, the government’s initial stated purpose of holding the domestic consultation
process was to solicit feedback from stakeholders toward the establishment of a Canadian
domestic declaration and plan of action to combat racism. The government intended to
complete this initiative during the World Conference preparatory process and use it as the
basis for the articulation of Canada’s principles and policy goals during the negotiation
process. Upon the completion of the World Conference, the government planned to use
both the domestic declaration and plan of action, as well as the Durban Declaration and
Plan of Action, as the bases for its subsequent policy approach to its efforts to combat
racism in Canada. However, this initiative did not proceed as planned because the
government never fulfilled its plan to produce a domestic declaration and plan of action.
In March 2001, about two weeks after the completion of the national consultation, the
government attended the inter-sessional meeting in Geneva and announced its 12
priorities for the World Conference. While the 12 priorities contained much that could
satisfy the NGO community, it also fell substantially short of what stakeholders at the
domestic consultations were promised. The 12 priorities announced no new funding and
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no new government programs. Instead, it offered only general platitudes that lacked clear
goals, timelines and accountability mechanisms. Moreover, the process by which the
government announced the 12 priorities completely blindsided the NGO community in
Canada, who had no indication from the government that it was planning to change
course so suddenly. NGOs were stunned that the government was offering so little
following the domestic consultations, and were left feeling like the process amounted to
far less than what they had been led to believe.
Second, the sequencing of key events during the preparatory process resulted in
the government making important decisions prior to the completion of the domestic
consultation process. This greatly limited the ability of NGOs to influence the
government’s decision-making process. The first Preparatory Committee meeting was
held in May, 2000, during which time the domestic consultation process was only just
beginning to take shape. No formal consultations with any NGOs had occurred prior to
the meeting in Geneva. Although Canada characterized the meeting as a mostly technical
and process-oriented meeting, the event actually addressed some substantive issues on the
agenda. Most significantly, governments decided on the five themes of the World
Conference and had to address the issue of reparations. Canada and other Western
countries thus had to declare their position on this matter at a very early stage in the
preparatory process. African-Canadian NGOs felt particularly disappointed that Canada
had taken such a strong position against reparations, especially because it appeared to
shut the door on further discussion of the issue during the domestic consultations.
The Regional Conference of the Americas was also held before the domestic
consultation process had been completed. As originally scheduled by the government, the
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regional consultations would culminate in a national consultation that would be
completed in November, before the government departed to Chile in December. This
schedule was disrupted by the government’s decision in October to hold a snap election,
which was held on November 27, 2000. As a result of the election campaign, the
government’s preparations for the World Conference against Racism ground to a halt
during the months of October and November, and the national consultation was
postponed until February, 2001. In the meantime, the government attended the meeting in
Chile and announced important government positions, particularly with respect to
Aboriginal peoples.
Third, while the government’s decision to allow NGOs to accompany it to the
various preparatory meetings and the World Conference itself allowed for NGOs to serve
as witnesses to some of what transpired during diplomatic negotiations between Canada
and other states it did not translate into much influence for these groups. Meetings
between the government and Canadian NGOs facilitated discussion, but most of this
discussion occurred in the form of the government informing NGOs about decisions that
had been made and challenges that Canada faced in the context of the negotiations over
contentious issues. NGOs found themselves in a position to react to the unfolded
developments, but without the capacity to shape them.
One particular issue on which Canadian NGOs could have been reasonably
expected to influence the government’s position pertained to the government’s decision
to stay at the World Conference until the completion of the event. As mentioned, the
government seriously considered the possibility of withdrawing alongside the United
States and Israel, and the Canadian NGO community was divided on this issue. Jewish
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Canadian groups strongly pressed for Canada to withdraw from the World Conference,
but Canada’s decision to stay indicates that these groups did not have decisive influence
over the government’s decision making-process at this crucial stage in the World
Conference.
Fourth, members of each of the two Advisory Committees established to assist
Hedy Fry reported a feeling that the committees were less influential than they had hoped
at the outset. The Advisory Committees had limited budgets and time to organize their
work. Like many NGOs, they were keenly aware that their advocacy efforts operated
outside of the formal channels of government. On the key policy issues, they found
themselves having to respond to decisions made by government, rather than serving as
key actors in the decision-making process. As one member of the Civil Society Advisory
Committee put it: “In terms of making or formulating government policy, its role was not
as significant as I had anticipated that it might be because government policy is made in
government, and although outside advisors are used, I could see that in this case the role
of the outside advisors would be to serve in an advisory capacity but in a somewhat
limited way.”329
Fifth, the government’s efforts to consult specifically with Aboriginal peoples in
Canada produced very little constructive engagement, and may have even driven the two
sides further apart insofar as it raised expectations that were not met. While the
government repeatedly boasted of its efforts to consult with Aboriginal peoples,
Aboriginal peoples strongly rejected the government’s view that they had been properly
consulted during the process. The government’s effort to hold a separate Aboriginal
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consultation occurred in April 2001, two months after the national consultation, and far
too late in the process to be incorporated into the government’s overall approach. The
Aboriginal Advisory Committee likewise did not establish a productive relationship with
the government. Members of the committee distrusted the government’s motivations and
were skeptical that the government’s participation in the World Conference against
Racism would make any meaningful progress toward reconciling its relationship with
Aboriginal peoples in Canada.
Thus, the government’s overall approach to the World Conference against Racism
was consistent with the expectations of statist theory. The most important decisions were
made by government officials behind closed doors. Efforts to consult domestic actors
occurred on the government’s terms and provided NGOs and Aboriginal organizations no
meaningful influence over key policy decisions.
With respect to the role of interest groups and NGOs, it is clear that the World
Conference against Racism process provided them with numerous opportunities to
engage in advocacy work on behalf of their values and interests. These groups sought to
influence government both directly and indirectly. Directly, they met with government
officials to present their views and lobby the government to adopt policy consistent with
these views. Indirectly, they sought to inform their members and the general public about
the World Conference process and the various issues on the agenda. Thus, interest groups
and NGOs sought to shape both policy outcomes as well as the broader policy
environment in which government decisions are made. As mentioned, interest groups and
NGOs found little success in their efforts to directly shape policy outcomes.
The question of whether interest groups and NGOs were able to influence the
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broader policy environment is difficult to assess as this would require an analysis of a
much larger time period than the present case study can provide. But if we are to analyze
interest group and NGO activity during the World Conference process in a larger context
that views these efforts as a part of a longer process that began well before the World
Conference and continued well beyond, then it is reasonable to conclude that interest
group and NGO activity during the World Conference process had some impact on the
policy environment in Canada.
In the years following the World Conference, many of the NGOs involved in the
process continued to engage in the same kind of advocacy work that they had done during
the World Conference preparatory process—issuing press releases, holding panels,
workshops and other public events, and meeting with government officials to lobby for
policy change. One notable post-World Conference event occurred in October 2002 when
the Canadian Race Relations Foundation organized a four-day conference in Edmonton,
Alberta, entitled “Strengthening the Agenda Against Racism in Canada: Priorities for
Action.”330 The event was attended by more than 100 individuals from government and
non-government, including Minister Jean Augustine, who had by that time succeeded
Hedy Fry as Secretary of State (Multiculturalism) (Status of Women), and who received
the conference’s final report which contained more than 175 policy recommendations. A
second key post-World Conference event occurred in September 2003 when the
government invited United Nations Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance Doudou Diène to
visit Canada to examine the situations facing Aboriginal peoples and racial minorities in
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Canada and the government’s policy initiatives to address racism in Canada in the context
of the aftermath of the World Conference against Racism.331 During this visit, the Special
Rapporteur met with both government and non-government officials, many of whom
were involved in the World Conference. Third, in 2005, the government eventually got
around to releasing its domestic action plan against racism.332 The government allocated a
budget of $56 million over five years to implement the plan, which highlighted six
priority areas:
1) Assist victims and groups vulnerable to racism and related forms of
discrimination
2) Develop forward-looking approaches to promote diversity and combat racism
3) Strengthen the role of civil society
4) Strengthen regional and international cooperation
5) Educate children and youth on diversity and anti-racism; and
6) Counter hate and bias333
Much like the government’s positions at the World Conference, the policy was drafted by
the government according to its own preferences. As expected, some NGOs questioned
the adequacy of the plan of action. Nonetheless, the document likely would not have been
released at all had it not been for the persistent work of Canadian NGOs during the World
Conference process and its aftermath. In this sense, it is reasonable to suggest that NGO
activity during the World Conference played a role in shaping the policy environment in
Canada in the years following the World Conference.
Another example of Canadian NGOs helping to shape the policy environment can
be seen by examining their role in pressuring the government to enact domestic
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reparations in response to past racially motivated injustices. These efforts preceded the
World Conference and continued in the subsequent years, but the World Conference
preparatory process can be seen as one part of this larger process.
The 1988 Japanese-Canadian Redress Agreement was a landmark event in the
history of the domestic reparations movement in Canada and influenced many similar
redress efforts by other racial groups in Canada, such as Aboriginal peoples, Chinese
Canadians, and African-Canadians. Although the government was not very receptive to
these efforts during the 1990s, the government did return to them in the first decade of the
twenty-first century. In June 2006, the government offered a formal apology and some
monetary compensation to individual Chinese Canadians who had been subjected to the
Head Tax policy that existed from 1885 to 1923. In June 2008, the government formally
apologized to Aboriginal peoples for the government’s policy of assimilation and the
establishment of the residential school system. The government also established an Indian
Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In February 2010, the federal
government partnered with the city of Halifax to offer a formal apology and financial
compensation to African Canadians impacted by the destruction of Africville in 1960s.
Although an examination of all of the political factors that shaped each of these three
government decisions is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is reasonable to conclude
that these outcomes likely would not have occurred in the absence of sustained lobbying
efforts by various Canadian NGOs over the course of many years. Most of the NGOs and
organizations that lobbied the government for these three respective apologies and
reparations agreements were the same ones that were heavily involved in the domestic
preparations for the World Conference against Racism. Thus, the lobbying efforts that
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occurred during the World Conference process can be seen as part of a larger effort
engaged in by these groups to shape government policy on the issue of reparations. By
keeping these issues on the political radar of the both the general public and the
government, the interest groups and NGOs that participated in the domestic consultations
and international meetings in Santiago, Geneva and Durban helped to create the political
environment in Canada that eventually led to the government adopting reparations policy.
Thus, on the question of whether interest group and NGO participation in the
World Conference process helped to democratize the Canadian foreign policy-making
process, it is fair to suggest that their participation had some democratizing impact, but
not an overwhelming one. Canadian foreign policy continued to be made behind closed
doors by a relatively small number of government officials and was designed to primarily
serve the interests of the state. However, the numerous opportunities provided for NGOs
to participate and observe the process helped somewhat to create greater transparency
during the process. Certainly, the absence of these opportunities would have resulted in
the policy making-process being even more opaque than it already was. Nonetheless, the
overall experience of Canada’s preparations for, and participation at, the World
Conference against Racism best fit within the expectations of statist theory. The
government possessed considerable autonomy in the policy-making process and there
was not much room for interest groups and NGOs to influence—or democratize—the
outcome.

8.2 - Canada on the world stage
Canada’s international preparations for the World Conference against Racism
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began in May 2000 when it attended the first of three international Preparatory
Committee meetings in Geneva. Canada attended the Regional Conference of the
Americas in Santiago, Chile, in December, 2000. And, of course, Canada sent a large
delegation to the World Conference in Durban. At each of these meetings, Canada was an
active participant and sought to exert what influence it could to shape the negotiations in
a direction favourable to Canada’s interests. Academic debates about the international
determinants of Canadian foreign policy differ about both the nature of Canada’s interests
and its geopolitical capacity to pursue and attain these interests. What can Canada’s
participation during the World Conference against Racism tell us about Canada’s role on
the world stage? What light can this experience shed on the academic debates about
Canada as a middle power, a satellite/dependent state, or a principal power?
In order to address this question, it is useful to examine Canada’s participation in
the negotiations on each of the three main debates during the World Conference
process—the Middle East, the legacy of the transatlantic slave trade and colonialism, and
the rights of indigenous peoples. Canada had a clear national interest regarding each of
these issues and sought to use the World Conference as a forum to help advance these
interests. Each of these three issues will be examined in turn.
Regarding the Middle East, Canada went to the World Conference with a clear
position that the entire Middle East conflict was not an appropriate topic for discussion at
the event and should never have been placed on the agenda in the first place.
Accordingly, Canada took every opportunity to denounce the language that was being
used throughout the preparatory process to characterize Israel in a negative light. Almost
none of this language made its way into the final Declaration and Programme of Action,
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and what little references to the Middle East that did make it in were unequivocally
denounced by Canada.
Canada’s approach to the Middle East issue at the World Conference was shaped
by its longstanding policies toward the region that had developed over several decades,
and was both a reflection of Canada’s interests in the region as well as the interests of
other Western states in the Middle East. The core of Canada’s policy is support for a
negotiated settlement between Israel and representatives of Palestine, in accordance with
UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 and other sources of international law, that
would result in a two state solution that respects both Israel’s right to live in security and
the Palestinian right to self-determination. Canada does not recognize Israel’s permanent
control over territories occupied following the 1967 war or Israel’s subsequent
annexation of East Jerusalem, and considers that the Fourth Geneva Convention is
applicable to the occupied territories. Canada believes that final status issues such as
borders, the status of Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugee situation should be negotiated
among the relevant parties within a framework of international law. Following the
Second Intifada that began in the autumn of 2000, Canada took a stronger position
against groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah and has designated them as
terrorist entities.334 In this sense, Canada’s position represents a balanced approach that
emphasizes the supremacy of international law and rejects any unilateral action taken by
either side that compromises the peace process.
Perhaps the most relevant part of Canada’s Middle East policy with respect to its
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approach to the World Conference was Canada’s rejection of what it considered to be
one-sided discussions at the United Nations and other forums that assigned blame to only
one side of the conflict while effectively absolving the other side of any responsibility for
the failure to reach a lasting peace agreement. In the years following the World
Conference against Racism, Canada formalized this position by indicating that:
Every year, resolutions addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict are tabled in the United
Nations, such as at the United Nations General Assembly and the Human Rights Council.
Canada assesses each resolution on its merits and consistency with our principles. We
support resolutions that are consistent with Canadian policy on the Middle East, are rooted
in international law, reflect current dynamics, contribute to the goal of a negotiated twostate solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and address fairly and constructively the
obligations and responsibilities of all parties to the conflict. Canada advocates a fairminded approach and rejects one-sided resolutions and any politicization of the issues.
Successive Canadian governments have been concerned about the polemical and repetitive
nature of many of the numerous resolutions. Canada believes that the United Nations and
its member states have a responsibility to contribute constructively to efforts to resolve the
Israeli-Arab conflict. Canada will continue to examine carefully each of these resolutions as
they come forward.335

Canada’s overall approach to the discussions of the Middle East at the World
Conference adhered to these principles. In this sense, Canada’s approach on this issue
reflected traditional middle power diplomacy. Canada rejected efforts by some states to
divert the World Conference away from its intended purposes and turn it into a one-sided
attack against one particular member state. In addition, Canada demonstrated its
commitment to Middle Power diplomacy through its decision to stay at the World
Conference until the end. The withdrawal of the United States and Israel while European
states decided not to follow suit created a small schism in the Western bloc that allowed
Canada to chart its own path. By exerting what influence it could to steer the World
Conference away from chaos, Canada sought to salvage the event from the efforts of
other states with more parochial interests and keep the focus on global efforts to combat
racism and racial discrimination. Moreover, Canada proved to be successful in this regard
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insofar as it helped to eliminate the most inflammatory language from the World
Conference texts, and was even praised by Israel for its achievements in this regard.
Overall, Canada’s decision not to withdraw from the World Conference, but to stay and
strive to work toward a more favourable (or less unfavourable) outcome was an
indication of its commitment to multilateralism and the United Nations process.
Regarding the issue of reparations, however, the debate played out along the more
traditional North-South axis. Canada appeared less independently minded and quickly
adopted a position that was effectively indistinguishable from the position adopted by the
United States and the European Union. Canada was in no sense ‘in the middle’ between
Western states and developing world states in Africa and the Caribbean. Certainly, this
was the conclusion reached by several Canadian NGOs involved in the World
Conference. Officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade noted
that “some NGOs ... indicated that Canada is perceived as a member of a Western bloc
preventing successful negotiations on language regarding compensation.”336 Throughout
the entire preparatory process—beginning at the First Preparatory Committee Meeting in
May 2000 and especially at the Regional Conference of the Americas when Canada
joined the United States as the only two countries in attendance to formally reject certain
provisions in the regional document—Canada steadfastly opposed any suggestion that
states establish any sort of international compensation mechanism within the United
Nations or some other framework. Nor did Canada make any meaningful effort at finding
a middle ground compromise position, such as emphasizing debt relief for less developed
countries or an increase in foreign aid funding from the West. The suggestion that
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Western states offer an apology for the legacy of the transatlantic slave trade and
colonialism was too much for Canada, even if the apology were to be written in a manner
intended to avoid opening the door to legal obligations. From beginning to end, the entire
issue was a non-starter for Canada. Thus on the issue of reparations, Canada’s position
less resembled that of a Middle Power and more of that of a satellite state within the orbit
of the Western bloc.
Canada’s approach to the rights of indigenous peoples ended up somewhere in
between the dueling expectations of Middle Power theory and satellite/dependent state
theory. On the one hand, Canada’s position regarding the status of indigenous peoples as
“peoples” under international law did undergo a gradual evolution throughout the 1990s
and resulted in Canada accepting the legal argument that indigenous peoples were a
“peoples” and thus had a right to self-determination. On the other hand, Canada did little
to publicize its position on the matter. When the issue first arose in the context of the
World Conference—at the Regional Conference of the Americas—Canada did not
directly state its position one way or the other in any of its public statements. However,
what Canada appeared to do was privately inform key leaders at several Aboriginal
organizations that Canada had revised its position. This represented progress, but of a
very timid kind. By conveniently refraining from stating its revised position publicly,
Canada apparently sought a path of least resistance. Canada had one message for
Aboriginal peoples in Canada, but another for international audiences and other states in
which Aboriginal peoples reside. A decision to publicly affirm the right of indigenous
peoples as peoples would have given a significant boost to the efforts of Aboriginal
peoples throughout the Western hemisphere and the entire world, but Canada chose to
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remain silent, perhaps to avoid disturbing the interests of the United States and other
countries that publicly rejected the view that indigenous peoples were a peoples under
international law.
Overall, therefore, Canada’s contribution to the World Conference against Racism
with respect to most dominant issues on the agenda provided a mixed assessment of
Canada’s role on the world stage. At times, Canada appeared timid and motivated more
by a desire to preserve state sovereignty and the status quo than by a desire to boldly
advance a human rights and anti-racism agenda, at least within the context of the World
Conference against Racism. On the issues of reparations and the rights of indigenous
peoples, Canada made scant effort to diverge from the consensus that existed within the
Western bloc. But at other times, Canada sought to ensure that the World Conference
produce the best possible outcome given the circumstances. Canada’s effort to eliminate
the most contentious language concerning the Middle East was a particular highlight in
this regard.
While the World Conference against Racism was a difficult experience for
Canada it also served as an illustrative case study into the Canadian foreign policymaking process. To be sure, a case study of a single event is not intended to provide a
universal theory of Canadian foreign policy that exists across all time and space. Rather,
the analysis of the case study provides a snapshot of the process as it existed at a
particular point in history. Still, the case study adds to the study of Canadian foreign
policy by facilitating an examination of both the domestic and international factors that
help to shape it.
At the domestic level, the study shows the continued value of statist theory by
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demonstrating that the state possessed considerable autonomy from domestic societal
actors in its ability to control the policy agenda and implementation throughout the World
Conference process. Key decisions were made by government officials behind closed
doors and domestic actors were often left in a position where they had to react to
decisions that had been made rather than proactive work with government to help shape
them.
At the international level, the results of the case study are more mixed. In some
areas, Canada appeared constrained by the broader geo-political forces that shaped world
politics. Bloc politics remained an important factor throughout the World Conference
process. Accordingly, Canada’s positions oftentimes reflected the positions adopted by
other states in the Western bloc, and particularly the United States. At the same time,
Canada did find some opportunities to chart its own middle power path and advance its
own Canadian interests. Canada’s role on the world stage thus provided both
opportunities and constraints for action at the World Conference against Racism.
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